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ABSTRACT 
This study depicts the nonrevolutionary revolution that has been unfolding in Israel’s 
Religious-Zionist society for the past two decades. It is based on ethnographic fieldwork in Israel 
between 2014 and 2017 among religious congregations and nongovernmental organizations that 
belong to liberal circles of Religious-Zionist society. The revolution is about shifting the locus of 
religious authority from formal institutions and rabbinical leaders to “the people.” I call it 
nonrevolutionary because the men and women who lead it care about “tradition.” This study 
ultimately demonstrates that endeavors to promote social and religious change are sites of 
struggles about what constitutes “tradition.”   
Historically, Religious-Zionist Jews in Israel have viewed themselves as embodying and 
enacting Israel’s Jewish and democratic ideal through their integration within Israeli society and 
state institutions. I study Religious-Zionists who identify as dati’im liberalim, liberal religious 
Jews, who re-envision the locus of religious authority and of public Judaism. Instead of state 
institutions and official rabbinical leaders, they designate “communities,” that is, voluntary 
organizations of citizens, as the places where questions of halakhic significance should be 
debated and determined. This process, which I call, the “scaling-down of public Judaism,” is 
inspired by past models of community-based Judaism as well as by research participants’ notions 
of public religious life in the United States. Ultimately, I argue, liberal observant Jews in 
contemporary Israel promote a model of Religious-Zionist citizenship that favors local and 
individualized frameworks of civil participation in accordance with their community-based 
outlook on halakhic Judaism.  
 During my fieldwork I accompanied the activities of nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) that propose community-based alternatives to the state’s Chief Rabbinate as well as 
iii 
 
residents of a south Jerusalem neighborhood who seek to transform religious practices and 
community life at the local-municipal level. My fieldwork activities included participant 
observations, interviews, informal conversations, and a survey of public discourse in Religious-
Zionist journals, newspapers, and social media. My multi-sited fieldwork allowed me to identify 
ways that reform initiatives at the level of everyday life are interrelated with organized activism 
at the broader level of state politics.  
 This study joins ongoing anthropological conversations about the entwining of religion 
and politics in the consolidation of citizenship, national identity, and social belonging in 
contemporary nation-states. This line of investigation has focused on the relations between 
secular state ideologies and public religions. The Israeli case furthers this conversation by 
contributing the perspective of a state that self-identifies as Jewish. Furthermore, while scholars 
have emphasized the central role of deliberate re-interpretation of religious texts, rituals, and 
objects in processes of religious change in Jewish communities, I demonstrate that bodily 
sensations, dispositions, affect, and social identifications are as important in the shaping of 
religious change. By showing how the interplay between tradition and innovation plays out on 
the ground in Religious-Zionist communities, this study proves that in today’s Israel, tradition is 
a valuable social and political currency in struggles between Jewish groups over the nature of 
public Jewish life.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
My last visit to the Baka Minyan in the Baka neighborhood in Jerusalem was on a warm 
Saturday morning in September 2016.1 I had not participated in the congregation’s communal 
prayers during the previous few months because I was busy with my wedding preparations. That 
last weekend in the field was also the first one in which my partner, Efrat, accompanied me to a 
communal prayer in the congregation I had studied for the past year. I contacted the 
congregation’s managing team in advance and scheduled to give a brief talk at the end of the 
service, called Dvar-Torah, to mark the end of my fieldwork in the Minyan.2 I was nervous by 
the idea of speaking in front of the whole congregation about my research, and I wanted the 
support and comfort of Efrat’s presence. However, her presence was also a source of discomfort. 
How would congregants, many of whom were of Jewish-Orthodox background, welcome us, a 
lesbian couple? 
 When we arrived at the Minyan’s communal prayer hall on Saturday morning, I led Efrat 
to my usual place in the women’s section. Ora,3 who was the gabai’it that morning, approached 
us to say hello, and asked if I would be willing to participate in the blessings during the Torah 
                                                 
1 Minyan is the quorum required for the communal reciting of Jewish prayers. In Jewish Orthodox 
tradition, a minyan must consist of at least ten adult (over 13 years old) Jewish men. Minyan has another, 
less formal meaning, which is a prayer group or a congregation that is not an established, full-blown 
synagogue (Sztokman 2011). The Baka Minyan is such a prayer group.  
2 Lit. “word of Torah.” It is a short commentary about the weekly Torah portion, delivered by a 
congregation member or the congregation’s rabbi (if there is one).  
3 I use pseudonyms to protect the privacy of my interlocutors. In a couple of cases, interlocutors who are 
public figures and who gave me their consent, are mentioned in their full name. In addition, the names of 
public figures who participated in public events I attended as part of my fieldwork are also mentioned in 
full.  
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reading.4 I agreed right away. I already participated in this part of the communal prayer a few 
times before during my fieldwork. What seemed to me stressful and foreign at the first stages of 
my fieldwork was not as threatening by then.  
When it was my time to participate in the Torah reading blessings, called Aliyot, I left my 
seat and approached the front of the prayer hall, where the Torah reading took place.5 At the end 
of the reading of my Aliya’s section of the weekly Torah portion, Ora read aloud the standard 
Torah blessing (mi sheberach) in which the person who stands near the Torah reader is blessed 
for his or her “rising” (Aliya) to honor the occasion.6 At this point I saw on the table in front of 
Ora a clear plastic folder containing a page with printed text, titled “a blessing for the groom and 
bride” (mi sheberach lachatan velakala). Oh-oh, I thought. Who is the groom here? And then, 
with a wide smile, Ora began to read from the text and blessed Efrat and me. Instead of “groom 
and bride” she said, “for their wedding.” She began to chant the traditional chant in Ashkenazi 
(European Jewish) synagogues reserved for celebrations like weddings, Bar and Bat Mitzvahs, 
and the birth of a new child. Congregation members joined her chanting from their seats. A 
woman threw candy at me from the women’s section, as customary in synagogue celebrations. 
When the chanting was over, Ora told me, grinning, “we had to celebrate your wedding 
somehow.”  
 I walked back to my seat and waited nervously for my Dvar-Torah at the end of the 
service. When I walked again to the podium at the front of the prayer hall and began reading my 
                                                 
4 Gabbai’it is the female form of gabbai – a member of a Jewish congregation who assists in the running 
of synagogue services. In Orthodox congregations, only men perform this role. At the Baka Minyan, 
women perform this role, too.  
5 Aliya (pl. Aliyot) is when a congregant is honored by being called to stand in front of the Torah scroll 
and being blessed after the reading of a Torah portion. 
6 In traditional Jewish Orthodox congregations, only men perform these roles (i.e., the person who 
blesses, the Torah reader, and the person who participated in an Aliya). The Baka Minyan, however, is 
not a traditional Orthodox congregation and it integrates women into these roles. 
3 
 
text, I recognized familiar faces in the crowd and felt better. I noticed that people were listening 
attentively, and even smiling at times. When I was done and went back to my seat, Gila, one of 
the regular female congregants, approached me, clearly excited, and thanked me for my talk. She 
said that she always thought that to understand what was happening in the congregation, they 
needed someone “from the outside” to study them. On my way out of the prayer hall, additional 
women approached me to bless me for the wedding and wish me good luck with my research.  
 On Saturday night, after Shabbat had ended, I texted Rinat, a congregation member, to 
thank her for her help throughout my fieldwork. She replied that she was sorry to have missed 
Ora’s blessing and that she heard it was “really beautiful.” She then added, “This is a small-big 
step for our community. Thank you for allowing us to do this mitzvah.”7 I was moved by her 
words. Apparently, that was the first time the congregation honored a same-sex wedding in their 
communal prayers, and it was my wedding.  
 After giving Rinat’s words a second thought, I realized that they carried another meaning. 
Rinat was not only thanking me for allowing her congregation to do a good deed by honoring a 
lesbian wedding but also for allowing them to examine their communal boundaries and to 
demonstrate that they could stretch these boundaries a little further. My “coming out” in the 
communal service, therefore, allowed them to reaffirm their self-perception as a group of people 
who do not take things for granted, people who question social norms and doubt dominant 
conventions.   
 I also thought about Gila’s words that in order to learn about themselves, they needed an 
“outsider.” The congregation blessed me and Efrat for our wedding exactly because we were 
visitors, not regular congregants. The Baka Minyan is a congregation that is comprised of mostly 
                                                 
7 Rinat, in fact, did not mention the word “mitzvah,” which means a good deed of religious value. Her 
text said, “toda shezikiten otanu,” which is an expression that religious Jews use when they want to thank 
another person for allowing them to do a mitzvah.  
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married heterosexual couples with a few single men and women. I knew of a same-sex female 
couple in the Minyan, but I never met these women in person nor did I hear of a family 
celebration of theirs acknowledged in the congregation during the time of my research. I was 
familiar with other congregations in the neighborhood that were considered “gay friendly” and 
that were attended by a greater number of gay men and lesbians. Prior to that Shabbat, the Baka 
Minyan did not have an opportunity to examine its boundaries in relation to public celebrations 
of same-sex marriage simply because, as far as I know, there were no same-sex weddings among 
its members until then. In this sense, the congregation needed me, an outsider, to allow them to 
stretch their boundaries without challenging their community’s heterosexual and family-oriented 
character.   
 A few weeks later, Efrat told me that one of her teachers at Hebrew Union College in 
Jerusalem, the Rabbinical school of the Jewish Reform movement in Israel, who lived in the 
Baka neighborhood, told her that he heard about the ceremony in honor of our wedding at the 
Baka Minyan and that he was disappointed he missed this “historical occasion,” as he put it. This 
event, therefore, was not trivial. It had an impact in the liberal-religious “scene” in South 
Jerusalem. Members of the Baka Minyan succeeded, once again, in positioning themselves as 
spearheads. However, similar to previous innovations this community had led as part of their 
mission to promote gender equality in their communal prayers, these changes were carried out in 
a way that did not undermine members’ position in Religious-Zionist society.   
A “Nonrevolutionary Revolution” 
This study tells the story of a nonrevolutionary revolution that has been unfolding in 
Israel’s Religious-Zionist society for the past two decades. It is based on my ethnographic 
fieldwork between 2014 and 2017 among religious congregations and nongovernmental 
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organizations that belong to liberal circles of Religious-Zionist society. The revolution is about 
shifting the locus of religious authority from formal institutions and rabbinical leaders to “the 
people.” I call it nonrevolutionary because the men and women I study care about “tradition.” In 
the following chapters I demonstrate ways that their activities of social and religious change are, 
in fact, sites of struggle about what constitutes “tradition.”8    
The people I study grapple with a shared problematique – how to generate a Judaism that 
is publicly-meaningful yet independent of the religious authorities of the state and of religious 
leaders in Orthodox society. This vignette from my fieldwork in Jerusalem demonstrates my 
interlocutors’ “way out” of this dilemma. On the surface, the event portrayed above is a local, 
communal event in one congregation. However, the interactions portrayed here reflect larger-
scale dynamics that I have observed among liberal religious Jews who modify religious rituals in 
their congregations and who work in nongovernmental organizations to modify the religious 
institutions of the state. I call these dynamics the “scaling down of public Judaism.” As part of 
this process, liberal religious Jews in today’s Israel privilege local and communal settings, 
instead of the religious authorities of the state and of Orthodox society, as the locales where 
religious and halakhic (of Halakha, Jewish religious laws) questions should be debated and 
determined. 
I study the “scaling down” of Judaism in social change projects in settings that are 
considered part of the “public” sphere: NGOs, neighborhood venues, prayer halls and 
community centers. Although what happens in domestic and intimate spaces is nevertheless 
important in social and religious change projects (see, for instance, Mahmood 2005), my focus is 
                                                 
8 I use here the term “revolution” as an introduction to the process at the center of this dissertation. The 
term revolution is an emic term: I heard it used by liberal Religious-Zionists to describe the process I 
study and in the context of related social processes. However, “revolution” is not part of my own etic 
analysis. In conceptualizing the events I witnessed during my fieldwork, I found concepts other than 
revolution as analytically productive (see the following paragraph).  
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on how liberal observant Jews perceive certain “public” places as separate from the state, and on 
how this perceived separateness allows them to envision a different kind of public Judaism. 
As my discussions throughout the chapters show, the “scaling down of public Judaism” 
takes different shapes and forms. The following chapters flesh out different articulations of this 
process. The activists I study in chapters two and three promote the decentralization, 
democratization, and privatization of the religious institutions of the state while residents of 
south Jerusalem practice a localized and autonomous Judaism in their day-to-day lives (chapters 
four and five). All these instances, I argue, represent different facets of the “scaling down” of 
public Judaism.  
This process demonstrates a shift in the dominant way Religious-Zionists have engaged 
with religious authority and have envisioned it. It represents an ideology that relocates religious 
authority and agency – i.e., the power to determine questions of religious significance – from 
state institutions and formal rabbinical leaders to the hands of community members. 
In blessing a union between two women during the Torah reading of a Shabbat morning 
service, members of the Baka Minyan, a congregation that self-identifies as committed to 
halakha, took liberty in deciding which forms of marriage are halakhically and socially 
legitimate. They did not seek the approval of rabbis, as is the norm in Orthodox communities.9 
This is not a trivial step for a congregation that considers itself halakhic. In 2010, members of a 
liberal-Orthodox congregation in Tel-Aviv left their synagogue and started a new one after their 
original congregation refused to celebrate a lesbian wedding of two of its members (Sapir-Weitz 
2013).  
                                                 
9 Orthodox Jews’ reliance on rabbis’ opinions in halakhic questions, as well as in questions pertaining to 
the “secular” realms of life, varies from one Orthodox stream to another (Zivan (Mivtzari) 2011). 
Generally speaking, rabbis have a stronger authority and a more central role in ultra-Orthodox 
communities than in Modern-Orthodox ones (ibid).  
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Although this event was a communal celebration that had no formal-legal status, it 
belonged in the realm of “public Judaism.” By celebrating the wedding of a same-sex couple, 
members of the Baka Minyan participated in the public debate that exists in Israel about the 
legitimacy of same-sex marriage and took a stand about it. 10 Their decision made a social impact 
in their neighborhood, as Efrat’s teacher’s comment demonstrates. This occasion, therefore, 
entailed the “scaling down” of halakha-based discussions and decisions. While in Orthodox 
society in Israel discussions about which types of marriage are halakhically and socially 
legitimate belong in the realm of the religious establishment or of rabbinical leaders who have 
formal societal authority (Ben-Porat 2013), here they took place at the local level of a religious 
congregation.  
Moreover, this vignette demonstrates the “nonrevolutionary” orientation of the initiatives 
at the center of this dissertation. I asserted above that this event was enabled by the fact that I 
was not a full-fledged member of the Baka Minyan. I was not part of Religious-Zionist society 
while most congregation members were. I was not a regular member at the Minyan either. I was 
an ethnographer from a secular background, a visitor for the year. Celebrating my wedding, 
therefore, did not impact the self-identification of the congregation and how it was identified by 
others. The congregation had remained predominantly heterosexual and family-centered, two 
elements that are crucial for members’ self-identification as members of Orthodox society in 
Israel, despite their ambivalence toward this society. As I demonstrate in the following chapters, 
the reform initiatives I examine challenge Jewish Orthodox conventions. Some of them are even 
perceived as radical by Orthodox standards. However, my interlocutors do not view themselves 
                                                 
10 There is no state-recognized route for same-sex marriage in Israel because only Orthodox rabbis who 
are approved by the Chief Rabbinate, Israel’s religious establishment that does not recognize same-sex 
marriage, have the legal authority to officiate weddings. 
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as revolutionaries and they work hard not to be considered as such by other members of 
Orthodox society.  
Furthermore, the scaling-down of public Judaism is inspired by US-based notions about 
public religious life. It is not merely an “American” transplant brought to Israel by American-
Jewish immigrants, as one might suggest in light of the relatively large number of US-born 
Israelis in liberal observant circles.11 Although some of the main social actors in my field are 
US-born Jews, the story is more complex than that. First, a greater number of liberal observant 
Jews are Israeli-born. Second, the “American connection” is not merely a process of copying 
US-based ideas into Israeli reality. Instead, I argue that my US-born interlocutors, as well as 
Israeli-born interlocutors who are second-generation (Israeli born) to Jewish-American 
immigrants and Israeli-born Jews who lived in the United States at some point in their lives, 
serve as “cultural brokers” who translate notions of public religiosity from the US context to 
Israeli reality. This translation involves the implementation of a vocabulary of religious 
pluralism, voluntarism, and autonomy in ways that demonstrate how this vocabulary is 
compatible with what these people view as “traditional” Judaism. While in the United States this 
vocabulary is part of a worldview that defends the separation of religion and state, in Israel it is 
used by liberal religious Jews to invigorate public religiosity. Chapters two and three 
demonstrate how such cross-cultural translations play out on the ground.  
  At the same time, this scaling down of public Judaism is rooted in a Religious-Zionist 
cosmology and in notions about social belonging to Religious-Zionist society. The scaling-down 
of religious politics is a way for my interlocutors to exercise their Religious-Zionist citizenship – 
                                                 
11 Shlomo Fischer (2012) writes that, as a newly arrived Modern-Orthodox immigrant from the United 
States, he found the liberal stream of Religious-Zionist society in Israel “easy to understand and 
congenial,” and nationalist Religious-Zionism as “alien and opaque” (109). Although this was Fischer’s 
personal experience, he argues that it reveals a wider cultural phenomenon, a “divide” between US and 
Israeli Modern-Orthodox societies (ibid).  
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hence, express their commitment to improving Jewish life in Israel – while articulating their 
disagreement with, and criticism of, the kind of a Jewish state that Israel has become.  
Their projects of civil participation and activism reflect their Religious-Zionist 
citizenship in yet another, deeper level. Their view of communities as spaces of religious 
autonomy and authority is in accordance with their outlook on “traditional” Judaism. According 
to them, “original” halakhic Judaism was decentralized and pluralistic. Their current focus on 
communities, therefore, not only represents their disappointment of state institutions. It also 
communicates their conviction that “true” Judaism dwells among “the people” and not in the 
hallways of the parliament and in the chambers of state bureaucrats.  
The following chapters illustrate that the scope of this “nonrevolutionary revolution” 
remains, for the most part, contained within the boundaries of Israel’s Jewish society. Although 
Israel’s identification as a Jewish state has shaped its citizenship regime in a way that prioritizes 
Jewish over non-Jewish citizens (Shafir and Peled 2002),12 the initiatives I depict in this study do 
not address (for the most part) the concerns of non-Jewish populations. Their efforts focus on 
promoting change within Israel’s Jewish society. This too, perhaps, is part of the 
“nonrevolutionary” inclination of the processes I analyze in this study.   
Religious-Zionism in Israel 
Between Revolutionism and Pragmatism  
 Before looking into the scaling down of public Judaism in greater detail, I first provide a 
social-historical background about the Religious-Zionist movement in pre-state Jewish society 
and in current-day Israel. This review focuses on the tension between revolutionary and 
moderate tendencies in Religious-Zionism. 
                                                 
12 I elaborate on Israel’s stratified citizenship regime as part of my discussion of Religious-Zionist 
citizenship in chapter six.  
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Historically, Religious-Zionism was part of the Zionist movement that appeared at first as 
a secular Jewish national movement in Europe at the end of the 19th century. Early Zionists, 
inspired by their contemporary European national movements, sought to find a solution to the 
“problem” of Jews in Europe – namely, centuries of anti-Semitism – not through assimilation 
within their non-Jewish environments but through territorial sovereignty that would “normalize” 
Jewish existence (Shapira 1992; Vital 1975). Zionism’s relationship with traditional Judaism had 
been ambivalent. Early Zionist leaders rejected Orthodox Judaism because they identified it with 
the “Jewish problem” – in order to reinvent themselves, Jews had to break from their past (Ben-
Porat 2013, 29).  
At the same time, Judaism was an important resource for secular Zionism. For the 
nascent national movement in Europe, religion was a marker of boundaries and a valuable source 
of myths and symbols that activated a sense of belonging among assimilated Jews (Ben-Porat 
2013; Berkowitz 1993). In Zionism’s settlement project in Palestine under the Ottoman Empire 
and, later, the British Mandate (from 1881 to 1948), Zionist settlers re-appropriated religious 
symbols and myths that provided them with a narrative of Jewish continuity in Eretz Israel (the 
Biblical land of Israel), a connection to the land, a Jewish culture, and a calendar for national 
Jewish life (Ben-Porat 2013; Gurevitch 2007; Neumann 2011; Shapira 1992). Jewish religious 
elements, therefore, were part of Jewish nationalism since its inception. 
Religious Zionists joined the Zionist movement in 1902, with the founding of 
HaMizrachi (lit. Eastern) party under the leadership of Orthodox rabbi Yitzhak Yaakov Reines. 
The original Religious-Zionist ideology sought to constitute the Jewish nation, instead of the 
Jewish community, as the primary expression of Jewish religiosity and aimed for an independent 
national status in Eretz Israel (Schwartz 2009). To early Religious-Zionists, the revival of Jewish 
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national sovereignty had a theological aspect: they believed it would lead to redemption (ge’ula) 
(ibid).13  
Religious-Zionist leaders (in HaMizrachi and outside it) had different theologies about 
the relationship between Zionism and redemption. In Reines’ writings, he described Zionism in 
redemptory terms. However, in his responses to non-Zionist Orthodox critics who accused him 
of “hastening redemption,” he rejected the association between Zionism and redemption and 
argued instead that Zionism involved the realization of the divine will (Schwartz 2009, 11-12). 
Unlike him, explicit ideas of redemption are evident in the theology of Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak 
HaCohen Kook (who is better known as HaRav Kook), a prominent religious leader and 
theologian in the early twentieth century who became an important political leader as the first 
Chief Rabbi of the Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine in 1921. HaRav Kook had an 
explicit redemptory theology that viewed Zionism’s enterprise of settling the Land of Israel as 
part of a divine-messianic trajectory that will ultimately bring about the redemption of the People 
of Israel (Fischer 2012).  
Regardless of these differences, the underlying premise of Religious-Zionism had been a 
revolutionary one (Schwartz 2009). Religious-Zionist ideology represented an explicit Jewish 
initiative to rebel against the “passivity” of diaspora Jews by refusing to await redemption by 
divine means. It was also revolutionary in the Religious-Zionist desire to create a new religious 
type of a “redeemed person” (ibid, 1).  
Religious-Zionism’s revolutionary quality expressed itself most explicitly not in the 
original HaMizrachi faction, which was predominantly middle-class, but in HaPo’el HaMizrachi 
(lit. The Eastern Laborer), the labor-socialist faction of early Religious-Zionist movement (Leon 
2010; Schwartz 2009). A fundamental principle in HaPo’el HaMizrachi ideology was the 
                                                 
13 Largely speaking, redemption in Jewish theology refers to the coming of the Messiah. 
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concept of the “sacred revolt.” The members of this faction rebelled against Jews’ “exilic 
mentality” by emphasizing manual labor that would bring about the creation of a new, healthy, 
active religious Jew, and against HaMizrachi, which represented for them this exilic mentality 
(Schwartz 2009, 44).  
Moreover, HaPo’el HaMizrachi members privileged non-rabbinic leadership and 
emphasized individual decision-making and responsibility. These ideological components came 
to fruition in the religious kibbutzim they founded in Palestine and later, in Israel.14 In these 
communal settlements, the communities did not appoint rabbis and all halakhic decisions were 
made by kibbutz members. This had been the case until recent decades (Schwartz 2009, 49).  
In 1956, after the founding of the state in 1948, HaMizrachi and HaPo’el HaMizrachi 
united to create the National Religious Party in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament. During the first 
few decades of the Israeli state, Religious-Zionist society was dominated by “pragmatist” leaders 
who collaborated with the ruling Labor party and put aside Religious-Zionism’s revolutionary 
ethos in favor of integrating themselves into the political system and state institutions of the 
young state (Cohen and Liebman 1997; Schwartz 2009).  
This changed after the 1967 war, when Religious-Zionists gained new landscapes, 
literally speaking, in which to revive their revolutionary impetus (Leon 2010; Schwartz 2009). 
Religious-Zionists were key players in the Jewish Settlement enterprise in the territories Israel 
occupied during the 1967 war – the West Bank, Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai 
Desert. Religious-Zionist leaders’ support of Jewish settlement in these areas became significant 
with the establishment of Gush Emunim (lit. The Bloc of the Faithful) movement after the Yom 
                                                 
14 Kibbutzim (sing. kibbutz) are communal agrarian settlements that were part of the Zionist effort to 
settle the land of Israel prior to the state being established and in the decades following it. The religious 
kibbutz movement was founded in the 1930s by HaPoel HaMizrachi. Its members sought to combine 
Zionism, socialism, and religion (Schwartz 2009).  
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Kippur war in 1973. Gush Emunim mobilized Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza, and 
Religious-Zionism was the “driving impulse” behind it (Schwartz 2009, 95).15  
Gush Emunim revitalized Religious-Zionism’s messianic theology that viewed Jews’ 
“return” to territories that are identified with the Biblical Land of Israel as a “corridor” to 
redemption (Schwartz 2009, 100-102). However, following Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai in 
1982 and the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin’s in 1995 by a Jewish religious man, the 
messianic ideology retreated to the periphery of Religious-Zionism (ibid). It continues to thrive 
mostly in Jewish settlements in the West Bank that are home for devoted emuni (lit. of faith) 
communities (Fischer 2012; Harel 2016).16 Other than in these communities, scholars of 
Religious-Zionist society today depict a society that is predominantly middle-class and part of 
the social mainstream in Israel; it is, in their view, a society that is more bourgeois than 
revolutionary in its politics and lifestyle (Leon 2010; Sheleg 2000, 2010).17  
Religious-Zionism and the Ideology of Statism    
 Religious-Zionist attitudes to the Israeli state are derived from the tension mentioned 
above between revolutionism and radicalism, on the one hand, and moderation and pragmatism 
on the other. Since the main process analyzed in this study is the “scaling down” of state 
                                                 
15 The history of contemporary Religious-Zionism could not be understood without considering the ways 
in which Jewish settlement in the territories Israel occupied in 1967 drastically shaped this movement. 
However, as this study focuses on the liberal stream within Religious-Zionism, which is distinguished, 
politically and socially, from followers of the revolutionary ideology of Gush Emunim (Fischer 2012, 
107), I do not elaborate on this part of Religious-Zionist history. For extended discussions of Gush 
Emunim see Aran (2013), and Hirschhorn (2017) – on the participation of American Jews in the 
settlement project. 
16 Emuni refers to circles in current Religious-Zionist society that have continued to develop the ideology 
of Gush Emunim. These circles are characterized by a high degree of religious observance and far-right 
political views (Fischer 2012, 93). 
17 The revolutionary orientation of Religious-Zionism is perhaps most evident today in the shifting gender 
norms in Religious-Zionist society as a result of the activities of the Israeli Jewish Orthodox feminist 
movement. I write more about this movement below, in the section titled “Contemporary Religious-
Zionist Society in Israel.” 
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ideologies among liberal Religious-Zionists, it is necessary to acknowledge here Religious-
Zionism’s history of embracing ideologies that valorize the state.  
As described above, Religious-Zionist leaders during the first two decades of 
independence privileged their integration into the “secular” political institutions of the state 
instead of the transformation of them. This preference was not due to pragmatic considerations 
alone. It had a theological aspect, too. Within Religious-Zionist society, there is a stream that 
believes that the state of Israel, its institutions, and its representatives are sanctified. This 
ideology developed from the theology of HaRav Kook, who viewed Zionism and its activities of 
nation-building and territorial repatriation to the Land of Israel as part of a divine-messianic 
trajectory that will ultimately bring about the redemption of the People of Israel (Fischer 2012; 
Schwartz 2009).  
 Another central component of HaRav Kook’s theology is the idea of the divine state. 
HaRav Kook supported Zionist efforts to establish a sovereign Jewish nation-state because, 
according to his theology, the modern state is the most appropriate vehicle for embodying God’s 
divinity in the mundane world (Fischer 2012, 99). This idea is evident in his famous reference to 
the Zionist vision of a Jewish state as the “foundation of God’s throne in the world” (ibid).  
 After the founding of the Israeli state in 1948, followers of HaRav Kook, and primarily 
his son, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook (Z.Y Kook hereafter), translated these ideas into Israel’s actual 
political reality. In his theology, Rabbi Z.Y Kook designated the young Israeli state with divine 
properties and accorded state institutions loyalty, honor, and obedience (Fischer 2012, 100). 
Rabbi Z.Y Kook disciples, many of whom are prominent Religious-Zionist rabbis who were his 
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former students in Yeshivat Merkaz Harav in Jerusalem, became identified with an approach to 
the state known as mamlakhtiyut (lit. statism).18   
The ideology of mamlakhtiyut has a wider significance in Zionist history. David Ben-
Gurion, a Zionist leader in the pre-state period and Israel’s first Prime Minister, coined this term 
to represent his vision of the centrality of the Israeli state. This centrality meant concentration of 
political and social power and privileging state interests over other interests and considerations. 
On the symbolic level, it meant the transformation of the state and its institutions into the central 
foci of loyalty and identification for its citizens and the ultimate source of values and symbols to 
them (Don Yehiya 1995, 171).   
In Religious-Zionism, the mamlakhti stream focuses on cultivating and strengthening 
Israel’s state institutions. According to the mamlakhti ideology, the Divine will actualize itself 
through the historical development of the people of Israel. Since the state of Israel embodies the 
current phase of the collective and public life of the contemporary People of Israel, the state and 
its institutions constitute and activate elements of the divine (Fischer 2012, 102-103). 
 Religious-Zionists who have supported the mamlakhti ideology endorse a policy of 
respecting the governing bodies of the state and its laws. For instance, during the 2005 
implementation of the Disengagement Plan, in which the Israeli military evacuated Jewish 
settlements in the Gaza Strip and the northern West Bank, Religious-Zionist society underwent a 
tremendous social and political rift between followers of the mamlakhti approach and those who 
rejected it. While anti-mamlakhti rabbis spoke against the government and encouraged their 
followers among the settlers to resist the evacuation violently (Fischer 2012; Leon 2010), 
                                                 
18 Yeshivat Merkaz Harav (lit. the Central Yeshiva of the Rabbi) was founded in 1924 by HaRav Kook 
and was led for many years by his son, Rabbi Z.Y Kook, who was an important spiritual leader in 
Religious-Zionist society.  
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mamlakhti rabbis urged their disciples to adhere to government decisions.19 Leading Religious-
Zionist rabbi of the mamlakhti stream, Zvi Thau, the president of Yeshivat Har Hamor in 
Jerusalem, urged his followers among the settlers not to engage in violent confrontations with 
Israeli soldiers. Along the same lines, Religious-Zionist rabbi Shlomo Aviner, the rabbi of the 
West Bank settlement of Beit-El, instructed Israeli soldiers to obey orders, even when they 
required active participation in the evacuation (Fischer 2012, 103).  
 It is important to note here that the mamlakhti ideology goes hand in hand with the 
central role of rabbinical leaders in Religious-Zionist communities and yeshivot (religious 
academies). The examples above show that rabbinical leaders such as Rabbi Thau and Rabbi 
Aviner, who are communal leaders that are not part of the religious bureaucracy of the state,20 
have immense power in certain Religious-Zionist circles. In Religious-Zionist communities that 
demonstrate a greater level of religious observance and social-political conservativism,21 the 
religious and social-political authority of communal rabbinical leaders has become increasingly 
important and influential in the day-to-day lives of their followers (Zivan (Mivtzari) 2011). 
Therefore, the prominence of the mamlakhti ideology does not make community rabbis 
irrelevant. On the contrary, it is enabled by powerful rabbinical leaders in Religious-Zionist 
communities who have supported this ideology.  
Overall, the mamlakhti ideology and its notable representatives within the Religious-
Zionist leadership demonstrate that values of valorizing the state and complying with its 
institutions and policies had been a central feature of mainstream Religious-Zionism since the 
                                                 
19 Expressions of anti or non-mamlakhti ideology are evident mostly in the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) 
society or among some circles within the Haredi-Le’umi (ultra-Orthodox nationalist) stream of Religious-
Zionism. Among non-Haredi Religious-Zionists, mamlakhti views are the mainstream (Hermann et al. 
2014). 
20 Although as the head rabbis of religious institutions that are recognized by the state Rabbinate, they 
receive some funding from the state (Ferziger 2008). 
21 Known as Torani (lit. “of Torah”) (Hermann et al. 2014, 28). 
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founding of the state. This social and theological context is important to understanding my 
interlocutors’ shift toward engaging with ideas about the religious significance of public Jewish 
life in Israel in local, non-state, and “private” settings.   
Contemporary Religious-Zionist Society in Israel 
In today’s Israel, the Religious-Zionist movement, also known as dati-le’umi (religious-
national) society, is a category that refers to numerous social groups of varying levels of 
religious observance, different theological and political inclinations, and diverse lifestyles 
(Caplan 2017; Hermann et al.; Sheleg 2000, 2010). In broad terms, the common denominators of 
these groups are their identification with Orthodox-oriented interpretations of halakha,22 and 
their agreement with the Zionist vision of the state of Israel as the Jewish homeland (Hermann et 
al. 2014).23  
As I describe above, the roots of Religious-Zionism are the ideology that Jewish 
settlement in Eretz Israel and Jewish national revival have a religious significance. In Religious-
Zionist society in contemporary Israel, these ideas manifest themselves in the dominant social 
values of national responsibility and contribution to the Jewish people and the Israeli state. These 
values are evident in the messages Religious-Zionist teachers deliver to their students in the 
state-funded religious schools (Rapoport, Penso and Garb 1994); in the high percentage of 
Religious-Zionist men who serve in combat units in the Israeli military (Sheleg 2000); and in 
Religious-Zionist state bureaucrats who view their jobs as a fulfilment of their Religious-Zionist 
commitment to dedicate oneself to the Jewish state (Kravel-Tovi 2017).  
                                                 
22 There are also some Religious-Zionist Israelis who identify as non-Orthodox, but they are a minority 
(Hermann et al. 2014).  
23 Hermann et al. (2014) name a third common denominator, defined as “openness to modernity” (ibid, 
27). I think this category is problematic because it implies that Orthodox Judaism is contradictory to 
modernity. This kind of dichotomy was criticized by anthropologists who suggested more complex ways 
of looking at religion and modernity, as I describe later in this chapter. It also does not coincide with the 
more-nuanced categories that I noticed in my fieldwork.   
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At the same time with this emphasis on the nation, local communities have always been 
central social units in Religious-Zionist society. I mentioned above the powerful status of 
community rabbis in certain Religious-Zionist circles. In addition, communities are important 
social units in Religious-Zionist society. Religious-Zionist communities, especially those in rural 
settlements (including in the West Bank), are usually socially cohesive and with a high degree of 
mutual accountability (Herzog 2009). They also provide political spaces in which members 
discuss and express political views, many times in response to the leaflets on the weekly Torah 
portions that are distributed in synagogues and that often contain political commentaries on 
current affairs by leading Religious-Zionist rabbis (Leon 2010). My interlocutors’ turn to 
communities, therefore, is not surprising. However, I point to a new mode of communal politics. 
To the liberal Religious-Zionists I study, the community is not only a social and religious 
resource and a space to talk about state politics. It is a space that is meant to replace, in some 
ways, the functions of formal religious authorities.   
Furthermore, my interlocutors’ shifting from national and state arenas to local and 
communal spaces square with studies of recent social transformations in Religious-Zionist 
society over the past three decades. These studies have pointed to a decline in the power of 
religious centers and the rise of ideologies about individual autonomy and agency, including in 
relation to religious life (Engleberg 2015; Fischer 2012; Friedman 2004; Sheleg 2000, 2010).  
There is no single narrative that explains these shifts but, rather, a conjunction of key 
events and processes. Leon (2010) and Sheleg (2000) mention the assassination of Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 by a religious Jewish man and the Disengagement Plan in 2005. 
They argue that these events exacerbated internal conflicts and divisions in Religious-Zionist 
society. In addition, dominant educational and ideological centers such as Yesha Council, the 
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central council of Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza,24 and Yeshivat Merkaz Harav in 
Jerusalem became less central as a result of the death of rabbinical leaders and of the evacuation 
of Jewish settlements in Sinai, Gaza, and the West Bank by Israeli governments (Sheleg 2000).  
Socioeconomic status has also played a role in these changes. Studies of Religious-
Zionist communities over the past three decades have revealed that the majority of graduates of 
Religious-Zionist high schools now choose “typical middle-class professions” such as becoming 
professional bureaucrats, members of the liberal professions, and employees in knowledge-
intensive professions in the public or private sector (Leon 2010, 61; Sheleg 2000).25 Sheleg 
(2000) points out that the Religious-Zionist norm of starting a family at a young age is another 
factor that contributes to the dominance of a bourgeois way of life in Religious-Zionist society 
(94-95). Consequently, middle-class Religious-Zionists reject radical actions and lifestyles in 
favor of a “pragmatist” approach that privileges financial security and a high quality of life 
(Leon 2010, 73). This middle-class mobility explains, in part, Religious-Zionists’ overall 
compliance with the Israeli government during the 2005 Disengagement Plan and the minimal 
violent resistance during the evacuation of Jewish settlements (ibid).  
These social shifts illustrate a common thread in Religious-Zionist society of the past few 
decades, that is, a decline in the influence of centralized societal institutions and an increased 
social fragmentation and heterogeneity. This thread provides an important social backdrop to the 
events and processes that are analyzed in this study. 
Another significant backdrop to this study is the development of the Israeli Jewish-
Orthodox feminist movement over the past few decades. The revolutionary aspect of Religious-
                                                 
24 Yesha is an acronym that stands for Yehuda, Shomron and Aza (Judea, Samaria and Gaza). 
25 These studies rely on ethnographic observations among Religious-Zionist communities. They are not 
based on large-scale statistical data. Leon (2010) mentions the large communities of Religious-Zionists in 
newly-built affluent neighborhoods in Jerusalem and in the suburban towns surrounding Tel-Aviv as 
evidence of Religious-Zionist mobility into the Israeli middle-class (ibid, 63) 
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Zionism, which I have discussed above, is evident today in this movements’ achievements. 
Women’s education was the first arena in Israel in which Orthodox feminist theory was 
formulated and practiced through the founding of midrashot, post-secondary schools for 
advanced Judaic studies, in the late 1970s by US-born Jews (El-Or 2002). These schools, which 
started as a marginal phenomenon, grew increasingly popular and they are currently considered 
part of Religious-Zionism’s mainstream and even a “mandatory rite of passage” in some circles 
(Sztokman 2014, 14).  El-Or (2002) argues that women’s “literacy revolution” in Religious-
Zionist society has brought about dramatic changes in gender relations and gender identities that 
entail a “profound transformation” in Orthodox Judaism (20).  
The midrashot brought about a new generation of young Religious-Zionist women who 
were highly literate in Jewish texts. Some women continued to pursue the study of Judaism from 
a feminist perspective in Israeli academia, as part of a trend in Religious-Zionist society of 
studying Judaism from a critical perspective (Schwartz 2009, 116). Others pursued further 
halakhic training as counselors, particularly in the area of niddah, laws of women’s purification, 
and as rabbinical pleaders in the state’s rabbinical courts (Shiloh 2006). Beginning in the 1990s, 
Orthodox women started to form feminist activist organizations that address the status of women 
in Orthodox society and women’s rights in marriage and divorce.26 Over the past two decades, 
Orthodox feminists have initiated a discourse about women’s equality in public religious life, 
including in synagogue life (Fischer 2012).27 Overall, Israeli Orthodox feminism has focused 
primarily on attempts to initiate social change from within Orthodox society and its halakhic 
framework (Irshai and Zion-Waldoks 2013; Ross 2004).  
                                                 
26 I list some of the dominant organizations in this field in chapter three of this dissertation. 
27 Gender equality in synagogue life is the focus of chapter five of this dissertation.  
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Although I do not study sites that are formally associated with any of the feminist 
Orthodox organizations, the men and women I study are members of the same social circles as 
Orthodox feminists and a few of my key interlocutors are active members in Orthodox feminist 
initiatives. Therefore, the “nonrevolutionary revolution” that I have observed in my research is 
closely related to Israeli Orthodox feminists’ emphasis on a revolution “from within” Orthodox 
society.  
Liberal Religious-Zionists  
The people I study belong to a section of Religious-Zionist society that is considered 
“liberal” (Fischer 2012; Hermann et al. 2014). My use of the term “liberal” to describe my 
interlocutors is an emic one. The groups I study belong to a wider social group that is known in 
Israel as dati’im liberalim – liberal religious Jews. There are communities of liberal religious 
Jews across Israel, but it is Jerusalem, mostly its southern neighborhoods, that is the home for a 
large population of liberal religious Jews in Israel (Zaban 2013). Although my fieldwork 
activities were not confined to Jerusalem and some of my main interlocutors lived in other Israeli 
cities, Jerusalem has become a main site for me because of the richness of its liberal religious 
world. 
The term dati liberali is composed of two categories, each of them carrying diverse 
meanings. In Jewish-Israeli society, dati – a religious person – refers to Jews who observe 
Orthodox-oriented interpretations of halakha (Hermann et al. 2014, 26). The identification of 
dati, a religious Jew, with “Orthodox” is fairly new. The category Orthodox has become 
increasingly important in popular Israeli discourse since the arrival of the non-Orthodox 
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movements – Reform and Conservative Judaism – to Israel from North America after 1967 
(Ferziger 2014).28  
Nowadays, “Orthodox society” is often used as synonymous with “religious society” 
(hevra datit). It is used to refer to the following Jewish-Israeli publics: Haredi (ultra-Orthodox), 
Haredi-Le’umi (ultra-Orthodox national) and Religious-Zionist (also known as dati-le’umi, 
religious-national) (Hermann et al. 2014). Each of these groups includes numerous sub-groups 
that vary in terms of religious outlook and observance, political views, and relations with secular 
society in Israel (ibid).29 
The term, liberali, (liberal) also encompasses multiple meanings. Although liberal and 
liberalism are ambiguous terms that denote different things in different contexts (Özyürek 2006), 
I use this term because this is how my interlocutors’ social group is identified by other Orthodox 
Israelis. While in the United States, “liberal Judaism” refers to the non-Orthodox Jewish streams, 
in Israel, the term “liberal Judaism” includes parts of Orthodox society as well as the non-
Orthodox streams.  
In the context of Israel’s Orthodox society, the liberali religious Jews are those who 
support “open-mindedness and unrestricted contact and confrontation with modern Western 
culture and values and a continual synthesis of modern cultural and Torah values” (Fischer 2012, 
107). There are concentrations of liberal Religious-Zionists in the religious kibbutz movement 
(Hakibbutz Hadati) and in Jerusalem, where there are also centers of research and education that 
                                                 
28 Interestingly, these dynamics are similar to the dynamics that led to the development of a distinct 
Orthodox stream in Judaism in19th century Europe. Orthodox Judaism developed as a response to the 
founding of the Jewish Reform movement in Germany as part of broader modernization processes among 
European Jews and their assimilation into their non-Jewish environments (Katz 1973). 
29 Haredi society is particularly diverse. However, since it is not part of the scope of this study, I do not 
elaborate here on the different Haredi streams. It is important to point out that one of the main differences 
from Religious-Zionism is their view of the Israeli state as a “religiously neutral entity” that is part of the 
secular realm (Ravitzky 1996, 145). 
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promulgate liberal Religious-Zionist ideas, such as the Shalom Hartman Institute in Jerusalem 
and Ya’acov Herzog Institute in Kibbutz Ein-Zurim (Fischer 2012, 107). I unpack what “liberal” 
means to my interlocutors throughout this study. 
The variation within Religious-Zionist society in terms of level of religious observance 
and interpretation of national (Zionist) ideologies offers an important background to my 
research. The group at the center of this study is considered moderate (metunim, in Hebrew) both 
in their level of religious observance and in their national ideology. Currently, their moderation 
is in a somewhat marginal position in light of increasing religious stringency and of ultra-
nationalist ideologies in Religious-Zionist society during the past three decades. This trend is 
evident in the formation and rapid growth of the Haredi-Le’umi and the Mizrahi-Haredi groups 
(Fischer 2012; Hermann et al 2014; Leon 2014). My interlocutors’ somewhat peripheral location 
in Religious-Zionist society is relevant to understanding their focus on local and communal 
settings.  
The Terminology of this Study 
This study focuses on organizations, communities, and individuals who are affiliated with 
Religious-Zionist communities. Their affiliation is first and foremost societal. Although some of 
my interlocutors would not necessarily identify themselves with Religious-Zionist society as 
individuals, they were born and raised in households that belonged to Religious-Zionist 
communities, attended Religious-Zionist schools, and send their children to these schools. 
Religious-Zionist society is, therefore, their social milieu. I also consider as Religious-Zionists 
those interlocutors of mine who were not born in Israel, and thus are not “native” to Religious-
Zionist society, because the religious communities into which they have been integrated in Israel 
are considered Religious-Zionist.  
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As I was writing this dissertation I considered different terms to describe my 
interlocutors. I was looking for an English term that would capture their commitment to a liberal 
worldview and their identity as Halakah observing Jews. I rejected already-existing definitions 
like “Orthodox,” “Religious-Zionist” and even “religious” because they come with a baggage of 
cultural and social meanings that did not necessarily fit with how my interlocutors viewed 
themselves. Although many of my interlocutors belong to social circles that are known as 
Orthodox and as Religious-Zionist, these categories are associated in the imagination of Israeli 
Jews with social and political conservatism that do not characterize my interlocutors’ 
worldviews.  
Some of my interlocutors explicitly told me that they identify neither as Orthodox nor as 
Religious-Zionist because of the meanings these categories have assumed in Israel. Instead, they 
prefer the term “halakha observing” or “committed to halakha” because it denotes a certain set of 
beliefs and practices rather than a social affiliation. For instance, Ronen, one of my main 
interlocutors at the Baka Minyan told me that he preferred the term “committed to halakha” over 
“Orthodox” because it is a term that “crosses social boundaries,” according to him. Similarly, 
Ilan, another key interlocutor, told me he did not identify as “Orthodox” because it was, 
according to him, a “foreign category” that was imported from North America and that did not 
reflect Israeli reality.  
Eventually, I decided to use the term liberal observant Jews. This term reflects my 
interlocutors’ commitment to a worldview that is perceived as liberal as well as to halakha, and 
their conviction that one supplements and completes the other. My ethnographic analysis in the 
following chapters explores how this entwining of liberalism and halakha plays out in different 
settings. 
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Although I refer to my interlocutors as “liberal observant Jews,” their ways of being 
liberal and of being observant are not homogeneous. Among my interlocutors there were 
individuals who practiced a more Orthodox-oriented interpretations of halakha and individuals 
whose observance was closer to Conservative Judaism, in which there is greater willingness to 
reinterpret halakha in ways that are more compatible with contemporary life than in Orthodox 
Judaism. The meaning of “liberalism” also varied across my field. For instance, my interlocutors 
in the Baka Minyan live in West Jerusalem, the neighborhoods of Jerusalem that have been 
under Israeli sovereignty since the founding of the state in 1948 (unlike East Jerusalem that was 
occupied in 1967 by the Israeli military and is predominantly populated by Palestinians.) They 
belong to the liberal circles of Religious-Zionism that are also associated with left-wing politics 
that is critical of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank (Fischer 2012). Unlike them, a few of 
the staff members in the nongovernmental organization where I volunteered as part of my 
fieldwork lived in West Bank settlements. Although I never asked these individuals about their 
political views I assume that some of them identify with centrist or right-wing views, at least in 
relation to the question of Israel’s sovereignty over the West Bank. Therefore, they are liberal in 
relation to halakhic change and to gender equality, not in relation to left-wing political views. 
On Scale 
In order to understand the significance of the ethnographic analysis that follows, I turn in 
this section, and in the following two sections, to the scholarly conversations in which this study 
is embedded. First, I consider here the theoretical implications of my use of the term “scale.” I 
have developed the idea of the “scaling down” of public Judaism to conceptualize how liberal 
observant Jews perform what seems to be a contradictory task. On the one hand, they “zoom-in” 
on communities and their members as the places where religious authority should be exercised. 
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On the other hand, they maintain that everything that they do is meant to enhance and improve 
public Jewish life at a national, “zoomed-out” level. The concept of scale allows me to analyze 
projects that seem to disengage with the state and with large societal frames and yet that are very 
much devoted to these larger “scales.”  
Scale is also part of my research design – namely, my decision to study liberal observant 
organizations who work in “large scale” arenas of state institutions and aim to reform national-
level policies, as well as groups that are busy improving their “small scale” environments such as 
neighborhood and religious communities.  
The following chapters unpack the scaling down of ideologies about the state, religious 
authority and citizenship among liberal observant Jews. These ideologies are scale-making 
projects that entail the institutionalizing of certain scalar perceptions and positions (Summerson 
Carr and Lempert 2016, 9). In such “scale making” projects, social actors structure knowledge 
and social relations based on their distinct vantage points (ibid). While anthropology of scale-
making is often focused on discourse analysis and semiotics in language (Agha 2007, 64-83; Gal 
2016; Irvine 2016; Wortham and Rhodes 2012), I employ this perspective to analyze how people 
mobilize scalar distinctions in projects of social and religious change (Orta 2013).  
Across my field sites, liberal observant Jews work against a dominant conviction in 
Orthodox society that situates religious authority in the “macro” levels of state institutions and 
national frameworks of social belonging. They promote, in different ways, shifting the objectives 
of these ideologies, that is, from “macro” to “micro” settings such as neighborhoods, 
communities and individuals. This shift, however, is not from one “given” scale to another. My 
interlocutors’ ideas about the scalar terrains across which they fluctuate – the Israeli state, 
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Orthodox society, their neighborhoods, communities, and families – are shaped by their vantage 
points as liberal Religious-Zionists.  
 Anthropologists have demonstrated the importance of problematizing distinctions 
between “top-level” and “bottom-level” scales like state and civil society (Ferguson 2006; 
Ferguson and Gupta 2002) and the global and the local (Appadurai 1996; Ong 1999b; Tsing 
2005). Since each of these levels is not a stable analytical term but a product of social 
circumstances and dynamics, it is the task of an ethnographer to unpack the social processes that 
produce these scalar distinctions (Summerson Carr and Lempert 2015).  
Ferguson and Gupta (2002) demonstrate how this “unpacking” is done ethnographically. 
In their investigation of ways that people understand and experience state authority in the world 
of Indian NGOs, they reveal two prominent models: a vertical model in which the state is viewed 
as above society and an encompassing model, in which the state is understood as containing its 
localities (981). Based on their analysis of African states’ “outsourcing” of their functions and 
responsibilities to international NGOs and agencies, Ferguson and Gupta develop the concept of 
“transnational governmentality” that questions the models mentioned above. They highlight, 
instead, the emergence of a new transnational neoliberal regime that has reconfigured state 
authority (996). Their study illuminates the taken-for-granted quality of scalar and spatial images 
of the relationship between state, civil society, and global actors, and demonstrates that a closer 
examination of this relationship reveals more complex landscapes in which the boundaries 
between these scales are not clear-cut. Ferguson and Gupta’s perspective accentuates that the 
“scaling down” of public Judaism in Israel does not entail merely the replacement of one scale 
(state) with another (localities) but a reconfiguration of state ideologies about public religiosity 
and their implementation in local settings.  
28 
 
Furthermore, in examining the “scaling down” of public Judaism, I employ the scalar 
distinction offered by Zali Gurevitch (2007) between a “small place” (makom katan) and a “large 
place” (makom gadol). In his analysis of Israeli Jews’ sense of place, Gurevitch distinguishes 
between Israel as a “small place” – a house, a street, a childhood landscape, a circle of friends – 
that generates a “nativist” sense of belonging, and Israel as a “large place” – the idea of “the 
land” (Ha’Aretz) as a collective Jewish-Israeli identity. The large place is not merely an 
expansion of the small place. It is a shift from an immediate, concrete reality to an idea. 
Gurevitch highlights the ongoing tension between these two scales: “the land” as always a source 
of promise and potential and, at the same time, of disappointment (2007, 25-26).  
Gurevitch’s theoretical framework allows me to acknowledge that by doing and 
promoting a “scaled down” public Judaism, liberal observant Jews continue to engage with Israel 
as a “large place” – with the ideal of a Jewish and democratic state – while expressing their 
critique and disappointment of “small place” Israel, that is, its actual institutions, policies, and 
norms of public Judaism in present day Israel.  
Anthropology of Tradition 
A scalar perspective is important to understand the new local politics of public Judaism 
among liberal observant Jews. In order to understand the forms in which this politics takes shape, 
it is pertinent to consider the role of “tradition” in the lives of these social actors. The people at 
the center of this study emphasize that they are committed to halakha and that their pro-change 
initiatives stem from within the “traditional” worlds of halakha and Jewish history. In the 
chapters that follow I depict different ways in which liberal observant Jews evoke “tradition” in 
their endeavors to promote change.  
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Over the past few decades, anthropologists have agreed about the view of tradition as a 
dynamic process of generation and transformation, in which past and future are interlinked, 
rather than a passive act of preservation (Asad [1986] 2009; Clifford 2000; Linnekin 1991). This 
view goes against earlier sociological and anthropological models in which tradition was 
conceptualized as antithetical to modernity. For instance, in his discussion of different types of 
social authority, sociologist Max Weber presented traditional authority as based on a belief that 
certain social orders and powers were “handed down from the past, ‘have always existed’” 
(1964, 341). In anthropology, as Handler and Linnekin (1984) have argued, Kroeber depicted 
tradition as an assortment of cultural traits that are handed on from one generation to another. 
Over the past few decades, anthropologists have pointed out that these conceptualizations of 
tradition are flawed because the concept of tradition itself is, in fact, a modernist creation that 
developed within a Western cosmology (Asad [1986] 2009; Herzfeld 2004,18). According to 
Clifford (2004, 153), as social scientists grew critical of the concept of modernity as a singular 
narrative of progress, they developed a more complex view of tradition, too. 
Within current anthropological discussions of tradition, one prominent conversation has 
developed in the field of indigenous activism in postcolonial settings and in the context of 
globalization. Anthropologists, mostly working in the Pacific, looked at movements of national 
and cultural revival (Clifford 2000, 2004; Linnekin 1983); public discourse and legislation 
(Povinelli 1999); and colonial efforts to assimilate the indigenous population into settler society 
(Hanson 1989). These studies show that efforts to define “authentic” tradition are political sites 
of struggle and conflict over identity and rights. Both indigenous movements and colonial states 
have engaged in contestations over determining the “authenticity” of traditions as the basis for 
legal rights and social recognition (Clifford 2000; Hanson 1989; Povinelli 1999). Tradition is 
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also important to the development of group identification. According to Clifford, tradition 
creates “ways of belonging” that are always contingent in terms of time and place (2000, 97). 
Tradition, in his view, is less about preservation than about transformative practices and “a 
selective symbolization of continuity” (ibid, 100).  
Furthermore, the relationship between tradition and authenticity has been a 
methodological dilemma for anthropologists. By presenting tradition as “constructed,” 
anthropologists who study indigenous rights movements risk being misunderstood by non-
anthropologists as suggesting that these indigenous endeavors represent “inauthentic” tradition 
(Hanson 1989; Linnekin 1991) or “merely political” actions, “contrived for current purposes” 
(Clifford 2004, 156). Linnekin (1991) suggests a few solutions. One is by emphasizing that all 
cultural traditions, Western and non-Western alike, are invented (447). Herzfeld’s (2004) study 
of the modernist invention of a traditional artisan culture in Crete is of the kind of ethnographic 
work Linnekin calls for.30 Another solution is through challenging anthropology’s authority to 
define “authentic” tradition, such as in the reflective and critical move of Clifford and Marcus in 
their discussions about “Writing Culture” (1986).  
Handler and Linnekin (1984) note that this view of tradition as an ongoing endeavor of 
interpretation and assigning meaning is not completely new and can be dated back to mid-
                                                 
30 Both Linnekin (1991) and Herzfeld (2004) distinguish between their approach and Hobsbawm and 
Ranger’s (1983) argument about the “invention of tradition.” In the introduction to this edited volume, 
Hobsbawm introduces the concept “invented traditions” to refer to processes of “formalization and 
ritualization, characterized by references to the past, if only by imposing tradition” (Hobsbawm 1983, 4). 
He argues that as opposed to “invented traditions,” some traditions are “genuine”: “where the old ways 
are alive, traditions need be neither revived nor invented” (ibid, 8). Linnekin and Herzfeld criticize 
Hobsbawm’s conceptualization and maintain that it implies that some traditions are “authentic” while 
others, are not. For an analysis that relies on the concept of “invented tradition” through critiquing it, see 
Goldstein-Gidoni (1997). 
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twentieth century American anthropology.31 Nevertheless, Clifford (2004) argues that “tradition” 
has been an important subject for anthropologists in recent decades because of current-day 
“social negotiations, political claims, and fraught conversations” about it, particularly in areas 
that were previously colonized by the British and French empires and that have recently 
undergone globalization processes (153).   
A parallel conversation about tradition has taken place in recent anthropological 
scholarship about Islam. Inspired by Foucault’s notions of discourse, these anthropologists have 
highlighted the discursive, authoritative power of tradition. Similar to the body of works 
described above, this conversation demonstrates the productive role of tradition in constituting 
subjectivities and its interlinking of past, present, and future. Its contribution, however, is in 
foregrounding the central role of practices in social negotiations over tradition.  
 Anthropologist of Islam Talal Asad suggested a discursive framework of tradition as a 
critique of dominant anthropological understandings of Islam. In particular, Asad responded to 
anthropologists like Geertz who studied Islam as a “fixed” and “essential” social structure (Asad 
[1986] 2009, 15). According to Asad, the social and religious study of Islam is historically rooted 
in Euro-centric and Christian understanding of what “religion” was. This understanding is 
detached from Islam’s social and historical context and, therefore, cannot be a suitable 
framework for studying it (Asad [1986] 2009, 1993).  
Instead, Asad asserts, Islam is a “historical formation” and a tradition that is based on 
authoritative texts – the Qur’an and the Hadith. This is how he defines Islam: 
                                                 
31 They cite Edward Sapir’s (1949) notion of “genuine culture” that is based on the past and, at the same 
time, open for transformation, as an early example of this view of tradition (Handler and Linnekin 1984, 
287).  
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A tradition [that] consists essentially of discourses that seek to instruct practitioners 
regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice that, precisely because it is 
established, has a history… An Islamic discursive tradition is simply a tradition of Muslim 
discourse that addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to 
a particular Islamic practice in the present (20).  
Tradition, therefore, is a relationship between past, present, and future that is authoritative by its 
power to “instruct” adherents on what counts as tradition at a particular social and historical 
moment. Tradition is made up of practitioners’ concepts of what counts as “apt performance” of 
the practices dictated by the authoritative texts – how the past is related to present practices (ibid, 
20-21). Practices, therefore, are crucial to Asad’s notion of tradition. 
Saba Mahmood (2005) further developed this framework and provided ethnographic 
illustrations for Asad’s arguments. She highlighted the Foucauldian influence on Asad’s work, 
and referred to Foucault’s concept of “discursive formation” (1972) to define tradition as 
follows: 
 [A] field of statements and practices whose structure of possibility is neither the individual, 
nor a collective body of overseers, but a form of relation between the past and present 
predicated upon a system of rules that demarcate both the limits and the possibility of what 
is sayable, doable, and recognizable as a comprehensive event in all its manifest forms” 
(Mahmood 2005, 114-115).  
In her ethnography of Muslim women in Cairo, Mahmood depicted how the authoritative 
power of tradition and embodied religious practices constitute these women’s pious 
subjectivities. She highlighted that what is considered as “tradition” not only shapes adherents’ 
practices and beliefs but also constructs their personhoods as pious individuals.  
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While in the previous body of works I described above, anthropologists have emphasized the 
efficacy of tradition in rights-based and identity-based struggles, Asad and Mahmood remind us 
that tradition also produces docility.  
 As noted above, the discursive understanding of tradition was developed by Asad as part 
of his wider critique of the European and North American scientific study of Islam. Nevertheless, 
scholars of Judaism, such as Satlow (2006), have found the discursive analysis of tradition to be 
useful in Jewish contexts, too. This framework allows Jewish studies’ scholars to investigate 
ways that Jewish communities throughout history “choose, highlight and discard parts of their 
received tradition (both textual and behavioral) to build their religious understandings” (Satlow 
2006, 846). The following chapters of this dissertation demonstrate ways that liberal observant 
Jews use a discourse of tradition to authorize, inform, and justify their beliefs, values and 
practices (Satlow 2006, 846).  
Anthropologists of Jewish communities and Judaic scholars alike have examined how 
religious change develops through the reinterpretation and re-utilization of “traditional” Jewish 
texts, rituals, and objects (Ochs 2007; Prell 1989; Satlow 2008). The reliance on texts is 
particularly central in Jewish religious renewal projects, and many new Jewish rituals are 
inspired by canonical texts (Ochs 2007, 6). While this insight is true in many cases, it is 
insufficient. An approach that focuses on a deliberate reinterpretation of “tradition” misses out 
ways in which change unfolds through people’s habitual practices as part of their ways of being 
in the world. Landes (2010), for instance, shows how rabbinical students’ divergent ways of 
wearing the tzitzit (a fringed, four-cornered under-garment worn by Orthodox men) is a site of 
struggle between contesting views of “authentic” tradition.  
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My ethnographic analysis in the chapters that follow develops this approach by 
demonstrating that bodily sensations, dispositions, affects, and social identifications are central 
in the shaping of religious change. My analysis demonstrates how liberal observant Jews can 
promote change and tradition at the same time. Within this understanding of tradition as a 
discourse, the “nonrevolutionary revolution” of liberal observant Jews makes sense. Their 
practices, activities, and self-perception are shaped by what they view as halakhic Judaism. In 
this sense, their efforts are “traditional.” At the same time, they charge halakhic traditions with 
new meanings that are, at times, perceived as revolutionary by dominant Orthodox standards.  
The Politics of Citizenship, Religion and the State 
This study focuses on how “tradition” is mobilized in projects of social and religious 
change. I look at tradition, therefore, through a political prism. The “scaling down” projects I 
depict in this dissertation are political projects because, essentially, they are about questions of 
citizenship. Citizenship is explicit in some of these projects while, in others, it lies below the 
surface. I move from activists who operate in the arena of state politics who collaborate with 
parliament members and formulate bills to residents of a Jerusalem neighborhood who forge 
spaces where they can practice their Judaism freely. However, across these sites, the men and 
women I study grapple with what traditional Judaism is as a way of expressing their “good 
citizenship” as Religious-Zionist Israelis.  
My discussion of citizenship relies on anthropological views that acknowledge that 
citizenship is not only a legal and political status ascribed by states, but also a social position and 
identification that is shaped by socio-economic, ethnic, gender, and sexual hierarchies (Brodkin 
2014; Holston 2008; Ong 1999a; Rosaldo 1994, 1999; Sa’ar 2016). This view understands 
citizenship as an ongoing process in which groups negotiate their social belonging and 
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membership through everyday encounters and experiences (Holston 2008; Rosaldo 1994). Ong 
(1999a) argues for a view of citizenship that is simultaneously a top-down process of “being-
made” into subjects of a nation-state and a bottom-up process of “self-making” (264).  
Citizenship in this sense can be extended to analyses of the domestic sphere (Özyürek 
2006) as well as to civil participation in political communities other than the state, such as 
neighborhoods (Zaban 2013), rural municipalities (Orta 2013), cities (Holston and Appadurai 
1999; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Zhang 2002), and global, transnational or supra-national 
communities (Balibar 1999; Ong 1999b). Greenberg’s insight about activism as a discursive field 
in which the meaning of citizenship is “worked out” (2014, 111) is particularly helpful to me. I 
argue that, when liberal observant Jews talk about and act toward modifying religious norms in 
communities and institutions, they carry out their Religious-Zionist citizenship. My contribution 
to this body of political-anthropological knowledge on citizenship is, therefore, in accentuating 
ways that debates about “tradition” are political grounds in which social actors contest, debate, 
and formulate modes of belonging. 
 The triangular relationship I highlight in this study among religion, citizenship, and state 
is multifaceted. Religious categories are utilized to delineate national boundaries between nation-
states (Barker 2009) and within them (van der Veer 1994). In both these cases, this process of 
nation-building is facilitated by positioning religious views, practices, and identities as 
antagonistic. Barker concisely summarizes this argument: “To be Irish was to be Catholic 
because England was Anglican. To be Polish was to be Catholic because Russia was Orthodox” 
(Barker 2009, xii). In a similar vein, the Hindu and the Muslim nationalist movements in India 
developed in an antagonistic relationship: each group needed the other to consolidate its own 
distinct national consciousness (van der Veer 1994). 
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Anthropologists of religious minorities in contemporary Europe have exemplified ways 
that religion intersects with ethnic, racial, national, and gender identities in the European 
“regimes of incorporation” (Soysal 1994). Religious minorities in France have responded to the 
nation’s laws and culture of laïcité in practices of racializing their own identities – as in the case 
of North African Jews in Paris (Arkin 2013), and in efforts to develop new Muslim 
“repertoires”– as in the case of Muslim public leaders (Bowen 2010, 11). In German media and 
public discourse, national imaginaries about Muslim men, mostly Turkish immigrants, position 
them as the stigmatized “other” against which German national identity is consolidated (Pratt 
Ewing 2008b). Ironically, “white Muslims,” who are ethnic Germans who had converted to 
Islam, present their new religion as commensurate with “being German” (Özyürek 2015). 
Finally, an analysis of a mandatory “naturalization ceremony” for immigrants in the Netherlands 
shows that to Dutch authorities, citizenship is not only a formal legal status but also the 
acceptance of Dutch “norms and values” that are presented in these ceremonies as conflicting 
with immigrants’ cultures and traditions (Verkaaik 2010). These ceremonies represent a new 
form of nationalism that rejects “foreign” cultures while perceiving itself as tolerant and 
multicultural (ibid, 70). 
These studies illustrate the close association of religion, ethnicity, and citizenship in 
European nation-states. Studies of religious minorities in the US emphasize the important role 
that class positioning and race play in facilitating or inhibiting minorities’ cultural citizenship 
(Brodkin 1998; Pratt Ewing 2008a). Brodkin (1998), for instance, argues that Jews became 
recognized as “white Americans” during the second half of the twentieth century due to their 
upward class mobility. After 9/11, Muslims in the US have become racialized as “Arabs,” a 
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category that is perceived as excluded from the “American” collectivity (Leonard 2003; Pratt 
Ewing 2008a).   
The Jewish State and its Non-Jewish “Others” 
This comparative examination of religion and citizenship demonstrates that different 
religious identities are deemed as legitimate or as non-legitimate based on whether they are 
perceived as threatening to the secular-liberal state. Mahmood (2006) and Agrama (2010) 
suggest that it is the ongoing regulation of religious subjectivities, associations, and institutions 
that are perceived as threatening to a secular liberal order that produces and maintains the state as 
“secular.”  
The Israeli case contributes to this conversation by adding the angle of a state that does 
not identify as secular. The Jewishness of Israel is first and foremost a national-ethnic construct, 
but it also has a religious dimension to it, as described in the discussion on Religious-Zionism 
above. In Israel, it is the delineation of boundaries between Jews and non-Jewish “Others,” as 
well as monitoring and regulating boundary crossings, that produce and reproduce it as a Jewish 
state (Kravel-Tovi 2017; Shenhav 2006). Israel’s primary “Others” are the Palestinians who live 
under its control. Israeli anthropologists who worked from the 1960s through the 1980s had often 
highlighted ways that Israeli authorities produce and maintain the marginalization and 
deprivation of Palestinian and Bedouin citizens in terms of class position, land administration, 
and the work force (Marx 1967, Rosenfeld 1964, Shokeid and Deshen 1982). These works, 
however, were later criticized for reproducing Zionist ideologies of the Palestinians as a 
“traditional” society that is incompatible with the “modern” Israeli state (Furani and Rabinowitz 
2011; Rabinowitz 2002). 
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Israel’s structural mechanisms that delineate national boundaries along religious-ethnic 
lines not only consolidates the Jewishness of the state but they also shapes the day-to-day lives of 
the non-Jews in its territory. Anthropologists have depicted myriad ways in which Palestinian 
and Bedouin citizens of Israel, as well as Palestinians living under Israeli occupation in the West 
Bank, have crafted their lives against this Jewish-national dominance in realms as diverse as 
reproduction (Kanaaneh 2002), higher education and the work force (Abu-Rabia-Queder 2008; 
Rosenfeld 2004), gender roles (Sa’ar 2007; Sa’ar and Yahia-Younis 2008), and urban sociality 
(Monterescu 2015; Rabinowitz 1997). In recent years, a growing body of scholarship has 
depicted ways that non-Palestinian migrant workers and asylum-seekers carve spaces that resist 
and challenge the hegemonic vision of Israel as a Jewish state and, at the same time, reinforce it 
(Kemp and Raijman 2003; Kritzman-Amir 2009; Paz 2018; Willen 2007, 2019). These studies of 
non-Jews in Israel have demonstrated that the Jewishness of Israel is not a fixed, already-given 
condition. It is an ongoing project in-the-making that requires continuous regeneration and 
maintenance through the management of non-Jewish lives.  
Jewishness and the Israeli State  
 The anthropological study of the triangular relationship of citizenship, religion, and the 
state in the context of Israel’s Jewish population is not vast. Anthropologists have studied Jewish 
religious groups in Israel, but they tended to concentrate on their piety, religious rituals, 
education, and community life (Bilu 2010; Bilu and Goodman 2010; El-Or 1994; Stadler 2009). 
The Israeli state is present in these studies but not as a primary object of inquiry. Studies that did 
investigate questions of Jewish nationalism and citizenship among religious Jews tended to focus 
on “fundamentalist” groups such as Jewish settlers in the West Bank (Aran 2013; Hirschhorn 
2017) and Haredi Mizrachi Jews (Leon 2014).  
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Simultaneously, anthropologists and sociologists developed a valuable body of 
scholarship about national identity and citizenship among Israeli Jews and the social and 
institutional mechanisms that produce and solidify them. Domínguez’s (1989) study of Jewish-
Israeli peoplehood encompasses vast social realms, spanning national holidays, state laws, public 
discourse, and popular culture. Other anthropologists have studied national commemoration days 
(Handelman 1990), the military (Lomsky-Feder and Sasson-Levy 2018; Weiss 2002); national-
historical museums (Katriel 1997); Holocaust commemoration activities (Feldman 2008; 
Goodman and Mizrachi 2008); and women’s rights laws (Berkovitch 1997). These studies, 
however, focus on the mostly-secular portions of Israeli society and on the secular laws and 
institutions of the state. They do not designate religious Jews as their primary focal group.  
The intersection of religion, citizenship, and national ideologies among Israel’s Jewish 
citizens is explicit in three ethnographies. Susan Kahn (2000) demonstrates that Israel’s state-
administered policies and practices of assisted reproduction technologies are shaped by Orthodox 
social actors who determine the implementation of these technologies based on halakhic 
principles of Jewish kinship. According to Kahn, the dominant discourses in Israel about the 
reproduction of Jews and the Jewish nation are inseparable from the halakhic cosmology of 
Jewish reproduction. In her study of Jewish literacy among young Religious-Zionist women in 
the midrasha of Bar-Ilan University (Israel’s only Religious-Zionist university), Tamar El-Or 
(2002) dedicates a chapter to exploring how the national identity and democratic citizenship of 
these women are constituted in classroom discussion of Talmudic texts. A more recent 
ethnography that engages with intersections of religion and citizenship is Michal Kravel-Tovi’s 
(2017) study of Religious-Zionist Jews who work in the Jewish Conversion Administration of 
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the state. One of the foci of this study is the “bottom-up” ways in which these Religious-Zionists 
construct, experience and understand their citizenship through their professional vocation. 32  
These three ethnographies offer productive insights into ways that religious Jews 
constitute their national ideologies, identities, and sentiments by envisioning their participation 
in statist-institutional settings. My study shifts the ethnographic lens to recent developments in 
Religious-Zionist society in which Religious-Zionists disengage from the formal institutional 
arena of the state. I examine how they construct their identities as Israeli citizens and as religious 
Jews not through participation in state mechanisms but by promoting and creating local 
alternatives to these mechanisms. 
The Methodology of Studying Liberal Observant Jews: Forming the Amorphous  
Research Design  
I set out to do fieldwork with an intent to learn more about social actors that challenge the 
norms of a traditional society from within that society. Above, I claimed that the terms that 
define my study – liberal observant Jews, Orthodox society, Religious Zionism – do not carry a 
single, clear-cut meaning. Consequently, the boundaries of the field where I was to explore this 
question were uncertain and ambiguous when I began my fieldwork. I asked myself, what 
phenomenon and which social actors belonged in my study, and which did not? There was no 
already-defined “field” to study; instead, it was my fieldwork that marked the boundaries of my 
field.  
I eventually chose my primary sites based on a combination of potential for intellectual 
productiveness and practical considerations (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). Out of the numerous 
                                                 
32 While El-Or focuses on religious women, Kravel-Tovi and Kahn include the perspectives of religious 
social actors as part of broader cultural accounts. Kahn looks at the experiences of secular Jewish Israeli 
women who are assisted by alternative reproductive technologies, and Kravel-Tovi studies the 
experiences of conversion candidates, who are mostly women from the former Soviet Union.  
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sites in liberal Orthodox society that could have allowed me to address my research question, I 
decided to focus on two types of developments. The first is that of liberal Orthodox 
nongovernmental organizations that work to reform the policies, norms, and functioning of the 
religious institutions of the state. The second is of religious congregations that alter religious 
practices in their communal prayers. 33   
The first group – of nongovernmental organizations – is the one I originally set out to 
study. I was interested in “formal” activism, in deliberate attempts to lead change at the level of 
state politics. On a preliminary research trip to Israel in the summer of 2014, I held a series of 
meetings with liberal Orthodox activists in an attempt to find the right organization to study. The 
activists were helpful and welcoming but, I felt, something was missing.  
During those early months of fieldwork, I saw an advertisement (I do not remember 
whether it was online or during one of my “sleuthing” excursions to Jerusalem) for the first 
Israeli conference of “partnership communities.” I already knew by then that one of the primary 
areas in which Orthodox norms were being challenged was the realm of women’s participation 
as prayer leaders in congregation communal prayers. I figured that the conference was part of 
this trend, although I did not know exactly what “partnership communities” were. I decided to 
check it out.34 
                                                 
33 Some of the developments that did not end up as part of my research but that are relevant to my 
research question include: Orthodox schools that ordain women as rabbis; egalitarian gender roles among 
Orthodox couples, including a growing number of Orthodox couples who choose to marry in a private 
ceremony rather than in the state-sponsored procedure of the Chief Rabbinate; and advanced religious 
studies programs for women who train them to become halakhic consultants. These examples illustrate 
the scope of the developments that are currently taking place in liberal Religious-Zionist society (for a 
more exhaustive list, see Ettinger 2015b).  
34 The term in Hebrew is kehilot meshatfot, which means “inclusive communities.” I use the term 
“partnership” because this is the common term in English to refer to these communities (Sztokman 2011). 
Rinat, who became one of my main interlocutors at the Baka Minyan, told me months later that there is 
controversy around the term “meshatfot” (inclusive) because it implies men’s patronization toward 
women. She preferred the word shitufi, which means “common” or “shared.” 
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The conference spanned over three days in late June 2014 and took place in the 
Community Center on Emek-Refai’im street in the German Colony neighborhood in South 
Jerusalem. The community center is a large three-story building that is nestled in an enclave of 
grassy lawns and a small shaded plaza. The building is protected from the bustling Emek-
Refai’im street by a wall and an iron gate, which is open wide during the center’s activity hours.  
Although the conference was open to the public, I was nervous about attending an event 
in which most attendants would most likely be Orthodox. I was particularly concerned about 
what to wear. I wore long pants, despite the dry heat of late June in Jerusalem and brought a 
shawl to cover my arms. When I arrived there, I was relieved to see that the building was 
swarmed with men and women, about two hundred in total, whose appearances were diverse. I 
saw women in short pants and short-sleeved shirts, as well as women with long skirts and head 
covers. Most men wore knitted kippot – the “trademark” of Religious-Zionist men (Caplan 
2017).35  
I attended the plenary session titled “Partnership Communities in the Religious Realm,” 
which took place in the community center’s auditorium. I took field notes as the speakers talked 
about balancing tradition and change in Orthodox society and about how, and when, to promote 
change. Ronit Irshai, a prominent Feminist-Orthodox scholar and a leading member in Shira 
Hadasha congregation – the first partnership minyan in Israel – paraphrased Audre Lorde’s 
saying: “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.” Irshai argued that 
partnership communities use the master’s (hence, Orthodox Judaism) tools to build a “house 
                                                 
35 There are different sizes, colors, and patterns of knitted kippot. Different types are common in different 
social groups. To a certain extent, the type of knitted kippa a man wears “labels” him as affiliated with a 
certain Religious-Zionist group (Caplan 2017). For instance, large white kippot that cover most of the 
scalp are common among messianic-oriented settlers in the West Bank. During my fieldwork in South 
Jerusalem I observed that small, black knitted kippot are common among liberal observant men.  
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within a house.” She believed that Orthodox society could amend itself, and that change was 
possible within the existing Orthodox framework.  
The next speaker was Rabbi Daniel Sperber, a Professor of Judaic Studies in Bar-Ilan 
University and the halakhic leader of Israeli partnership minyans, whose halakhic books and 
articles provided legal grounds for many of the changes led by members of these congregations. 
Rabbi Sperber spoke about the ordination of Orthodox women as halakhic leaders in Israel and 
in the United States.36 He said:  
This is a process of renewing and expanding halakhic boundaries. We need to rethink 
halakhic sources in a way that allows us to respond to the challenges of our generation… To 
expand the boundaries on the one hand without transgressing them, on the other.37  
Rabbi Sperber rejected the opinions of Orthodox rabbis who argue that promoting gender 
equality in prayer is a “deviation from Jewish traditions.” The halakha is renewing in each 
generation, he maintained, and the challenge is to innovate and renew while using “accepted” 
halakhic parameters.  
Ronit Irshai concluded by saying that partnership minyans challenge the “religious 
narrative of what it means to be a religious person.” For a “true change” to happen, she said, 
there had to be a change in this narrative. For the Orthodox-Feminist revolution to succeed, she 
concluded, there must be an ideological-theological change in addition to changing religious 
practice.  
                                                 
36 In Israel, Rabbi Sperber is the leading Orthodox rabbi to ordain women. In the US, the leading 
Orthodox rabbi who ordains women is Rabbi Avi Weiss of Yeshivat Maharat and Yeshivat Chovevei 
Torah in NY. Rabbi Sperber refrains from calling the women he ordains “rabba” (a female rabbi) because 
this is the title used in non-Orthodox Jewish streams (i.e., Reform and Conservative). He uses Maharat – 
a Hebrew acronym, coined by Rabbi Weiss, that stands for “Leader of Halakha, Spirit and Torah” 
(Ettinger 2015a). 
37 See Hebrew origin in Appendix B item 1. 
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 This panel made me rethink my research. The speakers talked about revolution, but they 
emphasized that their revolution would take place within the normative boundaries of Orthodox 
Judaism. It was a revolution that did not aim to “dismantle the master’s house” but, rather, to 
rearrange it. The men and women in that conference spoke about social change from a “bottom-
up” perspective. It was to be a revolution that grows from community life. Their informal 
activism complemented the more organized type of social change I planned to study in 
nongovernmental organizations.  
Subsequently, I decided to study religious congregations as another type of field site. My 
fieldwork among liberal Orthodox nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that aim to reform 
the religious institutions of the state allowed me to observe debates about the meaning of the 
Jewish state. My fieldwork in partnership communities allowed me to observe how liberal 
Orthodox men and women use Orthodox norms to change the “narrative of a religious person,” 
as Irshai had put it. 
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Research Sites 
 
Figure 1: Israel map (source: WorldAtlas.com. 
https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/lgcolor/ilcolor.htm, 
accessed 5/10/2019). 
 
 
Figure 2: Field sites in Jerusalem. The location of ITIM’s office is 
marked by the cursor. The approximate territory of South Jerusalem’s 
neighborhoods is delineated at the bottom of the image. (Map data: 
Google, Mapa GISrael). 
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Most of my fieldwork took place in Jerusalem. I decided to focus on one NGO, ITIM (lit. 
Times), 38 and one religious congregation, the Baka Minyan. My initial interest in ITIM was 
because the organization’s founder and director, Shaul Farber, is a US-born Orthodox rabbi. I 
was then already aware of the dominance of US-born activists in the field of liberal Orthodox 
organizations and I wanted to better understand their role in it. However, ITIM ended up being 
one of my primary research sites because of Farber’s staff members.  
 In August 2015, I emailed Ilan, who is a senior staff member at ITIM, and told him about 
my research and my interest in his organization. He responded right away, and we made an 
appointment to meet in his Jerusalem office. Our conversation then was friendly and lively. We 
were both Israelis of about the same age and I felt that we were speaking the same language 
although he was of Orthodox upbringing and I was of a secular background. We spoke about the 
questions that interested me in my research and I got the impression that he was sincerely 
interested. I suggested that I volunteer on a regular basis and assist them in various projects and 
this way I could learn about their work. He agreed right away. They had had researchers 
volunteering before in their organization and he was familiar with the model. He was himself a 
researcher who was in the midst of writing a Master’s thesis and I think he appreciated the 
project I was undertaking.  
 Since my first day as a volunteer in ITIM, Ilan and other staff members welcomed me 
openly and generously. During my first weeks I engaged in numerous casual conversations with 
staff members about the questions that interested me as a researcher, which were questions that 
they grappled with in their work and in their personal lives, such as how to make change while 
remaining within the “mainstream” and whether this kind of change is at all effective.  
                                                 
38 ITIM is a Hebrew word, not an acronym. I capitalize the word throughout the dissertation because this 
is how the organization refers to itself on its English website. ITIM is the focus of chapter three.  
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Ilan “adopted” me into his team and included me in their weekly staff meetings and 
group emails. Since Rabbi Farber travels often, Ilan was the one who often ran the everyday 
work in the office. While he and other staff members work closely with Rabbi Farber and consult 
with him regularly, Ilan was more present and influential in the numerous small, day-to-day 
decisions. Till this day I can’t exactly say what Ilan’s motivation was in allowing me such an 
open access to study the organization. Having him on “my side” facilitated my fieldwork in 
ITIM and in other sites, too. He is a well-known figure in liberal Religious-Zionist circles, and I 
often found that mentioning that I was working with him as part of my fieldwork was 
appreciated by other interlocutors in other sites. 
I volunteered once a week, sometimes twice, in the organization’s office in Jerusalem 
between August 2015 and June 2016.39 In addition, I joined staff members in meetings of 
parliamentary committees and conferences in the Knesset; meetings with colleagues in other 
organizations; workshops and training sessions that ITIM staff members held for members of 
other organizations; and in office retreat days. I also joined the legal team in a court session in 
one of their petitions against the religious institutions of the state. During my fieldwork, the 
organization had about 15 regular staff members (some of them left during this time and new 
ones joined).40 I interviewed nine staff members, focusing on members of the administration 
team and on staff members who have been in the organization a few years. During my research, 
however, I got to know everyone in the office through numerous informal conversations and 
daily interactions.  
                                                 
39 I describe my volunteer activities in greater length in chapter three. 
40 I include in this count staff members who officially worked for a new network of Religious-Zionist 
conversion courts called Giyur Kahalakha (“proper conversion”). Although this initiative is independent 
of ITIM, the organization has been a central partner in the founding and administration of these courts 
(see chapter two). The three regular staff members of this project (at that time) had a working space in 
ITIM’s office, participated in the organization’s activities, and collaborated with ITIM’s staff members in 
many aspects of their work. 
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The other primary site was the Baka Minyan – a partnership community in the Baka 
neighborhood in South Jerusalem.41 After the “partnership communities” conference, I decided 
that my focus would be on a Jerusalem community. I decided this because I figured that my 
fieldwork would benefit from Jerusalem’s numerous liberal Orthodox communities located in 
close proximity to one another (as described in chapter four). During my first weeks in Jerusalem 
I visited Shabbat services at several Jerusalem congregations. I eventually decided to make the 
Baka Minyan my primary site when I became aware of the debates that dominated the Minyan’s 
communal life at that time on the question of whether to increase women’s participation in 
communal prayers. The Baka Minyan, therefore, had just the right mix for my research objective. 
They were interested in doing things differently, yet they were busy negotiating how far to push 
at the boundaries.  
 Between July 2015 and September 2016, I participated in the congregation’s activities. I 
attended regular services over the weekends (Friday nights and Saturday mornings) and during 
Jewish holidays, and classes held by congregation members. I followed the communal debates 
about gender equality – I attended formal communal meetings that focused on this topic, read 
materials about the halakhic implications of this move, and held numerous conversations about it 
with congregation members. I interviewed twenty congregation members about their attitudes 
toward religious reforms in their congregation and in Israel more broadly.  
The gender equality debate was not my only focus in my fieldwork at the Baka Minyan. I 
aimed to participate, as much as possible, in the full spectrum of communal experiences and 
activities. This part of my fieldwork was particularly challenging for me because, as a secular, 
non-married (at that time), lesbian woman, I felt out of place. Many of the social interactions in 
                                                 
41 This is not the congregation’s formal full name. I chose to use it to disguise its identity somewhat in 
order to protect the privacy of congregation members, visitors, and guests. 
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the congregation were not within the formal activities of the Minyan. They were in the day-to-
day interactions and friendships among men and women who lived in the same neighborhood, 
had children of the same age who attended the same schools, and who themselves attended the 
same Religious-Zionist schools and lived in the same neighborhoods as they were growing up. I 
was not part of this circle. In this sense, I have felt that my fieldwork in the congregation 
remained limited. 
Ironically, the instances in which I felt that the boundaries between me and my 
interlocutors dissolved were related to my upbringing in a secular kibbutz. At the beginning of 
my fieldwork I had some concerns that my upbringing in one of the most radically-secular places 
in Israel would be a disadvantage. I thought it might interfere with my ability to connect with my 
interlocutors. At the Baka Minyan, however, I formed the closest relationships with members 
who were former-kibbutz members themselves. Even though they grew up in religious 
kibbutzim, our shared kibbutz upbringing offered a common language.  
I sensed that congregation members who did not grow up in a kibbutz appreciated this 
part of my biography, too. For instance, in one of my early conversations with Ronen, he 
wondered aloud what drew me, as a secular woman, to studying a religious congregation. “We 
usually study ourselves this way or another,” he commented (being an academic, he had his own 
personal experiences with research.) But when he heard I was from a kibbutz, it made more 
sense to him. “You understand what a community is, then,” he concluded.  
During my fieldwork, I rented a room in an apartment in the Katamon neighborhood in 
South Jerusalem. I spent all weekends and Jewish holidays as well as half of the weekdays in that 
neighborhood. When I was not in South Jerusalem, I was in Tel-Aviv, transcribing interviews 
and writing extended field notes, reading primary sources about Religious-Zionism in the 
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libraries of Tel-Aviv and Bar-Ilan universities, and attending conferences and events related to 
my research. Residing in Jerusalem allowed me not only to volunteer in ITIM and attend the 
Shabbat services of the Baka Minyan but also to attend prayers and events organized by other 
congregations and organizations. This allowed me to situate my main field sites in the context of 
their wider social milieu. I tried to “sample” congregations that served the liberal, halakha-
observing crowd yet differed from one another in some respects. Among the congregations 
whose communal services and activities I attended were Shira Hadasha, Zion, Sod Siach, 
Ramban, and Yedidia congregations. In Yedidya congregation, I also attended a weekly Talmud 
study group that was led by a member of the congregation. Participating in this group allowed 
me to become familiar with Talmudic texts as well as with some of the issues and concerns that 
liberal observant Jews find pertinent.  
Although my move to Jerusalem was for practical reasons, the fabric of life in South 
Jerusalem ended up being part of my ethnography (see chapter four). The woman I shared the 
Katamon apartment with was of a religious background herself and had close familiarity with the 
congregations I was studying. As a Mizrahi woman, she did not find her religious home in any of 
these Ashkenazi-dominated congregations, but she had strong opinions about them. We had 
numerous conversations on the apartment’s balcony that overlooked the main street in the 
Katamon neighborhood, or over Shabbat dinner with a few of her many friends, all of whom 
were curious about me and my research and were always enthusiastic to talk about the questions 
that interested me. Although these conversations and interactions did not become a central part 
of the final product of my ethnography – this dissertation – they were an important aspect of my 
fieldwork. I learned a lot from this group, which was mostly composed of single men and women 
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in their 30s and 40s, about current moods and concerns in the liberal Orthodox world. And, as 
important, they were my social context while I was “in the field.” 
Most of my fieldwork took place in Jerusalem although I did not set out to study 
Jerusalem. As I describe above, my zeroing in on Jerusalem has been, in part, due to 
considerations of convenience and practicality. However, there are special conditions in 
Jerusalem that do not exist in other liberal Orthodox communities elsewhere, and they have 
shaped the development of my research and its outcomes.  
Jerusalem has a strong urban culture. The municipality has divided the city into local 
community councils that are administered as non-for-profit organizations. The community 
councils work with the municipality and are responsible for developing communal services in the 
different neighborhoods in collaboration with local residents. South Jerusalem, one of my main 
field sites, is the home of two strong community councils: Ginot HaIr (lit. City Gardens) in the 
German Colony, which serves approximately 35,000 residents of several adjacent neighborhood, 
and the Baka Community Council, which serves the 13,000 residents of the Baka neighborhood 
(Jerusalem Municipality 2017).42  
These councils provide residents with strong community-based educational, cultural and 
recreational services. The Baka Community Council even has a residents’ forum that helps them 
to organize in favor of, or against, various municipal initiatives in the neighborhood (Zaban 
2013). For the religious residents of these neighborhoods, the lively religious scene in this area 
provides another communal frame of affiliation and belonging. It makes sense, therefore, that 
liberal observant residents of this area turn to local and communal settings in their grappling with 
questions of religious authority, autonomy, and citizenship (as I outline in chapters four and 
five).  
                                                 
42 These figures are accurate as of 11/30/2017. 
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The scope of this study, however, transcends the limits of South Jerusalem. The 
nongovernmental organizations I study aim to influence the national-political sphere and their 
employees do not all live in Jerusalem. In addition, I participated in many conferences, cultural 
events, festivals, and lectures in different locations in Israel in which I heard similar ideas to 
those I heard in my Jerusalem sites. I also followed public discourse in liberal Religious-Zionist 
society in articles published in Makor Rishon (lit. First Source) newspaper, a leading Religious-
Zionist daily newspaper, and De’ot (lit. Opinions), a liberal Religious-Zionist journal of popular 
as well as scholarly orientation. The need to come up with local and “from below” frameworks 
in which people could shape their religiosity rather than rely on rabbinical authorities was 
expressed in these spaces as much as it was in my Jerusalem field sites. Jerusalem, therefore, 
offers a distillation of the process at the center of this study – the scaling-down of public 
Judaism. This process, however, is not unique to Jerusalem; it represents a current concern that is 
on the agenda of liberal Religious-Zionist communities across Israel.  
Outline of this Study 
 Chapter two looks at current ways that liberal observant Jews rethink public Judaism 
through their activism. I first describe the past and present of Israel’s religious institutions and 
then present three recent initiatives in which liberal observant Jews have proposed alternatives to 
the religious services provided by the state. These initiatives, I argue, involve re-envisioning the 
locus of religious authority – from a state-administered religion to a religion that is decided upon 
at the level of individuals and communities. I show ways that these initiatives represent activists’ 
engagement with ideas about pluralistic, voluntarist religious life in the United States, and their 
appropriation of these ideas to make them legible in the Israeli context.  
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 Chapter three analyzes the activism of ITIM, a liberal Orthodox NGO that was founded 
by an Israeli-American rabbi with the explicit aim to reform the religious institutions of the state. 
Although the organization’s activism operates within the political arena of state institutions, it is 
nevertheless focused on the “personal” and the “private.” I argue in that chapter that the activism 
of leading figures in the organization is “affective activism” in its implicit aim to bring to life an 
Israel in which they, as liberal observant Jews, have a more central place. I show how, in their 
activities for reform, they work to facilitate the religious autonomy of individuals. In doing so, 
they make public Judaism a “personal” matter. 
Chapter four moves “downscale” to focus on a particular neighborhood in South 
Jerusalem, the home of many liberal observant Jews. I demonstrate how the plethora of liberal 
religious congregations that cater to the same crowd and are in walking distance from one 
another provides a pluralist religious “marketplace” in which free choice is emphasized. I 
describe how they enact their ways of being liberal and observant through a variety of modes of 
neighborhood sociability and, by doing so, create their neighborhood as a new Jewish “public 
square” that is meant to replace the national “public sphere.” 
Chapter five zooms in further. In this chapter I depict communal debates about religious 
authority, agency, and autonomy in the Baka Minyan. I argue that congregation members show 
bold innovation when they view their communal prayers as a private setting but are more 
hesitant to challenge Orthodox norms when they think about the public visibility of their 
congregation. By analyzing core elements in their communal services, I show the important role 
bodily sensations and questions of social identification play in discussions about ritual change.    
Finally, chapter six concludes the discussion by delineating connections between the 
cases described in the previous chapters. This chapter demonstrates that questions of citizenship 
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are important to understanding the scaling down of public Judaism. I argue that, through this 
process, liberal observant Jews construct their citizenship as Religious-Zionists who are 
simultaneously critical of the Israeli state and dedicated to it.  
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CHAPTER 2 
FROM STATE TO COMMUNITY: RE-ENVISIONING PUBLIC JUDAISM IN ISRAEL 
 On March 13, 2013, a new Israeli government was sworn into office. For the first time in 
eighteen years, no Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) parties were included in the coalition. The prime 
minister of that government was Binyamin Netanyahu, and the three dominant parties in the 
coalition were the Likkud party43; Yesh Atid (“There is a Future”), a new party that aimed to 
represent middle-class Israeli Jews; and HaBayit HaYehudi, The Jewish Home, Israel’s new 
Religious-Zionist party, that replaced Hamafdal party (acronym for Miflaga Datit-Le’umit, 
Religious-National Party) in representing Religious-Zionists in the Knesset. The Jewish Home 
party won twelve seats and became the biggest party at that time that represented religious Jews.  
 After the 2013 elections, there was an air of excitement in Religious-Zionist Circles. The 
slogan of the Jewish Home party was Mashehu Hadash Matchil – “Something New Begins,” and 
texts published after the elections by public figures within Religious-Zionist society testify that 
they truly believed that a new era was starting. This era was, first and foremost, an era in which 
the Haredi parties did not determine the religious agenda of the Israeli government. Instead, it 
was a Religious-Zionist party that held the “Jewish reins” in the government. Secondly, it was 
the rise of Yesh Atid party, under the leadership of Yair Lapid, a former journalist and media 
personage who became a politician, that marked this “new beginning.” Yesh Atid is a centrist 
party, 44 that portrayed itself in its campaign as representing the Israeli “mainstream”: middle-
                                                 
43 Prior to the elections, Israel Beiteinu, a party that represented the interests of Jewish immigrants from 
the former Soviet Union, merged with the Likkud and held a joint campaign.  
44 The Israeli political map is organized according to left-wing, right-wing and centrist parties, in relation 
to their position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Domínguez 1984). Left-wing parties hold dovish 
positions on questions pertaining to political negotiations with the Palestinians and advancing toward a 
viable solution. Right-wing parties hold hawkish positions regarding these questions. Centrist parties 
present themselves as neither dovish nor hawkish; they will not resist negotiations with the Palestinians, 
but they will not have it at the top of their political agenda, either.  
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class, secular or masorti Jews who hold centrist political views. 45 At least four Knesset members 
of Yesh Atid, some of them from a Religious-Zionist background, ran for office as promoting a 
liberal and pluralist Jewish agenda, one that might speak to the majority of secular and masorti 
Israeli Jews. Together with The Jewish Home party they brought about an air of a new, 
moderate, pluralist and accommodating Judaism that would represent the interests of an 
imagined Israeli-Jewish “mainstream”– those hundreds of thousands of Israeli Jews who wished 
to integrate various interpretations of Jewish tradition into their mostly secular lives, but did not 
identify with ultra-Orthodox Judaism that dominates the state’s religious institutions.  
 The strengthening of the Jewish Home party in the 2013 elections initiated a discourse in 
Religious-Zionist circles about the nature of Jewish leadership that Religious-Zionism had to 
offer to Jewish Israeli society at the turn of the twenty-first century. They asked, what can 
Religious-Zionists do differently than the Haredim and how would they go about doing it? In 
Religious-Zionist media, scholars and intellectuals theorized the opportunities embedded in 
“Religious-Zionism’s return to the front of the political stage” (Nachlon 2013).46 The 2013 
elections and the new political map it created were perceived in Religious-Zionist circles to be an 
opportunity to reconfigure the relationship between religion and state and to reset Religious-
Zionism’s role in shaping this relationship.  
                                                 
45 Masorti (lit. traditionalist) is a social-religious category that refers to Jews who neither identify as hiloni 
(secular) nor as dati (religious). This category of religiosity is viewed as characteristic of the Judaism of 
Mizrahi Jews. Commonly, masorti Jews are perceived as following the traditions of past generations and 
are not considered as full-fledged participants in “modern” secular Israeli society (Yadgar 2005). 
According to Yadgar, who researched this group extensively, a masorti identity is an active choice rather 
than a tradition that is “passively” passed on from one generation to another. He argues that individuals 
who assume this identity do so as a way of building, maintaining and strengthening their Jewish identities 
(ibid). 
46 See, for instance, the April 2013 issue of the journal De’ot (lit. Opinions) published by the liberal 
Religious-Zionist movement Ne’emanei Torah Ve’Avodah – “Faithful of Torah and Labor” (on which I 
elaborate below). The whole issue was dedicated to analyzing the post-elections political map from the 
viewpoint of Religious-Zionism. 
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  This moment in Israeli politics in which liberal Religious-Zionists felt that they have 
regained power to influence Israel’s Jewish orientation was short-lived. The government in 
which Religious-Zionists occupied key positions suffered from political instability and 
eventually was replaced in May 2015 by a new government with two large Haredi parties. These 
political shifts arrived at a critical point in time when liberal circles within Religious-Zionist 
society grew increasingly discontent with the Chief Rabbinate’s intensifying stringency in its 
policies of Jewish conversion, marriage, burial, and kashrut (Judaism’s dietary laws). 
 Although the Chief Rabbinate was dominated by Religious-Zionist rabbis during its first 
few decades, in the past couple of decades, Haredi forces (Ashkenazi as well as Mizrahi) have 
been occupying central positions in Israel’s religious institutions. These Haredi state actors have 
been introducing stricter policies of Jewish conversion and marriage, as a way of safeguarding 
the “wholesomeness” of the Jewish collective in Israel (hence, by limiting access to joining this 
collective) (Cohen and Susser 2000; Leon 2014). This strictness was resulted in a growing 
discontent with the religious services of the state. 
 One aspect of this discontent can be seen in people’s personal choices to disengage with 
the services of the Chief Rabbinate as an act of protest. The most prominent example is the 
growing number of Religious-Zionist men and women who choose to perform their Orthodox 
wedding ceremonies without turning to the Chief Rabbinate’s marriage registration and 
certification procedures (Maltz 2018). This means that their marriage is not recognized by the 
state of Israel although it is valid according to Jewish law standards.  
In June 2018 alone, three studies on non-Rabbinate marriage among Orthodox as well as 
non-Orthodox couples were published. Two of these studies cover the full range of couples who 
were married in non-state procedures, including same-sex couples and heterosexual couples who 
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married in Jewish ceremonies of non-Orthodox orientation. These studies were published by the 
Rackman Center at Bar-Ilan University’s Law School and by Panim, a nongovernmental 
organization that promotes pluralistic Judaism in Israel. The third study, published by Mavoi 
Satum, a nongovernmental organization that protects women’s rights in Jewish marriage and 
divorce, focuses on Orthodox marriage alternatives. These three studies were funded by Israel 
Religious Expression Platform (iREP) – an initiative of the Jewish Federations of North America 
that works to “encourage respect for diverse expressions of Judaism in Israel” (Jewish 
Federations of North America, n.d.). 
These studies are meant to document and analyze this new trend, but also to provide 
information and guidance to couples who seek alternatives to the Chief Rabbinate. They show 
that there is an audience seeking this information but also that there are organizations and 
institutions working to advance this agenda.  
 In this chapter I focus on ways that protest against the Chief Rabbinate has translated into 
organized activism. Rabbis, activists, and public figures who belong to liberal circles of 
Religious-Zionist society have been talking and writing about creating new Orthodox-oriented 
religious services that bypass the Rabbinate’s procedures and have acted in ways that can realize 
these ideas. At the core of their projects is an effort to rethink the way Judaism has been part of 
the Israeli state. The two parallel trajectories I describe above – the political hope and subsequent 
disappointment of liberal Religious-Zionists on the one hand, and their growing discontent with 
the Chief Rabbinate on the other – are the backdrop to the reform initiatives I discuss in this 
chapter.  
 In what follows, I look at current ways that liberal observant Jews rethink institutional 
Judaism through their recent initiatives to found community-centered alternatives to the 
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centralized religious services of the state. I look at three recent cases: a proposal to democratize 
the Chief Rabbinate; the founding of a network of Jewish conversion courts; and the 
establishment of a private kashrut certification service. I argue that the activists who are involved 
in these initiatives re-envision the locus of religious authority – from a state-administered 
religion to a religion that is decided on at the level of individuals and communities.  
This emergent focus on individualized and community-based religion represents a 
divergence from the historic emphasis of Religious-Zionism on mamlakhtiyut – on the Israeli 
state and its institution as the loci of religious authority. Instead, the activists engage with ideas 
about religious life in the United States and with notions about past Judaism. Liberal observant 
Jews in Israel, some of whom were born in the United States and immigrated to Israel, turn to US 
models of religiosity on the one hand, and to past models of Jewish life on the other, as they seek 
to reconfigure public Judaism in Israel. 
Public Judaism in Israel 
The Status Quo Between Religion and State 
This chapter looks at recent instances in which liberal observant activists have proposed 
local alternatives to the religious institutions of the state. These activists do not turn away from 
ideologies about Israel as a Jewish state but, instead, rework the relationship between public 
Judaism and the state. Before elaborating on the ethnographic case-studies, this section outlines 
this relationship between Judaism and state institutions.  
Israel self-identifies as a secular democracy and as a Jewish state that integrates civil law 
and Jewish law principles into its corpus of state laws. The Orthodox Chief Rabbinate was 
established in 1921, prior to the founding of the state, to administer and supervise legal aspects 
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related to religious life of the Jewish residents of Mandatory Palestine. After the foundation of 
Israel in 1948 it became the state’s formal Jewish religious institution (Cohen and Susser 2000).  
The jurisdiction of the Chief Rabbinate was determined in the “Status Quo” 
arrangement– an agreement between David Ben-Gurion, then the primary Zionist leader of the 
Jewish population in Palestine, and Haredi leaders, that outlined the Jewish character of the 
future Jewish state. This agreement later became the foundation of Israel’s religion-based laws: 
Jewish personal status laws, laws that determine kashrut (Jewish dietary laws) standards of 
restaurants, the shut-down of public transportation and businesses on Shabbat, and laws that 
concern death and burial. To this day, these realms are governed by the Chief Rabbinate’s 
Orthodox interpretation of halakha. The state does not provide non-Orthodox alternatives (Ben-
Porat 2013, 32; Halperin-Kaddari 2004).  
The consequences of this integration of religious laws and state laws to the lives of Israeli 
citizens are pervasive, and they affect secular Jews as much as religious Jews and non-Jewish 
citizens.47 In the early decades of the state there were few organized attempts to confront the 
status quo arrangement.48 This has changed during the 1990s with three processes: new 
constitutional developments stemming from the enactment of new basic laws that protected 
human rights (Barak-Erez 2007),49 the expansion of neoliberal economy and a culture of 
consumerism, and the massive immigration wave from the former Soviet Union that introduced 
                                                 
47 The establishment of religion in state institutions is not limited to Judaism. The other two primary 
religions in Israel, Islam and Christianity, also have state-regulated institutions that oversee the realms of 
personal status, marriage and divorce, and burial. However, since Israel self-identified as a Jewish state, 
the establishment of Jewish laws impacts the lives of non-Jews as well. For instance, state institutions, 
public and private workplaces and schools, as well as most private businesses are closed on major Jewish 
holidays. This is not the case in major Muslim or Christian holidays.  
48 For instance, the League against Religious Coercion that operated in the 1950s pushed toward 
separating religion and state (Ben-Porat 2013, 35). 
49 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (1994) and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992). 
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into Israel’s Jewish society a large population of Jews who had weak connections to Orthodox 
Judaism due to decades of a Communist regime (Ben-Porat 2013).  
Nowadays, there are numerous nongovernmental organizations of different orientations – 
secular, Orthodox, and religious yet non-Orthodox – that work to promote religious freedom in 
Israel. 50 These organizations have framed their objection to this Orthodox dominance in a 
language of “religious coercion” (kfiya datit) and in demanding greater religious freedom. 
However, although second and third generation Israelis are now more aware of the negative 
impact of the status quo on their standard of living (Barak-Erez 2010),51 this issue has never 
taken the form of a massive popular protest. The battle against “religious coercion” has remained 
mostly in the hallways of the Knesset and in the halls of the Israeli Supreme Court (Ben-Porat 
2013). It seems that Israeli Jews who wish to minimize the intervention of the Chief Rabbinate in 
their personal lives have found ways to bypass it in various ways, without substantially 
challenging the status quo. 
Ben-Porat’s study (2013) is particularly relevant to the instances of liberal religious 
activism I discuss below. Ben-Porat studies initiatives of Israeli secular entrepreneurs who, since 
the 1990s, have created state-recognized secular alternatives to the religious institution of the 
state.52 He argues that these entrepreneurs, which he calls “secular agents of change,” have 
circumvented the religious laws of the state, mostly by appealing to the Supreme Court, and have 
provided secular solutions that address the needs of secular Israeli Jews (xvi).  
                                                 
50 Among the prominent organizations that have been working toward changing the religious policies of 
the state and have been pushing toward greater religious freedoms are Hiddush (lit. “renewal”) and the 
legal center of the Israeli Jewish Reform Movement– Israel Religious Action Center. I elaborate on the 
Orthodox organizations that work in this filed on chapter three, as part of my discussion of ITIM.  
51 For instance, lack of public transportation on the Jewish Sabbath and on Jewish holidays limits the 
mobility of Israelis who do not own a car. 
52 Ben-Porat focuses on four realms: marriage, burial, kashrut, and the opening of shopping centers on 
Shabbat (the Jewish Sabbath).  
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This chapter examines a parallel development that has taken place within Israel’s 
religious society. The activists I study are “religious agents of change” who have founded 
religious alternatives that circumvent formal religious authorities. Similar to the secular 
initiatives Ben-Porat studies, the projects I analyze are also responses to the growing discrepancy 
between the religious institutions and the needs and demands of Israeli Jews (2013, 26). The 
secular agents of change Ben-Porat studies and the religious agents of change whom I study 
represent civil-society responses to the obstacles the religious institutions of the state have 
presented to activists’ ways of life – whether it is a secular way of life or a liberal-religious one. I 
do not argue that they try to “secularize” the state but, rather, that their ways of resisting the 
religious establishment have been in use by secular social actors until now. Ironically, my 
interlocutors are using these “secular” ways of resisting the religious institutions to strengthen 
Judaism in Israel.  
Public Judaism and the Politics of Jewishness 
Public Judaism in Israel – the Jewish laws and traditions that were incorporated into the 
legal framework of the state as part of the Status Quo arrangement – shapes much more than the 
day-to-day practices of citizens. It also configures Israel’s politics of Jewish identity. Since Israel 
self-identifies as a Jewish state, debates about Jewish religiosity and who is considered a Jew 
have political ramifications that go beyond the personal. In other words, the religious politics of 
the Israeli state are shaped by the politics of Jewishness and vice versa (Domínguez 1989; 
Kravel-Tovi 2017).   
The evolution of the Jewish Law of Return, Israel’s law of Jewish repatriation, 
demonstrates this point. The law defines who is considered a Jew for immigration and 
naturalization purposes. As amendments to the law over the years demonstrate, the question 
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“who is a Jew” does not have a definite answer. In fact, these amendments reveal that “Jewish” 
is a politically contested category (Domínguez 1989, Kravel-Tovi 2017). Prior to 1970, the Law 
of Return did not specify who was considered Jewish, so it had remained an ambiguous category. 
A 1970 amendment specified that “Jewish” is an individual who was born to a Jewish mother, as 
per with halakhic standards. The 1970 amendment narrowed the law by inserting this halakhic 
definition, but also expanded it by granting immigration and naturalization rights to relatives of 
Jews (Kravel-Tovi 2017, 27-28).53  
This amendment enabled the mass immigration of non-Jews (by halakhic standards) from 
the former Soviet Union (FSU) during the 1990s, which led to a substantial demographic 
transformation in Israel. For the first time in the history of the Jewish state, there was a 
significant group of Israelis who are not Jewish by halakhic standards yet have integrated into 
Israel’s Jewish society.54 This demographic shift has been the background to the establishment of 
national conversion institutions that aim to convert these immigrants into Judaism as well as to 
an escalation in the exclusionist policies of the Chief Rabbinate. The alternative religious 
services I analyze in this chapter represent liberal observant Jews’ response to this escalation. 
This example of the Law of Return demonstrates ways that halakhic questions inform legal and 
political debates about Jewishness, which in their turn shape and transform Israeli society and the 
lives of Israeli Jews.  
                                                 
53 The law also maintained ambiguity about what would be considered a valid Jewish conversion, 
intentionally not specifying whether it would have to be conducted according to Orthodox standards 
(Kravel-Tovi 2017, 28). 
54 The largest indigenous non-Jewish populations in Israel– Palestinian citizens of Israel, Druze, 
Circassian, and Bedouins– have remained, in many ways, segregated from Jewish society. For the most 
part, they live in separate towns and neighborhoods; attend different schools; and face marginalization in 
the work force. For discussions of mechanisms of segregation and inequality in Israel’s “mixed cities” see 
Monterescu (2015), Rabinowitz (1997), and Romann and Weingrod (1991). 
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Another example is of Jews who wish to practice non-Orthodox Judaism. Since the 
arrival of the Jewish Reform and Conservative movements to Israel in the 1960s and the 1970s 
from English-speaking countries, the Orthodox institutions have been hostile toward them. The 
state Rabbinate has been consistent in its efforts to prevent state recognition and funding of the 
non-Orthodox movements (Ferziger 2014). Their exclusion, however, is not only from state 
resources but also from the popular consensus about what is accepted as a legitimate Jewish 
religiosity. Within Orthodox society and in the wider Israeli public, “Orthodox” Judaism is 
considered the only legitimate Jewish tradition (ibid). While Israeli Jews who identify as 
Conservative or Reform enjoy multiple privileges as Jews, mostly of Ashkenazi origin, their 
religious practice is considered outside the realm of legitimate Jewish religiosity (Tabory 2004).  
This last example is particularly relevant to this study. The liberal observant Jews I study 
emphasize their commitment to the halakha as a way of establishing their social legitimacy. This 
chapter and the chapters that follow portray their efforts to criticize and offer alternatives to 
Orthodox norms while emphasizing their connections to “traditional,” halakhic Judaism.  
Scaling Down Judaism: Liberal Religious-Zionist Activism 
 This chapter looks at a reconfiguration of mamlakhti (statist) ideology among liberal 
observant activists who are members of Religious-Zionist society. Their stance is not anti-
mamlakhti. They are different from radical-revolutionary groups within Religious-Zionist society 
that actively and violently resist state policies that go against what they view as the “divine will.” 
The initiatives I analyze in this chapter represent a decline among liberal observant Jews in their 
support of, and identification with, the state’s religious institutions in their current form. It is not 
a violent resistance, nor an attempt to de-valorize state institutions but, rather, a critique of 
certain aspects of the state.  
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 This decline results in disengagement with the services these institutions provide and in 
active attempts to come up with alternatives. A common ground in initiatives that are part of this 
current mode within liberal Religious-Zionist society is their emphasis on local communities and 
individuals, rather than on the state and rabbinical leaders, as the locus of religious authority and 
as the place where Judaism in Israel should be debated and determined. Their efforts do not 
represent an abandonment of Zionist ideals of a sovereign Jewish state but, rather, an objection 
to the type of Jewish state that Israel has become – a state where the Jewish religious 
establishment is dominated by ultra-Orthodox authorities.  
 By calling attention to ways that liberal observant activists and intellectuals articulate a 
new focus on a community-based Judaism, I aim to cast light on their view of the meaning of 
Israel as a Jewish state. As I demonstrate in the remaining sections of this chapter, these activists 
turn to what they view as a US model of public religiosity, within the Orthodox Jewish world 
and outside it, in their proposals to shift the locus of religious responsibility and authority from 
the state to communities. This turn to “exilic” models of religiosity reflects a departure from 
dominant Religious-Zionist ideologies of negating Jewish existence in the diaspora (Don Yehiya 
1992).55 Liberal Religious-Zionist rabbis, intellectuals, and activists, some of whom are US-born, 
do not see Jewish existence in the diaspora as a “decayed” society, as was the common 
perception among Religious-Zionists in Israel (Don Yehiya 1992). Instead, they see it as an 
inspiration for how Judaism in Israel can be done better. 
                                                 
55 Don Yehiya argues that while historic thinkers across the Religious-Zionist spectrum, like HaRav Kook 
and ideologues of HaPoe’l HaMizrachi, had components of negation of the Diaspora in their ideologies, it 
is the “right wing” of Religious-Zionism that has been more vocal about it in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, particularly in the Gush Emunim movement. Perhaps my finding that some elements 
within the “left wing” of Religious-Zionism in Israel has assigned a positive meaning to aspects of 
contemporary Jewish experience in the US is part of their political and social differentiation from 
Religious-Zionist circles who identify with Gush Emunim ideology.  
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 I do not argue that they idealize Jewish life in the diaspora. There is a dominant discourse 
in Israel about the “perils” of assimilation in Jewish communities outside of Israel (see, for 
instance, Sokol 2014). Within this discourse, Israel is believed to be the “safest” place for Jews 
to maintain a distinct Jewish identity since they are the majority group (Goodman 2015). Instead, 
I argue that there are certain aspects of diasporic Jewish life that are perceived by the people I 
study as better than in Israel. 
 Another source of inspiration for these individuals is past Judaism, and particularly the 
Judaism that existed during the time of Hazal – the rabbis who were the spiritual and halakhic 
leaders of the Jewish community in the Land of Israel circa 325 BCE to 600 CE, and whose 
teachings are documented in the Mishna and the Talmud.56 The intellectuals and activists whose 
work I review in this chapter, as well as liberal observant Jews I met across my field in NGOs 
and religious congregations, “reach back” to a Jewish “traditional” past to validate their way of 
doing Judaism in the present (Clifford 2000).57  
 These two sources– American religiosity and Hazalic Judaism – provide the vocabulary 
liberal observant activists apply when they articulate their ideas of reform. To them, these are 
examples of a communal religiosity that works, and they draw links between their initiatives and 
these other models as way of justifying their own projects. As they do so, they not only argue for 
                                                 
56 Hazal is a Hebrew acronym for “our deceased sages.” The Mishna is the oldest post-biblical collection 
of originally oral laws supplementing scriptural laws. It was compiled during the first and second 
centuries CE. The Talmud is a collection of commentaries on and elaborations of the Mishna. There are 
two Talmuds – one that was compiled in the Babylonian exile and another in the Land of Israel. Both 
were compiled between the third and fifth centuries CE (“Mishna,” n.d. In Encyclopedia Britannica. 
Accessed 2/15/2019. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Mishna). 
57 Daniel and Jonathan Boyarin (1993) have also referred to Talmudic Judaism as representing of 
“traditional” Judaism better than Jewish culture that evolved in the modern state of Israel. Their 
ideological vantage point, however, is different from that of my interlocutors. While my interlocutors do 
not disagree with Israel’s Zionist premises (as far as I know), to the Boyarins, Zionism is the “subversion 
of Jewish culture and not its culmination” (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993, 712).  
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the Judaism they seek to advance but also constitute themselves as the “genuine” embodiment of 
the Jewish and democratic ideal.   
 The three case studies outlined below envision Jewish communities as the locus of public 
Judaism. In each of these projects, the significance of shifting public Judaism to the 
“community” means something slightly different. In the first initiative I describe, of an NGO that 
proposes two different ways to democratize the Chief Rabbinate, the focus on communities 
means a greater representation of the people’s will in shaping the religious institutions of the 
state. In the second initiative – a group of Religious-Zionist rabbis and activists who started a 
network of independent conversion courts – the focus on communities means diversification of 
halakhic standards so they better serve the needs of different Jewish groups. The third and final 
initiative is an organization that offered private services of Orthodox kashrut. Here, the focus on 
community entails a “free market” of kashrut providers which, according to activists, would 
ultimately lead to a better and fairer service. 
Activists in these groups are aware of each other’s work, collaborate with one another on 
certain issues, and know each other personally. Some have worked or volunteered in liberal 
Religious-Zionist organizations; others had attended the same advanced religious schools; and 
some participate in events that pertain to liberal religiosity in Israel. These three initiatives, 
therefore, reflect the range of topics addressed by Religious-Zionist activists who share a similar 
ideological stance and a common goal – that is, to improve the state of public Judaism in Israel 
by wresting control over religious services from the Chief Rabbinate.    
Democratizing the Chief Rabbinate  
 I first heard of the Religious-Zionist organization Ne’emanei Torah Ve’Avodah (lit. 
“Faithful of Torah and Labor,” NTA from hereafter) from Michal, a staff member in a 
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nongovernmental organization that provides consulting, organizing, and coalition-building 
services to Israeli NGOs that promote social justice in Israeli society. One of the areas Michal 
oversaw in her work was that of civil-society organizations that advance religious pluralism in 
Israel. As part of her work, she helped Orthodox organizations seeking to advance religious 
pluralism within Orthodox society. One of the primary organizations in this field was NTA, she 
told me, and she suggested that I speak with Shimon – a key figure in NTA – with whom she 
worked closely. I was still at Illinois at that time and was planning my summer research 
activities. I emailed Shimon and introduced myself and my research interests and asked to 
schedule a phone conversation to learn more about NTA’s activities. He replied within minutes, 
although it was well past eleven at night in Israel. His brief message said: “Shalom, Ofira. 
Gladly. The thing is, it is almost Passover. How urgent is it? Can it wait till after the holiday? If 
not, we’ll find time. By the way, I worked as a Shaliach in the Chicago area for several years. 
Where in Illinois are you?” 58 From this message, and from the additional ones that followed as 
we were scheduling time to talk (eventually he made time for me the day before Passover – 
“between cleanings,” he said), I got a sense of an energetic, straight-forward, and to-the-point 
person. Our phone conversation, and subsequent meetings over the summer, corroborated my 
initial impression. Shimon has been the driving force behind many of NTA’s activities over the 
past several years. In my conversations with him he told me about the movement’s agenda in 
general and about one of their recent flagship projects in particular – democratizing the Chief 
Rabbinate.  
                                                 
58 The literary meaning of Shaliach (pl. Shlichim) is an emissary. Jewish organizations and agencies of 
various orientations employ Israeli Shlichim who travel overseas to live among Jewish communities the 
world over for a designated period of time, and to work in projects that promote the organization’s 
objectives.  
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Ne’emenai Torah Ve’Avodah is a Religious-Zionist grassroots organization that was 
established in the late 1970s by Religious-Zionist intellectuals and educators who sought to 
respond to increasing religious extremism in Religious-Zionist schools and in the primary 
Religious-Zionist youth movement, Bnei Akiva (Sheleg 2000, 36). NTA’s mission is “To forge a 
more open and tolerant discourse in Religious Zionism, one that integrates Halachic lifestyle 
with active engagement in Israeli society, in order to strengthen tolerance, equality, and social 
responsibility on the national level” (NTA, n.d.). The movement holds leadership seminars for 
Religious-Zionist youth, publishes journals and policy papers, organizes conferences and events, 
engages in public advocacy activities, and collaborates with Knesset Members in formulating 
legislative bills that promote the organization’s mission (ibid). 
 Over the phone, Shimon told me excitedly about the organization’s recent initiative to 
reform the state’s religious institutions. Their model represented “separating religion and politics 
but not religion and state,” he said. According to the model his organization developed, the state 
will continue to fund religious services, but all decisions on religious matters will be made 
bottom-up, “from the community,” as he worded it. The time was ripe for a change, he said, 
because there were no Haredi parties in the government.59  
 As part of their public outreach, NTA sought to “change Religious-Zionist perception of 
religious authority,” Shimon told me. Until recently, he explained, Religious-Zionists have 
believed that the state Rabbinate held sole authority on matters of religious life. As a result of 
NTA’s outreach activities, he continued, people were starting to realize that the Rabbinate in its 
current form “is not the solution.” He told me that NTA was trying to advance an initiative for a 
democratic election of rabbis through local, municipal elections alongside national elections. 
                                                 
59 The conversation took place in April 2014, during the tenure of a coalition without Haredi parties, a 
rare reality in Israel’s political arena, as I discuss earlier in this chapter. 
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“Like in the US,” he emphasized.60 This initiative, he hoped, could prepare the ground for their 
more extensive and far-reaching model for a community-based Chief Rabbinate.  
 I held two additional conversations with Shimon the following summer, during which he 
told me more about NTA’s vision of public Judaism in Israel. Shimon depicted this vision by 
turning to two primary models of public religion – the ancient Judaism of Hazal, on the one 
hand, and current models of US religiosity, on the other.   
 Shimon used the term “liberal Judaism” to describe NTA’s community-based model. 
When I asked him to explain what he meant by “liberal” he said: “By its nature, Judaism has 
always been liberal. Most of the things we do [at NTA] are not new but, rather, a return to the 
sources.” When I asked him whether “liberal” meant the opposite of strict religiosity he 
confirmed:  
Yes, an open Judaism that allows thinking. This is how it has always been. There were 
always disagreements within Judaism, struggles between moderate and more conservative 
streams. Eventually, the moderates had won – like the struggle between Beit-Hillel and Beit-
Shammai during the destruction [of the second Temple].61 This is the exact same struggle 
between liberalism and conservativism.62 
                                                 
60 Shimon did not mean that US rabbis are nominated through democratic elections but, rather, that US 
citizens elect their municipal and state representatives on the same day of the national elections for 
presidency. In Israel, unlike the United States, municipal rabbis are employees of the state who have 
municipal or geographical jurisdiction. This is why this example from the United States seemed relevant 
to him.  
61 Hillel and Shammai were among the rabbis mentioned in the Mishnah. Hillel and Shammai were heads 
of batei-midrash (lit. houses of learning) that were known for their opposite worldviews – Shammai 
favored a strict interpretation of halakha and Hillel, a moderate one. Until today, “Beit Shammai” (lit. 
house of Shammai) and “Beit Hillel” (lit. house of Hillel) are Hebrew expressions that refer to a strict 
approach and a moderate approach, respectively.  
62 See the original Hebrew excerpt in Appendix B, item 2. 
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Shimon, therefore, reached back to past models of Judaism in search of alternatives to Israel’s 
current form of public Judaism. 
 Furthermore, Shimon turned to metaphors from the world of US religiosity when he 
described his vision of public Judaism in Israel. He envisioned it as voluntary, pluralized, and 
democratic. According to him, Israel’s religious establishment was an “unhealthy” organization:  
As an organization, the system does not function… When it comes to [the state’s] religious 
services, under each stone you turn you will find corruption and problems… I don’t mind 
that the Haredim will run it, as long as they run it properly. In the US there are all kinds of 
organizations that provide kashrut certificates. There is haredi kashrut, and it is decent. 
People are decent for the most part because there are alternatives. In Israel, there are no 
alternatives; one thousand Haredi men compete over three positions. This results in 
nepotism. I want to see a better service, and I believe that having alternatives would only 
benefit the system.63  
 When I asked him to tell me what his vision of a “healthy” system of religious 
institutions was, he said:  
As a religious person, I think it would lead to people being more religious [laughing]… The 
United States is a religious country, people there are religious. How come? Because it is 
voluntary, you are not being forced into anything. I think that if we have here [in Israel] free 
choice and people would choose where they want to belong, it will eventually do us good, 
and by “us” I mean Orthodoxy. Generally speaking, Israelis seek Judaism, they want to 
                                                 
63 See the original Hebrew excerpt in Appendix B, item 3. 
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connect, there is a return [to Judaism]. It will do us good; we will have a state of healthy 
Judaism.64  
In Shimon’s envisioning of a “healthy,” community-based religious establishment in Israel, 
American religiosity signifies its potential future, and Hazalic Judaism its origin in Jewish past.  
 Imagining community-based religiosity as a continuation of historic Judaism is not 
unique to Shimon. It also appears in the actual policy papers in which scholars affiliated with 
NTA outline the organization’s proposed model. The two policy papers that outline the model 
(Lifshitz 2011, Friedman 2014a) propose to reform the state’s Rabbinate based on the premise 
that a community-based system should replace the centralized, state-administered system that 
exists today. The earlier model (Lifshitz 2011) proposes that groups of Israeli Jews would be 
eligible to register as a community. These communities would choose their own rabbi and to 
shape their own religious orientation. Large communities, or a union of several small 
communities, would be eligible to maintain their own system of kashrut and of marriage and 
divorce (ibid, 5).65 
 The failure of the existing system, according to Lifshitz, is due to its subordination to 
political parties. This idea resonates with Shimon’s language about NTA’s goal to “separate 
religion and politics.” Because the Chief Rabbinate is subordinate to the Ministry of Religious 
Services, it is run according to the “narrow interests” of politicians and their lobbyists (Lifshitz 
2011, n.p). 66 This kind of politicized religious leadership is new to Judaism, according to 
                                                 
64 See the original Hebrew excerpt in Appendix B, item 4 
65 While Shimon has references to US religiosity in our conversations, Lifshitz’s proposal is different. He 
does not refer to the US model of formal separation between state and church. His proposal resonates 
more with European models in which the state funds certain activities of recognized religious streams 
(Berman-Shifman 2015).  
66 Over the past two decades, the Ministry of Religious Services, known until recently as the Ministry of 
Religion, was headed mostly by a Haredi minister. A notable exception was during the tenure of the 
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Lifshitz. Throughout Jewish history, pluralism and disagreements had been prevalent among 
Jewish communities, and each Jewish community chose its own religious leader (ibid). 
Furthermore, Jewish communities across the world had always had community-based religious 
systems that “served the public rather than the regime” (Lifshitz 2011). According to the author, 
the entwining of religion and politics in Israel had distanced Judaism from its “original” form.  
 According to NTA, such a model would strengthen the Jewishness of Israel, as well as its 
democratic foundation: “We believe that our community-based model would strengthen 
participatory democracy in Israel. This would make Israeli society more Jewish and more faithful 
to tradition. Social pluralism would bring about the prospering of a Jewish tradition that is based 
on democracy and values of human dignity. These values are necessary to securing the 
democratic foundation of Israel” (Lifshitz 2011, 3). A community-based public Judaism, 
therefore, will not only improve the state of Israel’s religious institutions but will enable Israel to 
realize its premise as a Jewish and democratic state.  
 The more recent policy paper (Friedman 2014a) proposes that rabbis responsible over the 
religious affairs of cities, towns, small settlements, and regional councils will be elected in a 
democratic vote by the Jewish residents in their respective area of jurisdiction.67 Residents of the 
same settlement or neighborhood will be considered members of a community, and they will be 
eligible to elect their communal rabbi, according to this model. Electing rabbis in a democratic 
procedure will allow better compatibility between rabbis and the people they serve, according to 
Friedman. Here, too, the author states that this model is closer to the way Jewish communities 
chose their religious leaders throughout history than the “top-down” model of the Chief 
                                                                                                                                                             
government that was elected in 2013, in which Naftali Bennett, the Head of the Religious-Zionist party 
The Jewish Home, served as the Minister of Religious Services.  
67 Regional councils are a form of local government in Israel. They are responsible over the administrative 
affairs of a group of small settlements, usually in rural areas, that are adjacent to one another.  
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Rabbinate: “The link that has always existed in Jewish communities between the rabbi and his 
community is now broken. It used to be that the town chose its own rabbi. Today, it is the state 
that chooses the rabbi. It used to be that the rabbi was responsible to be accounted to his 
community. Nowadays, rabbis are not accountable for anything” (ibid, n.p). According to 
Friedman, this model would create a closer and more relevant connection between rabbis and 
their communities. This way, the Jewish Israeli public would feel less alienated from the 
Rabbinate and more willing to accept its authority (ibid, n.p).  
 NTA scholars and activists reject the centralized, politicized model of public Judaism that 
was developed in Israel and turn to alternative models in Jewish history and outside of Israel. As 
members of Religious-Zionist society, who were raised on the values of a sacralized Jewish state, 
this move is not obvious.68 Although NTA scholars and activists turn to extra-Zionist sources, 
they view their proposals as realizations of Zionist ideals. To them, community-based religious 
institutions would be based on voluntarism and free-choice and, thus, would help Israel to be 
truly democratic and Jewish.  
I argue that these proposals are not only about Israel but also about the activists 
themselves; the values they seek to incorporate into the religious institutions of the state are also 
the values they identify with as halakha-observing Jews who are committed to an “open and 
tolerant” Judaism, as per NTA’s mission statement (quoted above). NTA activists, therefore, see 
themselves as embodying the Jewish and democratic amalgamation Israel has been struggling to 
consolidate since its founding.  
                                                 
68 In fact, NTA was criticized for “betraying” Religious-Zionist values. Yoav Sorek, a Religious-Zionist 
intellectual and publicist, argued that NTA’s proposal was promoting the separation of Religion and State 
(2013). In response, Lifshitz (2013) argued that NTA’s model does not entail the separation of religion 
and state but the substitution of an “indirect democracy” with “participatory democracy,” that grants 
citizens greater power to shape state institutions (31).  
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 When I met with Shimon in 2014, he was hopeful about the movement’s chances to 
advance their proposals because the government at that time had a more dominant Religious-
Zionist representation than in previous governments. They even held a pilot project with a 
regional council in northern Israel, in which they tested some of the principles of their 
Democratic-Communal model. That government, however, was replaced in 2015 by a new 
government with strong Haredi representation, as I said earlier.  
I contacted Shimon during the writing of this chapter, more than three years after our 
meetings in Israel, and asked him for an update about the model’s implementation. As of then 
(May 2018), he wrote, the movement no longer tried to advance the model as a whole but, rather, 
worked with Knesset Members on formulating legislative bills that address specific aspects of 
the model.  
A “Proper Conversion”: Diversifying Jewish Orthodox Conversion  
 Jewish conversion in Israel was not always a centralized institutional apparatus as it is 
today. Until the 1990s, conversions were only partially supported by the state. They were done 
on a small scale and were performed in various institutions that operated sporadically (Kravel-
Tovi 2012, 743). In the 1990s a massive immigration wave from the former Soviet Union 
brought to Israel between 270,000 and 350,000 immigrants that were eligible to immigrate under 
the Jewish Law of Return although they were not considered Jewish by halakhic standards. In 
Israel, they became naturalized but remained “religion-less” in state records. In light of this new 
reality, a special committee nominated by Prime Minister Netanyahu recommended in 1997 that 
the state establish a national Conversion Administration that would standardize and supervise 
Jewish conversion (Kravel-tovi 2012, 2017).  
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The Conversion Administration that has been operating since then oversees the activities 
of a network of Jewish education centers for conversion applicants, and of the special conversion 
courts that operate under the auspices of the Chief Rabbinate (Kraevl-Tovi 2017, 64-65).69 Most 
conversion candidates complete one of the state-authorized Jewish education programs and, 
simultaneously, attend a series of brief hearings at their local special rabbinic court of 
conversion. The final hearing takes place after the candidate has completed his or her education 
program. If the rabbinic judges (called dayyanim) approve the conversion, the candidate has to 
immerse himself or herself in a ritual bath (mikveh) in order to validate the conversion (Kravel-
Tovi 2017, 40-41).  
Despite institutional efforts to draw immigrants from the former Soviet Union to this 
conversion procedure offered by the state, only a small fraction of them, less than ten percent, 
has chosen to do so. There is no single explanation to this low number. Kravel-Tovi (2017) 
suggests possible explanations: that it may be because of the strict halakhic requirements of the 
courts that deter potential converts, or because members of this group are already integrated into 
Jewish-Israeli society and do not feel the need to undergo formal religious conversion (ibid, 79).  
This reality, in which thousands of Israeli citizens who participate in all social circles of Jewish-
Israeli society are not considered Jewish by the halakha, has been perceived as a “national 
problem” by Religious-Zionist actors from within the Conversion Administration and outside it 
(Kravel-Tovi 2017). 
 In attempt to solve this “problem,” two liberal Orthodox organizations, ITIM (which is at 
the center of chapter three of this dissertation) and the Israel Democracy Institute, a non-for-
profit research center of a liberal Religious-Zionist orientation, have formulated a reformed 
                                                 
69 Most rabbinical courts (other than a few Haredi courts) operate under the auspices of the Chief 
Rabbinate and are considered part of Israel’s legal system. 
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Conversion Law bill. The bill was submitted in 2014 by Knesset Member Elazar Stern from 
Yesh Atid Party, a former Major General in the Israeli military and a Religious-Zionist man.70 
The proposal included granting municipal rabbis’ authority to perform conversions, instead of 
the current system in which only rabbinical judges in the conversion courts of the Chief 
Rabbinate are entitled to convert.71 
  According to Advocate Elad Caplan of ITIM, who was one of the authors of the 
proposal, granting authority to municipal rabbis represents a return to the policy that was 
practiced in Jewish communities prior to the founding of the modern state of Israel, in which 
rabbis performed conversions “within their communities according to their halakhic 
perspectives” (Caplan 2015). The Conversion Reform (Reformat HaGiyur), as it became known, 
sought to diversify the system of state Jewish Conversion by allowing local rabbis to convert 
people (Stern, Farber and Caplan 2014, 6). According to the activists who prepared the bill, a 
diverse system of Jewish conversion would be more faithful to Jewish history, in which there has 
always been a “multiplicity of halakhic voices” (ibid). The authors also emphasize that this 
diversification would still remain within the boundaries of Orthodox-oriented halakha, and that 
the authority to convert would be granted only to Orthodox rabbis who were nominated by the 
Chief Rabbinate (Stern, Farber and Caplan 2014).72 
                                                 
70 As Head of the Manpower Directorate in the Israeli army, Stern initiated in 2002 a Jewish conversion 
program for soldiers who immigrated to Israel under the Jewish Law of Return but were not recognized as 
Jews by the state. Almost all of them immigrated from the former Soviet Union.  
71 There are exceptions to this policy. In March 2016, Israel’s Supreme Court ruled that the state must 
respect conversions approved by private Haredi courts, which are not associated with the Chief 
Rabbinate.  
72 Such community-based model of conversions also resonates with how Jewish conversions are done in 
the United States, where conversions are “construed and constructed locally and heterogeneously by each 
religious stream or congregation” (Kravel-Tovi 2018, n.p). Caplan, however, does not mention the US 
model as an inspiration.  
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 In November 2014, the government approved the Conversion Reform, which was based 
on MK Stern’s Knesset bill. It was supported by Naftali Bennet of The Jewish Home, the 
Religious-Zionist party, who was then the Minister of Religious Services. The decision, 
therefore, was passed in a government in which Religious-Zionists and secular Jews occupied 
key positions. However, this government was dissolved before the law was implemented. In July 
2015, the new elected government canceled the reform after Haredi pressure.  
 Disappointed by these political shifts, ITIM and other Religious-Zionist organizations 
and rabbis partnered to establish Giyur K’halacha – an independent network of conversion 
courts led by prominent Religious-Zionist rabbis (Caplan 2015). 73 These courts, which started to 
operate publicly in August 2015, focus on converting those Israeli citizens who immigrated to 
Israel under the Jewish Law of return, most of them from the former Soviet Union, and are not 
considered Jewish by halakhic standards.  
 These conversions are performed by prominent Religious-Zionist rabbis who do not have 
prior familiarity with the applicants. In this sense, these new courts do not implement the 
conversion reform; they did not make conversion more community-based, as the activists who 
formulated the reform sought. According to these activists, however, the significance of these 
courts is that they introduce an Orthodox conversion that takes into consideration the life 
circumstances of the applicants when making a decision than what is practiced in the conversion 
courts of the Chief Rabbinate (Giyur K’Halacha, n.d.). The activists see it as continuing the same 
vision as the rejected conversion reform: a vision of a “respecting, considerate and inclusive” 
conversion that is suited to accommodate the particular social profile of the applicants in order to 
                                                 
73 Literally, Giyur K’halacha means “conversion according to halakha.” It has a double meaning, 
however, as “k’halacha” also means “properly” in colloquial Hebrew. The name, therefore, also means a 
“proper conversion.” 
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facilitate their successful conversion to Judaism and integration into the Jewish people (Caplan 
2015).74  
 As part of my fieldwork in ITIM, I was invited to observe the activity of one of these 
independent courts. The court assembled in the synagogue of a West Bank settlement in the 
eastern outskirts of Jerusalem that is known for its “mixed” composition of both religious and 
secular residents. The rabbi of this settlement, a young vibrant man who is a well-known figure 
in liberal Religious-Zionist circles, willingly agreed to host the court. Other than this settlement, 
the independent courts meet in a few additional locations across Israel and in the West Bank. All 
of these locations are of Religious-Zionist affiliation, where the local rabbis either perform as 
rabbinical judges in one of these courts or are favorable to this new initiative and have agreed to 
play hosts.  
 The synagogue was empty when we arrived at ten in the morning on a week day. Anat, 
an employee of ITIM, who lived in this settlement waited for us to let us in and to show us where 
the local mikveh was. My attention was drawn to the communal bulletin board, which had 
printouts of classical Israeli poems. As Anat turned on the lights and the air conditioning, she 
told me that every week, a new poem that corresponded with the weekly Torah portion was 
selected to be presented on the board. I also noticed a roster of community members who were 
responsible for the weekly arrangement of the synagogue for the Shabbat prayers, and a printout 
with information about the weekly communal Torah classes. In the meantime, two staff members 
of the alternative court quickly set up a computer and a printer for the use of the judges, as well 
as a table with coffee and light refreshments for the applicants. The families of the applicants, 
who were all children, started to arrive shortly thereafter.  
                                                 
74 Kravel-Tovi (2017) demonstrates that a similar rhetoric is used by the conversion agents of the state 
(see p. 84-90).  
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 State conversions are conducted in an administrative setting of the Chief Rabbinate’s 
religious courts or at a government facility. Courts are often arranged in a way that judges’ seats 
are elevated so they have to “peer down” at the converts (Kravel-Tovi 2017, 163). Although 
rabbis try to make the court sessions pleasant, this setting generates bureaucratic exchanges that 
are “invariably harsh” (ibid). The alternative court session I attended was set in a communal 
location. It took place in a newly-built synagogue at the heart of a neighborhood of villas in a 
middle-class West Bank settlement. The synagogue’s large bright windows revealed the 
sprawling hills of the Judea desert and the Dead Sea. The communal mikveh where converts 
bathed upon the completion of their conversion was squeaky clean and well-maintained.  
 The location was an appropriate backdrop to the actual court session. Court discussion 
was held as rabbinical judges and family members convened around a large table. The judges 
were friendly, and their questioning was brief and non-intrusive. The brevity of sessions could be 
related to the fact that all applicants were children, since the standards for converting children are 
considered less strict than of adults (Rabinovitch 2014).  
The Head judge was a well-known Religious-Zionist rabbi who serves as the head of a 
large Yeshiva in another West Bank settlement. Other rabbis who participate as judges in these 
courts are rabbis of Religious-Zionist settlements and Yeshivas within Israel’s recognized 
borders and in the West Bank. They are often community leaders and educators. The alternative 
court, therefore, had a communal “feel” to it. 
 Since conversion is a state project in Israel (Kravel-Tovi 2017), judges in this alternative 
court repeatedly emphasized that their conversions were not recognized by the Chief Rabbinate 
and other state institutions, and applicants’ parents were asked to sign a written statement in 
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which they confirmed that they acknowledged this. 75 Nevertheless, parents seemed happy and 
relieved once their children returned from the mikveh, dripping water, and the rabbinical judges 
congratulated them with Mazal-Tov for joining the Jewish people, and handed them a chocolate 
egg.  
 The whole encounter was designed to be pleasant, friendly and personal. It was still not 
the community-based conversion ITIM activists tried to advance a couple of years earlier, but it 
was a conversion procedure that was tailored for a particular population (in this case, children of 
immigrant women from the former Soviet Union who were not considered Jewish by halakhic 
standards), and that took place in a community setting rather than in a governmental facility.  
 The alternative court’s mission is similar to that of the state’s conversion courts. Their 
method is not that different, either. Both courts follow halakhic standards of conversion, and 
none of them is genuinely a “community-based” conversion. Activists of the alternative court, 
however, argue that they “see” the applicants better than the conversion agents of the state, and 
are more willing to adjust the conversion procedure in ways that facilitate their successful 
conversion to Judaism. This alternative court network, therefore, demonstrates the “tense 
dynamics” over conversion and religious matters between Haredi and Orthodox-Zionist social 
actors (Kravel-Tovi 2012, 744). The alternative conversion courts are Religious-Zionists’ way of 
resisting Haredi-oriented domination over public religiosity. It is not only about improving the 
religious institutions and the lives of Israel’s Jewish citizens, but also about who has the power to 
shape public Judaism in Israel.  
 
 
                                                 
75 In September 2018, a Jerusalem court ordered the state to recognize as Jewish a woman who was 
converted by a court of this alternative conversion courts network. It is yet to be seen whether this ruling 
is a doorway to an encompassing state recognition, as the network’s rabbis and activists aspire to.  
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Private Supervision: A Free Market of Kashrut Services  
 Another NGO that exemplifies the “scaling down” of religious services by liberal 
Religious-Zionist activists is Hashgacha Pratit (lit. Private Supervision) – a nongovernmental 
organization that provided kashrut (Jewish dietary laws) certificates to restaurants between 2013 
and 2018. The organization was founded by Rabbi Aaron Leibowitz, a prominent figure within 
the liberal Religious-Zionist stream of Orthodox society in Israel. Leibowitz was born in 
Berkeley, California, and immigrated to Israel with his family as a teenager. In Israel, he was 
ordained as a rabbi and has led a congregation, ve’Ani Tefillah, in Nachla’aot neighborhood in 
Jerusalem (Chuppot 2018). He was a member of Jerusalem’s City Council as a representative of 
the Yerushalmim (lit. “Jerusalemites”) municipal party. He is mostly known, however, for his 
activity in Hashgcaha Pratit.  
 The full title of the organization is “Hashgacha Pratit: Community Trust according to 
Halakha.” The NGO’s “community-based” kashrut model enabled restaurant owners with skills 
to maintain a kosher business without relying on the mashgichim, kashrut supervisors, of the 
state’s Rabbinate. The organization employed three kashrut “representatives” who taught 
restaurant owners and staff how to maintain a kosher kitchen.76 The language here is important; 
they were called “representatives” rather than “supervisors” because the purpose of the 
organization was to allow restaurant owners to build a relationship of “trust and not authority” 
with their clients. When a restaurant chose to receive the organization’s kashrut services, the 
owners signed a “covenant of trust” which reflected the owner’s commitment to maintaining a 
kosher kitchen that is based on “halakhic requirements” (Hashgacha Pratit, n.d.).  
                                                 
76 Two out of the three “representatives” were women. This is exceptional in light of the fact that women 
are barred from serving as kashrut supervisors in the Chief Rabbinate’s system.  
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 Rabbi Leibowitz founded the organization after his municipal party, Yerushalmim, led a 
public campaign against the kashrut services of Jerusalem’s municipal rabbinate due to 
complaints about their kashrut licensing procedures. In 2013, several restaurants in Jerusalem 
opted out of the rabbinate’s kashrut services because of their high rates and insufficient 
supervision. Rabbi Leibowitz continued the Yerushalmim campaign by founding Hashgacha 
Pratit (Steinberg 2014). At first, the organization served only Jerusalem restaurants. Later, it 
expanded to serve restaurants outside Jerusalem.  
 The certificates the organization provided to its client restaurants were not recognized by 
the state. In fact, Haredi parties led a campaign against the organization and argued it violated a 
state law that forbids using the title “kosher” in products and businesses that were not certified 
by the Chief Rabbinate (Liss and Ettinger 2015). And, yet, Rabbi Leibowitz viewed his 
organization as a step in a direction toward a much-needed privatization of the kashrut system. 
He had argued that “what has to happen is a privatization of the process, like in the US, where 
private agencies like the OU and OK compete for the trust of the consumers and for the service 
they give to the restaurants” (Steinberg 2014, n.p).77  
 I heard similar messages from Rabbi Leibowitz at a launch of a Tel-Aviv restaurant that 
joined the organization’s alternative kashrut certification on June 2015. The restaurant is located 
in the heart of bustling downtown Tel-Aviv in a street that used to be home of the city’s artistic 
and intellectual scene in the 1980s and 1990s, and that has since become one of the city’s many 
indistinct urban strips of clothing stores and cafes. I was already familiar at that early stage of my 
fieldwork with Rabbi Leibowitz’s organization and heard of its activities in Jerusalem. The 
                                                 
77 OU is the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America; OK is a large kosher certification 
company in the United States.  
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restaurant in Tel-Aviv was the organization’s first venture out of Jerusalem, and I was curious to 
learn more about their activities.  
 In Jerusalem, the home turf of Hashgacha Pratit, events like this one, which provide an 
opportunity to critique the Chief Rabbinate’s monopoly and to imagine an Israel with a different 
religious institution, are attended by a considerably-sized audience, mostly from the liberal 
Religious-Zionist camp, that are enthusiastic to listen and talk about this topic. In Tel-Aviv, 
however, the number of observant Jews is significantly lower and matters of Religion and State 
are not as popular. When I arrived at the venue, the place was mostly empty. People started to 
trickle in shortly thereafter, and, by the end of the evening, the restaurant’s outdoor wooden deck 
was populated with twenty or so diners. Several of them came to support the restaurant’s choice 
of an alternative kashrut; others were simply looking for a place to have light dinner after 
shopping along the street’s stores and stumbled, surprised, upon a bearded man with a kippa who 
spoke about kashrut.  
 In the event, Rabbi Aaron congratulated the restaurant’s owner and said a few words 
about the organization and the kashrut services they provide. He described it as a “civil society 
project that attempts to create a revolution from below. The revolution is of religious services 
that grow out of communities, rather than institutional religious services that are decided from 
above.”78 He then said that the model that inspired his organization was the kashrut services in 
the United States, where there are “multiple institutions that provide kashrut certification. This 
results in better services for restaurants.” His vision is that there should be more organizations 
like his that provide kashrut certification because “pluralism is good,” according to him. After he 
                                                 
78 Rabbi Leibowitz spoke in Hebrew. This is an English translation of fieldnotes that I scribed during the 
event. 
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finished talking, he and the restaurant owner co-signed the kashrut certificate and shook hands as 
Ha’Aretz photographer took photos for next day’s issue. 79   
  I learned more about Rabbi Aaron’s ideas of a “revolution from below” a few months 
later, in an article he published in De’ot, a liberal Religious-Zionist journal. In his article, 
Leibowitz coins the term “autonomous Orthodox” to refer to a group in Orthodox society to 
whom rabbis “might no longer be relevant.” This group, he argues, is currently growing, as 
evident across Religious-Zionist communities in which individuals apply their own halakhic 
interpretation, rather than turn to rabbis, in various aspects of their religious lives: marriage, 
kashrut, bathing in mikva’ot, communal prayers, and dress codes. According to Leibowitz, this 
growing movement consists of individuals who follow liberal interpretations of the halakha as a 
personal, autonomous decision rather than as adherence to the authority of rabbis (Leibowitz 
2015-2016, 22).  
 Leibowitz’s activist project and his intellectual articulation of the emerging “autonomous 
Orthodox” group identify individuals and communities as the locus of religious authority. 
According to him, Judaism does not have to be the responsibility of the state. In fact, it should 
not. Through his activism and his writing, Rabbi Leibowitz encourages Orthodox people to take 
Judaism “in their own hands” and to shape their own Jewish lives rather than relying on the state 
to do this job for them.  
 Hashgacha Pratit had taken ideas about community-based religious services that are 
similar to those NTA outlines in their Democratic-Communal model and implemented them. 
Leading figures in both organizations, Shimon from NTA and Rabbi Leibowitz from Hashgacha 
                                                 
79 HaAretz is a leading daily newspaper in Israel that is identified with a left-wing political line. The 
newspaper often covers events that reflect critiques of institutional Judaism in Israel. Many of these 
articles, like the one that covered the event I attended in Tel-Aviv, are written by Yair Ettinger, who is a 
member of liberal Orthodox circles in Jerusalem.  
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Pratit, mention the United States as a role-model of a “free market” of religious services that is 
based on voluntary participation of “consumers” who can choose from a multiplicity of service 
providers. Both of them view this model as a desired model for Israel that could solve the 
problems they identify with the current system of a centralized religious establishment.   
 In February 2018, Tzohar, a Religious-Zionist rabbinical association, announced that they 
were starting their own system of kashrut services.80 Rabbi Leibowitz’s welcomed this move. In 
an interview with The Jerusalem Post, an Israel-based English newspaper, he said: “Five years 
ago, Hashgacha Pratit began to crack the rabbinate’s monopoly, and with time we widened the 
cracks and turned it into a gateway. We did not fight for ourselves but for the public, and out of a 
belief that other organizations will follow in our footsteps...Tzohar joining this campaign is a 
sign that the struggle has been victorious. From here onward it will only get better” (Sharon 
2018).81 In Tzohar’s initiation of their new kashrut certification services, Rabbi Leibowitz sees 
the realization of his vision of a “market” of organizations that offer kashrut services – “like in 
the United States.”  
 
 
 
                                                 
80 According to Tzohar’s homepage (as of 7/9/2019), Tzohar was founded in 1995 after the assassination 
of Prime Minister Rabin by a religious Jewish man. Their initial purpose was to re-establish the 
commonalities between Israel’s religious and secular Jews, and to provide religious services that are more 
moderate than those of the Chief Rabbinate and could address the needs of greater number of Israeli Jews. 
Both scholars (Ferziger 2008) and Religious-Zionist activists (Kahana-Dror 2013) have criticized Tzohar 
for not offering a genuine alternative to the Chief Rabbinate, and for perpetuating some of the ailments of 
the current system. 
81 Although not mentioned explicitly in the news coverage about this new kashrut service, Hashgacha 
Pratit reported on their Facebook page that Tzohar’s new initiative was, in fact, a merge. Hashgacha 
Pratit’s kashrut staff and client restaurants moved to be part of Tzohar’s kashrut certification service, and 
Hashgacha Pratit ceased to provide direct kashrut services (Hashgacha Pratit’s Facebook Page, 2/27/2018. 
Accessed 4/27/2018). 
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Discussion  
(Neo)Liberal Observant Activism?  
In discussing the new focus of liberal observant activists on local communities as the 
places where religious matters of public significance should be determined, I cannot ignore its 
resonances to neoliberal ideas. The “market” language used by Rabbi Leibowitz, the founder of 
Private Supervision organization, particularly resonates with neoliberal economic models. I did 
not ask him, or any of the activists mentioned in this chapter, about their view of neoliberalism. 
But I wish to highlight this resonance nevertheless, particularly in light of the US background of 
Leibowitz and other key figures in this field.  
Israel has undergone an economic and political restructuring from developmental to 
neoliberal political economies (Maron and Shalev 2017; Ram 2007; Shafir and Peled 2002). This 
transformation began with the 1985 Stabilization Plan of the Israeli government that was 
initiated in response to a rampant hyperinflation and a series of financial crises and included a 
vast increase in the power of fiscal and monetary authorities committed to a neoliberal agenda 
and to structural changes in the labor market (Maron and Shalev 2017, 2). Consequently, the 
Israeli economy became dominated by a small number of capitalist “tycoons.” Institutions that 
were identified with the Israeli welfare state lost their power (ibid, 16).  
What is relevant in the context of this chapter, however, are not the social and economic 
transformations that are part of Israel’s neoliberalization but the prevalence of neoliberal 
vocabulary and imagery among liberal observant activists. I refer here to the discourse about 
decentralization and municipalization depicted in this chapter and in the following two chapters, 
and that represents the “political salience of small-scale groups” so characteristic of neoliberal 
politics (Orta 2013, 112). In my approach to studying these neoliberal footprints, I follow the 
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path Esra Özyürek (2006) paves in her analysis of the role neoliberal symbolism has played in 
the privatization of secular politics in Turkey. Özyürek argues that, concurrent with Turkey’s 
neoliberal reforms, “secular state ideology, politics, and symbolism found a new life and 
legitimacy in the private realms” (ibid, 3). In light of the rise of political Islam in Turkey, this 
process reflected the expansion of “a newly hegemonic neoliberal symbolism” that began to 
define the civic and private spheres as “the latest exalted centers of power” (ibid).  
My analysis of liberal observant activism in this chapter and in chapter three shows that 
these activists use of a discourse that goes against a centralized, state-administered, public 
religious sphere and promotes the decentralization, pluralization, and localization of religious 
authority. I do not suggest that my interlocutors hold neoliberal agendas. Instead, I point to their 
treatment of non-state actors and spaces as the appropriate carriers of Judaism in the Jewish state. 
This logic is associated with neoliberal politics in which the civic and private spheres become the 
new arenas in which social actors debate questions that pertain to citizenship and the state (Orta 
2013, Özyürek 2006).  
The “American Connection” 
In the case of liberal observant Jews in Israel, the “migration” of neoliberal politics is not 
only from the economic sphere to the sphere of religious politics. It might also be related to the 
cultural baggage that key players in this field have “imported” from the United States. As 
depicted above, when talking about their initiatives, activists often invoke the American Jewish 
world and US religiosity more broadly. These invocations, as evident in Shimon’s and Rabbi 
Leibowitz’s visions, correspond with sociological depictions of post-WWII shifts in the social 
structure of religious life in the United States. These shifts entail a transition from religiosity that 
“inhabits” formal religious institutions to religiosity in which religion is experienced as a journey 
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of “seeking” (Wuthnow 1998, 2005) or as a “quest” (Roof 1999). As part of this quest, people 
negotiate different, often competing, ideas about “the sacred” in an attempt to craft spiritual life 
that is meaningful to them (Wuthnow 1998, 2-3).  
 Historians of American Judaism have depicted ways that it was shaped by this US 
context. Sarna (2004) argues that American Jews “fit well within [American] tradition of 
ambivalence to religious authority,” as can be seen in their resistance to have one ultimate figure 
of authority such as a chief rabbi (ibid, 369). Even within American Orthodox Judaism, in which 
adherence to figures of religious authority is more central than in other Jewish movements, there 
has been a “leadership” vacuum after the death of important Modern-Orthodox leaders in the 
past few decades, which resulted in increasing fragmentation (ibid).  
 By pointing to these analyses I do not seek to imply that “American religiosity” is a 
monolithic structure; obviously it is diverse and multiple. I do not argue that Israeli Religious-
Zionists are “importing” it to Israel, either. Instead, I suggest that prevalent understandings of US 
religiosity, which echo sociological analyses of US society and of Judaism in the United States, 
are circulating within the Israeli world of liberal Orthodoxy.   
 It is not coincidental that liberal observant Jews in Israel turn to US society as a source of 
inspiration for their activism. Some of them, like Shimon, lived in Jewish communities in the 
United States as part of their careers as activists or as academics. Others were born in the United 
Sates, like Rabbi Aaron Leibowitz who founded Hashgacha Pratit, Rabbi Shaul Farber who 
founded ITIM, and Rabbi Shlomo Riskin who is one of the primary driving forces behind Giyur 
K’halakaha, the alternative Religious-Zionist conversion courts. These individuals function as 
cultural brokers of what is considered as “American ideals” in Israel. They translate models of 
citizenship and of religiosity from the US context to the Israeli one. This translation work is not a 
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process of “copying” and “pasting” but, rather, of reformulating ideas so that they become 
legible within the Israeli context. Their task is to implement halakhic Judaism that is based on 
“American” ideals of religious freedom, autonomy, and voluntarism, and that privileges 
individuals and communities over the state, but to do so in Israel, where a state institution 
determines the boundaries of halakhic Judaism.  
 The American Jewish world to which they refer is the Modern-Orthodox world. 82  
Religious-Zionism in Israel and Modern-Orthodoxy in the United States are founded on the 
premise that commitment to halakha can, and should, involve commitment to participation in the 
public life of democratic states and to a modern lifestyle (Cohen, 1998; Ferziger 2015). Similar 
to Religious-Zionist society in Israel, the Modern-Orthodox world in the United States is 
currently characterized by a rift between an increasingly conservative institutional center of 
power and the liberal margins. In the United States, the rift is between the once-centrist Yeshiva 
University and its rabbinical school, Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary (RIETS), 
which have become increasingly more conservative in their political and religious stances, and 
liberal Orthodox rabbis and institutions – primarily Rabbi Avi Weiss and his Yeshiva in 
Riverdale, Yeshivat Chovevei Torah (YCT) that follows his ideas of “Open Orthodoxy” 
(Ferziger 2015; Heilman 2006).  
 In 2013 and 2015, NTA and liberal Religious-Zionist rabbis in Israel have aligned 
themselves with Rabbi Weiss when Israel’s Chief Rabbinate rejected his letters attesting that his 
congregants were Jewish because of his “liberal” worldview (Friedman 2014b).83 NTA activists, 
                                                 
82 The Modern-Orthodox world represents only 3% of the 5.3 million Jewish adults in the United States, 
as of 2013 (Pew Research Center 2015).  
83 When Jews who were not born in Israel ask to marry in Israel, the Chief Rabbinate requests that they 
provide a letter from a rabbi in their community of origin that attests that they were indeed Jewish. Over 
the past several years, the Chief Rabbinate has been rejecting letters of Modern-Orthodox rabbis that are 
viewed as “liberal” (Ben Zion 2017). 
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therefore, see themselves closer in their worldview to Rabbi Weiss’ ideas of an Open Orthodoxy 
that “is not centralized but individualized and pluralized” and that “accommodates a plurality of 
interpretations and traditions” (Weiss 2015), than to the Orthodoxy of the Chief Rabbinate. The 
ethnographic vignettes I depicted above demonstrate that liberal observant activists in Israel turn 
to ideas from the world of US religiosity in general, and American Jewish Orthodoxy in 
particular, when they envision the kind of Judaism they seek to achieve through their proposed 
reform. Looking to the United States, therefore, is also a result of collaborations and dialogues 
between liberal Orthodox in Israel and their counterparts in the United States.   
 To end this discussion about the “American connection,” I cannot ignore one significant 
aspect of this alliance between liberal American Jews and liberal observant Jews in Israel – 
funding. According to their websites, these three initiatives – NTA’s Communal-Democratic 
model, Giyur Ka’halacha and Hashgacha Pratit – have been funded in part by UJA (United 
Jewish Appeal) New York. The Jewish Federations of North America (JFNA) have also funded 
the recent studies about non-state marriage procedures I mention at the beginning of this chapter. 
US Jewry, therefore, not only provides a role model and vocabulary to liberal Orthodox Jews in 
Israel. It also in provides the funding necessary to their implementation. In fact, advancing 
(Jewish) religious pluralism in Israel is one of JFNA’s main aims according to their website (as 
of 6/18/2018). 
 Exploring the social and cultural meanings of this transnational philanthropic 
relationship, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation.84 I did not investigate the 
fundraising aspect of any of the projects described in this chapter, and that I describe in 
subsequent chapters. By throwing light on the existence of this relationship, I simply seek to 
                                                 
84 See Shaul Bar-Nissim (2018) about the changes in the philanthropic priorities of American Jewish 
federations as a result of the increased American Jewish criticism of Israel.  
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demonstrate that the relationship liberal observant Jews in Israel maintain with their US 
counterparts is a significant aspect of their activism. 
Conclusion  
 This chapter outlines the contours of a recent trend in liberal circles of Israeli Religious-
Zionist society. In subsequent chapters, I shift to a finer-grained analysis of specific sites in 
Jerusalem in which this trend takes particular forms. As I have shown in this chapter, this trend 
represents a shift in the way members of the liberal camp within Religious-Zionist society 
imagine the Jewishness of Israel. This means transitioning from a Jewish state in which state 
institutions and officials hold the authority to determine what kind of Judaism is the “right” one 
to a Jewish state in which communities and individuals have the liberty and authority to shape 
their Jewishness according to what they see fit.  
 This move is not one-dimensional. It is comprised of multiple layers and hues that 
manifest themselves in different ways. One layer of this process is what I called in this chapter, 
“the reaching back” to “original” or “traditional” Judaism as a model of, and justification for, 
community-based Judaism. We can see this in NTA’s claims that their Democratic-Communal 
model is, in fact, similar to the Judaism that was practiced in particular periods in the ancient 
Jewish world and in diasporic Jewish communities. We can also see this in the attempt to reform 
the state’s conversion procedures.  
 Another dimension of this shift is its look at what activists understand and perceive to be 
US models of religiosity. We can see this in the way Shimon, a senior member and the driving 
force behind many of NTA’s activities, describes the kind of Judaism that NTA seeks to promote 
through their various initiatives. The activists who formulated the Conversion Reform bill 
proposed granting community rabbis the authority to perform Jewish conversions, similarly to 
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how it is done in the United States. The pluralism of US religiosity, its market-like quality (Roof 
1999) that resonates with neoliberal ideas, serves as a beacon of light to the communal kashrut 
model of Hashgacha Pratit.  
 The projects I depict here represent my interlocutors’ attempts to make sense of the 
Judaism they promote vis-à-vis their views of US religiosity. Their endeavors are inherently 
Israeli (even when the activists themselves are US-born) because they are shaped by activists’ 
understanding of Israel as a place in which Judaism is, and should be, an embedded quality of the 
state. The individuals I met throughout my fieldwork translate into Israeli reality ideas that they 
identify as “American” as part of their endeavor to figure out a new and better way for Israel to 
be a Jewish state. Ironically, as liberal Religious-Zionist activists outline their vision of what a 
“truly” democratic and Jewish state means, and delineate their plans to bring it to life, they evoke 
notions of diasporic Judaism and about civil participation in European and US democracies. 
 This point leads me to another key argument in this dissertation. Debates about the locus 
of religious authority and about the kind of Judaism that should be most dominant in Israel are, 
in fact, opportunities for my interlocutors to establish and carry out their Israeli citizenship. In 
Israel, as in other locations around the globe in which the state is viewed through the prism of 
religion, discussions about religiosity are fundamentally about citizenship.  
In the previous chapter, I have described the deepening gap in Religious-Zionist society 
between Haredi-le’umi and moderate-liberal circles. Israel’s public religious sphere, therefore, 
has become increasingly inhospitable to liberal religiosity, including to liberal voices from 
within Orthodox society. This backdrop is important to understanding my interlocutors’ efforts 
to “do” public Judaism in a communal scale. The initiatives described in this chapter represent 
instances of a “scaled down” public Judaism, in which liberal observant Jews ultimately grapple 
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with their commitment to the Jewish state in a state that is becoming increasingly intolerant of 
their kind of Judaism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
MAKING PUBLIC JUDAISM A “PERSONAL MATTER”  
 
 In the previous chapter I reviewed recent initiatives in which liberal observant activists 
founded alternatives to the religious institutions of the state. These alternatives, I have argued, 
represent activists’ “scaling down” of public Judaism and of religious authority from the level of 
state institutions to the level of communities and individuals. One of these projects, a network of 
conversion courts led by Religious-Zionist rabbis, was co-founded by Rabbi Shaul (Seth) Farber, 
the head of ITIM (lit. Times) – a liberal Orthodox organization. In this chapter, I examine in 
greater depth the activism of Rabbi Farber and his colleagues at ITIM in their efforts to amend 
the policies and functioning of Israel’s Jewish religious institutions. 
The ITIM organization operates in the nongovernmental sphere of civil society 
organizations that monitor and work to modify the functioning and role of the religious 
institutions of the state.85 The organization is called “times” because of its original mission to 
assist Israeli Jews to have “positive and significant encounters with Jewish life” on major Jewish 
“times” such as weddings, births, conversion, and burial (ITIM n.d.). The organization still 
considers improving the Jewish life of Israeli Jews as its main objective but its means of 
attaining this goal has changed dramatically since its inception, as I describe throughout this 
chapter.  
ITIM’s staff members are trained professionals – lawyers, social workers, rabbis – who 
are paid for their work. I treat them as activists because they aim to bring about not only 
institutional change but also social change. In their work I found evidence of three discourses 
about activism. The organization’s formal mission is to improve the encounter of Israeli Jews 
                                                 
85 This realm is known in Israel as “Religion and State Relations” (yahasei dat ve’medina) and it is 
composed of state as well as non-state social actors.   
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with the state’s religious authorities. They do it by assisting individuals who contact the 
organization’s Hotline. The Hotline’s workers, some of whom have background in social work 
and law, assist individuals who face challenges in their interactions with the religious authorities. 
They provide guidance or represent their interests in front of the authorities. In this sense, the 
organization’s activism is oriented toward “empowerment” of vulnerable populations (Elyachar 
2005; Hemment 2007; Kamat 2002).  
At the same time, the organization’s leaders increasingly focus on legal and legislative 
efforts to reform the religious establishment – a change that would bring about, according to 
them, a more just social reality in Israel. Their activism, therefore, is oriented toward reforming 
state institutions as a means of social change (Greenberg 2014; Paley 2001).  
While these two discourses play out in ITIM’s formal mission and ways of action, I 
identify another, more implicit, discourse of identity as the basis of their social activism (Melucci 
1989). This discourse, I argue, impacts the organization’s work as much as its formal missions. 
In everyday talk and in my interviews with them, organization members told me that through 
their activism they seek to carve a more central space for their identity as liberal and halakha-
observing Jews. My analysis in this chapter touches on the “empowerment” and “reform” 
discourses of the organization but its focus is on the informal discourse of identity and social 
belonging, and on how it shapes the organization’s work.  
To conceptualize ITIM’s activism, I turn to insights of anthropologists who study other 
groups of activists. The first is Naisargi Dave’s work on queer activists in India. Dave asks, 
“Why are activists, activists? Why do (these) activists act?” and the answer she provides is, 
“because, collectively, they nurture ethical ideals about what the world could look like” (2012, 
4). In a different passage she writes that activism begins with “the previously unthinkable that is 
97 
 
now a flickering possibility” (ibid, 10). To study it is to study the relationship between “the 
virtual and the actual”: between the world that activists imagine and the actual world they inhabit 
(ibid).  
 The activists I study in ITIM are in a very different position and life circumstances than 
the queer activists Dave studied in India. Liberal Orthodox Jews in Israel are not a marginal, 
underprivileged, and persecuted minority. In fact, they are members of numerous dominant 
social groups in Israel: they are Jewish, mostly Ashkenazi, religious (dati’im), middle-class, and 
educated. And yet, their activism is very much driven by their self-perception that, as halakha-
observing Jews who hold a liberal worldview, they are underrepresented in the state’s religious 
institutions. ITIM staff aims to improve Jewish religious services for the sake of all Jewish 
citizens. Staff members in the organization promote changes to the state religious system, which 
they believe would improve this system and make it more just. As I will show in this chapter, 
however, the changes they promote are motivated also by their vision of an Israel in which their 
kind of Jewishness is more central and influential.  
 This leads me to yet another insight I borrow from Dave’s work. Because activism is a 
form of mediation between the “virtual” and the “actual,” it is a process in which affects are 
produced. Activism is an affective work when dreams of transformation confront the norms, 
institutions, and moralities of political engagement (Dave 2012, 10). In this chapter I investigate 
ways that activism of leading staff members in ITIM is, in fact, affective activism; it is activism 
that is shaped by affect that is produced in the process of mediating the Israel that these activists 
seek to bring to life and the Israel in which they live.  
 In understanding the activism of ITIM, I also find James Clifford’s (2004) outlook on 
activism to be particularly illuminating. Although Clifford’s analysis is based on a completely 
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different field than mine – his context is decolonizing tribal activism – his way of understanding 
activism is helpful in the case of liberal observant activism in Israel. Clifford argues that in 
activist movements in colonial and postcolonial settings, the past plays a central role: “loyalty to 
a traditional past is, in practice, a way ahead, a distinct path in the present” (ibid, 156). He does 
not argue that tradition is invented as part of indigenous politics but, instead, that in indigenous 
rights movements after the 1960s, there is constant blurring of the “sharp antinomies of 
progress” of before and after histories of colonial impact (ibid). 86  
 I argue that Clifford’s foundational observation about activism as both “backward and 
forward looking” (ibid) is particularly helpful in the case of Jewish religious activists in Israel, 
who perceive the halakha, Jewish religious law, as central to their activism. Halakha is Judaism’s 
legal corpus that has been developed over the past two millennia. It continues to be developed 
today, as rabbis are called to rule on contemporary issues that were not addressed by the halakhic 
poskim (rulers) in the past. For instance, Orthodox rabbis in contemporary Israel have been 
debating about the halakhically-appropriate ways of using Assisted Reproduction Technologies 
(Kahn 2000). In Orthodox Judaism today, rabbis make halakhic pesikot (rulings) by 
demonstrating that their interpretations of halakhic sources are linked to earlier pesikot that were 
codified over time, in what Phillips (2004) calls a “chain of interpretation” (11). Contemporary 
Orthodox society, therefore, perceives halakha as a Jewish past that constantly impacts and 
shapes the Jewish present.  
 In the context of my study, Clifford’s prism of understanding activism as a way of “going 
backwards into the future” complements Dave’s insight about activism as a relationship between 
the virtual and the actual. As my analysis below demonstrates, to staff members of ITIM, the 
                                                 
86 In fact, he rejects this theoretical line, mostly identified with Hobsbawm and Ranger’s The Invention of 
Tradition (1983), and in anthropology – with Hanson’s (1989) work about cultural invention.  
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way to an Israeli state in which tolerant, moderate, and pluralist Judaism sets a more central tone, 
goes through a Jewish past of halakhic knowledge. In their activism, ITIM staff members turn to 
halakhic sources to show that the alternatives they advance represent halakhic principles while 
the Rabbinate’s policies are, in fact, contradictory of these principles. Their reliance on halakha, 
however, not only legitimizes their activism but it also legitimizes their Jewish identities. By 
establishing the halakhic foundation to their activism, the activists of ITIM assert their 
Jewishness as “authentic” and, hence, legitimate.  
 In their activism, ITIM’s activists strive to make public Judaism a “personal” matter. This 
is evident in the affective activism of key members; in the way in which halakhic discourse is 
utilized not only to reinforce the initiatives they promote but also their own Jewish identities; and 
in the organization’s emphasis on maintaining a close contact with the Jewish-Israeli public and 
on representing its interests.  
Their efforts to personalize public Judaism –to make the religious policies of the state 
into something that Israel’s Jewish citizens are knowledgeable of and voluntarily engage with – 
is one dimension of the broader process of scaling down Judaism, that I outline throughout this 
dissertation. This chapter illustrates that the activism of liberal observant Jews not only embodies 
the notion that the political is personal but it also highlights activists’ aspiration to relocate the 
Political – in this case, Israel’s religious politics – from state institutions to the day-to-day lives 
of Israeli Jews. 
ITIM: A Brief Organizational Biography 
From Outreach to Activism 
The ITIM organization is one among numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
of religious as well as secular orientations, that work in a field known as “Religion and State 
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relations” (yahasei dat vemedina). As I described in the previous chapter, the secular opposition 
to the status quo arrangement is almost as old as the state. This opposition has included various 
nongovernmental organizations that attempt to change the status quo, either by pushing toward 
separating religion and state or by promoting a more heterogeneous and accommodating 
religious establishment. Over the past two decades, the secular opposition to the Chief Rabbinate 
was joined by Religious-Zionist activists, community leaders, and scholars. 87 They have formed 
nongovernmental organizations that seek to amend the official Rabbinate’s policies in 
accordance with Jewish religious laws.  
These organizations can be sorted into two main groups. The first group is composed of 
organizations that try to lead institutional change through influencing policy and legislation and 
through public advocacy. Among the dominant organizations in this field are Ne’emanei Torah 
Ve’Avoda (on which I write in chapter two); The Israel Democracy Center, a liberal-Orthodox 
research and policy center; and Kolech (lit. “your voice”) – an Orthodox Feminist organization. 
The second cluster is composed of organizations that help, mostly through litigation, individuals 
who have grievances against the religious institutions. One of the primary foci of these 
organizations is protecting women’s rights in their dealings with the religious institutions of the 
state, particularly in the realm of marriage and divorce. Dominant organizations are Mavoi 
Satum (lit. “dead end”) – an Orthodox-Feminist organization that represents women in divorce 
cases; and the Center for Women’s Justice – an Orthodox-Feminist organization that works to 
protect women’s rights in their dealings with the Chief Rabbinate.  
                                                 
87 I describe the background of this development in chapter two. Briefly, it is related to a dramatic 
increase in the number of Israelis, most of them are immigrants from the Former Soviet Union, who are 
not eligible to receive services from the Rabbinate because they are not considered Jewish by halakhic 
standards. It is also related to increased polarization within Israel’s Orthodox society between ultra-
Orthodox and moderate Orthodox sectors.  
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ITIM is one of the leading organizations in this field that does both these functions. The 
organization’s official mission is to help Israeli Jews to “navigate the religious authorities’ 
bureaucracy in Israel,” as stated on the organization’s home webpage. The scope of their activity, 
however, goes well beyond that.  
 The organization was founded by Shaul (Seth) Farber, a US-born Modern-Orthodox 
rabbi. Rabbi Farber was ordained at Yeshiva University in New York and immigrated to Israel in 
1995. During the time of my fieldwork he was in his late forties. When he talks, he switches 
quickly and frequently between English and Hebrew. Like many other Modern-Orthodox men, 
he wears a knitted kippa and he is neatly shaved. He lives in a middle-class town in the center of 
Israel that is known for its large population of immigrants from English-Speaking countries, 
where he serves as a rabbi of an Orthodox congregation. 
 When I asked him in an interview on November 2015 to tell me about the beginning of 
the organization, he told me about a young secular Israeli couple he met when traveling, who 
told him they were about to get married and that they did not want to do it through the system of 
the state’s Chief Rabbinate. Eventually, Rabbi Farber performed their wedding ceremony. He 
was the only kippa-wearing man at the event, he told me. This made him realize that there are 
secular Israelis who felt alienated from the state’s Rabbinate, who still wanted a traditional 
Jewish ceremony at their major life events. He sought to better understand why people felt 
alienated by the Chief Rabbinate, so he partnered with two other rabbis in an attempt to 
systematically identify the Rabbinate’s “weaknesses.” That initiative did not last and, eventually, 
Rabbi Farber founded ITIM as a not-for-profit organization in 2002.  
 His vision at first was to “improve the Jewish experience of Israeli citizens.” The 
organization started as an assistance center that addressed individual calls from people who 
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encountered difficulties in their dealings with the state’s Rabbinate. The organization also had 
educational programs that provided information about Jewish ceremonies at major life events 
such as the birth of a newborn and Bar Mitzvahs. Gradually, around 2009, the organization also 
started to address institutional problems in a more systematic manner through legal work. 
Around 2012, he hired a lawyer to oversee litigation and the organization bifurcated itself into 
two departments – The Assistance Center continued to address individual calls while the new 
department for Legal and Public Policy studied and addressed large scale, structural issues within 
the religious institutions. Currently, Rabbi Farber says, they no longer focus on improving 
people’s Jewish experience but on “changing the establishment.”  
The Physical is Political – ITIM’s Location and Structure  
 ITIM’s office is in Jerusalem, the home of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, the Israeli 
Supreme Court, and the offices of numerous NGOs that work in the same field as ITIM in Israel. 
Its location, however, is cut off from the city’s urban fabric. It is situated in an industrial area 
populated mostly by hi-tech companies at the north-west outskirts of Jerusalem, off three major 
highways that connect the city with Israel’s coastline and with the southern Jewish settlement 
bloc in the West Bank. This location is crucial since approximately half of the employees 
commute to Jerusalem daily from their homes in towns along Israel’s coastal plain and in West 
Bank settlements. It is also important since the organization regularly hosts numerous visitors 
from across Israel – clients who come to one-on-one consultations; employees of other 
organizations and agencies who come for seminaries and workshops led by ITIM’s staff; rabbis, 
journalists, lawyers, and donors who meet with the organization’s leaders. Although I never 
asked Rabbi Farber why he chose this location, I suggest that the physical location of ITIM’s 
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office signals that the organization’s aim and scope are not confined to Jerusalem’s limits. 
Rather, their scale is national.  
I mentioned earlier that the organization has a bifurcated structure: The Assistance 
Center, which provides individual guidance and help, and the Legal and Public Policy 
department, which studies the malfunctions of the religious institutions in terms of policies and 
regulations and prepares court petitions against the authorities when necessary. The organization 
works with its two departments even if they have somewhat different, and sometimes conflicting, 
aims.  
The Assistance Center is the organization’s Hotline, whose workers respond to people’s 
queries and complaints about the bureaucracy of the state’s religious institutions. The topic of 
these queries range across matters of marriage and divorce, burial, circumcision, conversion, 
public mikva’ot (ritual purification immersion baths), and dealings with the Ministry of the 
Interior on matters of immigrants’ naturalization.88 During the time of my fieldwork there, 
between 2015 and 2016, the Assistance Center consisted of four case managers and a director 
who oversaw their work. The most basic assistance is to provide information. Staff members 
answer callers’ questions about the various procedures of the religious institutions. When 
needed, staff members also provide counseling. Based on their intimate familiarity with the 
system of religious institutions, staff members advise clients about their possible lines of action, 
and how to avoid mistakes. At times, in complicated cases when clients cannot find a solution on 
their own, staff members intervene on their behalf and contact the authorities by email, phone or 
formal letters. When none of these steps works out, staff members may appear with clients at 
their scheduled meeting with the authorities. 
                                                 
88 “Overview of the Assistance Center,” unpublished document, ITIM, May 2016. 
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 When the Hotline’s case managers notice a recurring issue that comes up in numerous 
calls, the first step is to gather further data about the procedure that seems to create problems. It 
is usually the Legal and Public Policy department, which is also called the Advocacy Center, that 
conducts further research and evaluates whether there is, in fact, a systematic problem. The 
Advocacy Center first gathers data about what is happening on the ground. The department 
employs a research coordinator that studies the proceeding in question. One way of gathering 
data is by calling various religious institutions and inquiring about the services they offer. 
Volunteers, like me, usually do this job.  
During the course of twelve months, I volunteered in the organization as part of my 
fieldwork. One of my first projects was to call offices of religious councils across Israel and to 
ask about proceedings in which phone calls to the Assistance Center indicated there might be a 
violation of the Rabbinate’s guidelines. If there is a violation, or if the guidelines themselves 
violate state laws, ITIM’s legal team sends a formal request to correct the situation. If this does 
not work, they study the issue from a legal standpoint. If there is legal foundation, they file a law 
suit against the relevant institution.  
Another line of action is parliamentary lobbying. The organization collaborates with 
several Members of Knesset (MK) in formulating bills. For instance, ITIM collaborated with 
MK Elazar Stern of Yesh Atid party on the Conversion Reform bill that I discuss in chapter two. 
Rabbi Farber and Ilan, who is also a key figure in the organization, are regular visitors in the 
Israeli parliament. They speak in parliamentary committees and conferences on issues pertaining 
to Religion and State relations and meet with parliamentary assistants of MKs whose political 
agenda coincides with ITIM’s mission.   
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ITIM’s two departments are sometimes at odds. Staff members in the Assistance Centers 
often rely on collaborations with the authorities as they work to find solutions for specific 
applicants. The legal team “fights” the authorities when their practices violate the Rabbinate’s 
guidelines or state laws. In my conversations with Ilan, he told me these different, and 
seemingly-opposing, strategies were in fact “different sides of the same coin.” Both lines of 
action are necessary to achieve the organization’s objectives, according to him.  
Nevertheless, there is friction. During my fieldwork, I recall one instance in which the 
legal team filed a petition against several religious councils for violating the Rabbinate’s 
guidelines and included in the petition a religious council that has been working closely with the 
Assistance Center. Some people at ITIM thought it was unwise to file a court petition against 
religious councils that are favorable to ITIM because that might discourage them from 
collaborating with the organization in the future. Ilan and members of his legal team, however, 
argued that no “discounts” should be made to religious councils who violate the guidelines.  
During my time in the organization I noticed that the “combative” line has become 
increasingly dominant and the organization’s legal struggles have taken a greater portion of the 
organization’s public agenda. Key figures in ITIM often criticize the religious authorities over 
the media and the organization’s public relation person highlights the organization’s legal 
achievements in its Facebook page and on the organization’s press releases. Furthermore, in 
August 2018 ITIM “came out” as one of the sponsors and facilitators of the alternative 
conversion court of Religious-Zionist rabbis, called Giyur Kahalakha (see chapter two) – another 
step that directly challenges the authority of the state’s Rabbinate. This activist line coincides 
with Rabbi Farber’s words that his goal was, ultimately, to “change the establishment.” 
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The Organization’s Mission - Serving the People  
 The organization’s mission is outlined in their English and Hebrew web pages. The 
English page describes the organization’s work as followed:  
Through our activities, we help the Israeli public to meet with the religious establishment 
and strive to play a significant role in shaping and influencing policy. Work between the 
public and the religious establishment is delicate and complex, yet we believe that it affects 
the foundation of our existence as a Jewish and democratic society in the State of Israel 
(ITIM, n.d.). 
The same page in Hebrew emphasizes a somewhat different mission: 
We believe that the role of a Jewish state is to provide services that allow citizens to lead 
wholesome Jewish life, and that the role of the religious establishment is to attend to 
citizens’ needs in the best way possible. By reforming the system so it accommodates the 
public’s needs, we can modify the state’s religious establishment into a more accessible, 
tolerant, transparent and popular system. We do not seek to dismantle the religious 
establishment but, rather, to end damaging policies and actions that deter the public from 
pursuing its services. This way, the state’s religious services will benefit the public, who will 
then use them out of choice and not out of coercion (ITIM, n.d.).89 
 Both texts articulate the organization’s vision to reform the state’s religious institutions in 
a way that would better serve “the public.” The Hebrew excerpt also emphasizes that the 
reformed religious services will not be coercive. People will turn to them only if they choose to 
do so. The idea of non-coercive religious institutions has a loaded cultural baggage in Israeli 
                                                 
89 Translation and emphasis are mine, O.F.  
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popular discourse. Throughout Israeli history, critics of the integration of religion in the state’s 
institutions have argued that it leads to religious coercion, Kfiya Datit (Ben Porat 2013). ITIM 
does not advocate separating religion and state. However, the organization emphasizes that 
turning to the religious services of the state must be voluntary.  
This language about non-coercive religion could potentially appeal to many Israeli Jews 
who feel the system is coercive. In fact, even individuals who work in institutions that 
collaborate with the state’s Rabbinate find this language appealing and integrate it in their 
personal narratives about their work (Kravel-Tovi 2017). ITIM’s emphasis on a non-coercive 
religious institution bears additional meaning when considering that the founder of the 
organization immigrated to Israel from the United States, where ideas of religious choice and 
voluntarism occupy a central role in popular imagination about religion – in Jewish and non-
Jewish contexts (Roof 1999, Sarna 2004, Wuthnow 1998). I argue that this emphasis on 
voluntarism is part of Rabbi Farber’s role as a “cultural broker” of dominant US narratives of 
public religiosity.  
 As these excerpts show, both English and Hebrew versions highlight the organization’s 
role in serving the Jewish public in Israel and promoting a system that would better cater to its 
needs. This emphasis on being “connected” with the public and serving its needs is a recurring 
theme in the organization’s work, as I elaborate later in this chapter.    
The Political is Personal – Claiming Belonging and Legitimacy through Activism 
“The People Demand a Moderate Rabbinate”  
 Although the word “activism” has been in the working title of my dissertation since its 
proposal days, the first event that felt like “real” activism was in the final month of my fieldwork 
in Jerusalem. As in many other events throughout my fieldwork, it was Facebook that told me 
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about the demonstration against the Rabbinate’s rejection of Jewish conversions performed by 
US rabbis. I saw posts on Facebook pages of liberal Orthodox groups and on ITIM’s webpage. I 
then realized that ITIM was one of the organizers of this demonstration. The title of the 
demonstration was Neged hahaktzana baRabbanut (“against extremism in the Rabbinate”). It 
was clear to me then that I could not afford to miss it myself.  
 The demonstration was to be held at one of the busiest spots in Jerusalem – at the street 
corner that leads to the central bus station’s disembarking platforms – at nine o’clock, during the 
pick of the morning rush hour. This spot was chosen because of its proximity to the Chief 
Rabbinical religious court (Beit-Din) where a discussion was to be held that day in the case of an 
American woman whose conversion was performed by Rabbi Haskel Lookstein, one of the 
prominent rabbis of Modern Orthodox Jews in New York. I arrived at the street corner shortly 
after nine and the place was already crowded with several dozen demonstrators, many of them 
holding signs. I rushed closer to the front and pushed my way between them. I noticed that many 
of the people were dati’im - men with kippot and women with wide head bands that I had 
recognized by then as the head covering for liberal observant women. The age range was diverse; 
there were men and women in their fifties and sixties as well as young people in their early 
twenties.  
 When I got closer to the front, I saw Rabbi Farber standing on an elevated platform. 
Although he spoke into a megaphone, his voice was barely heard through the loud commotion of 
buses passing by. And still, there was an air of excitement. Rabbi Farber seemed energized, 
literally elevated; the “activist look” suited him. I caught him saying that this was the first 
demonstration but not the last. He then started to recite loudly into the megaphone, in a rhythm 
that was well-known to any Israeli who was around during the summer of 2011, the summer of 
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the “Social Protest” (mecha’a hevratit) in which Israelis protested economic inequalities. 90 The 
most popular slogan in the Social Protest demonstrations was, “The People Demand Social 
Justice” (HaAm Doresh Tsedek Hevrati). In that demonstration in front of the Chief Rabbinical 
court, Rabbi Farber re-appropriated this slogan and called loudly into the megaphone, HaAm 
Doresh Rabbanut Metunah – “the People Demand a Moderate Rabbinate.” The protesters picked 
it up quickly and joined him.  
 I recognized in the crowd many familiar faces from my fieldwork in South Jerusalem. 
Even Rabbi Daniel Sperber, the “Spiritual Father” of the partnership minyans movement, paced 
around slowly. Rinat from the Baka Minyan, where I prayed on Shabbat mornings during my 
fieldwork, passed by and greeted me with her big smile. I then spotted the people of ITIM. I 
asked Rivka, a staff member at the organization, who was behind the demonstration. She told me 
the initial idea came from students of Rabbi Lookstein who live in Israel but then ITIM picked 
up on their initiative and organized the demonstration. She and another employee showed me, 
proudly, the signs they prepared in the office ahead of time. The signs were hand written on 
colorful plastic boards. The signs said in Hebrew, “Extremist Rabbinate – a Disaster to the 
State,” “The People Demand Ahavat Ha-ger (Love the Stranger)”, and “Enough Disregarding 
Diaspora Rabbis.” Another sign said in English – “Don’t Divorce American Jewry.” The theme 
of these signs was twofold – against increasing stringency in the Rabbinate’s policies in general 
and against its rejection of the authority of non-Israeli rabbis, particularly liberal Orthodox rabbis 
from the United States, in particular.  
                                                 
90 In 2011, what started as a protest sit-in of several dozen young men and women in tents along 
Rothschild Blvd. in central Tel Aviv, grew to be the most massive social protest in Israeli history. 
Hundreds of thousands of protesters across the country protested economic inequalities in Israel. Over the 
course of several months, they held demonstrations, had sit-ins, and organized mass rallies (Kershner 
2011). 
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Figure 3: Demonstration signs made by ITIM staff members: “The People Demand Love the 
Stranger”, “Extremist Rabbanut – Danger to the State.”  
 
 I enjoyed the demonstration. There was a real air of excitement, of change, of a 
movement. It finally looked like a group of people committed to the same things and doing 
something about it. The protest reassured me that I was not studying disparate groups and 
individuals but a movement. My previous encounters with religious activists working to modify 
the state’s religious institutions were mostly in conferences and in the halls of the Knesset, when 
I joined ITIM’s staff members to various committees and meetings. There was always a leisurely 
quality to those events. The activists seemed like they enjoyed meeting each other and spending 
time away from their office work. However, on that warm July morning there was a sense of 
urgency, of action, a sense that change was coming. “This is our first demonstration but not the 
last”; Rabbi Farber’s words resonated with me. Later that day, I saw a post on ITIM’s Facebook 
page that said, “We went out today to protest and we will come back whenever is needed. We are 
done shutting up!” Finally, there was anger. 
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Affective Activism: Imagining the Virtual, Transforming the Actual     
 During the demonstration in front the religious court in Jerusalem, Rabbi Farber was 
interviewed by Channel Seven, an Orthodox and right-wing news channel in Israel. I watched the 
interview online later that day. Rabbi Farber explained why they were protesting. Israel’s 
Rabbinate was creating a “rift” between American and Israeli Jews, he said. He emphasized that 
the case of Rabbi Lookstein represented a recent trend in the Chief Rabbinate of rejecting 
decisions made by US rabbis. These are “Orthodox rabbis,” he said; the reporter reiterated, 
“Orthodox rabbis?” and rabbi Farber emphasized, “Yes, Orthodox rabbis that everyone knows in 
the United States, and here they are being slapped in the face!” These last words he uttered with 
apparent frustration.  
 The Rabbinate’s rejection of conversions performed abroad is nothing new. The 
Rabbinate has been rejecting conversions officiated by Reform and Conservative rabbis since the 
founding of the State of Israel. Non-Orthodox conversions from abroad are recognized in Israel 
only for the purpose of Aliya, Jewish immigration, and registration as Jews by the Population 
Registrar of the Ministry of the Interior. The Chief Rabbinate, however, does not recognize these 
converts and their Israeli offspring as Jews according to Orthodox interpretation of halakha and 
refuses to provide them with religious services necessary to determining their legal personal 
status. The recent haktzana, extremism, against which Rabbi Farber and his colleagues protested, 
refers to a new development in the Chief Rabbinate’s exclusionist policies. The rabbinate has 
started to apply its restrictive policies against Orthodox rabbis from abroad, mostly from the 
United States, who are known for their liberal worldviews and actions.   
 This trend is evident in the rejection of a conversion performed by Rabbi Lookstein and 
in the Chief Rabbinate’s rejection of Rabbi Avi Weiss’ letters attesting that his congregants were 
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Jewish, as I have described in chapter two. Rabbi Weiss and Rabbi Lookstein are among dozens 
of oversees rabbis, Orthodox and non-Orthodox, whose authority is not respected by Israel’s 
Chief Rabbinate (Ben Zion 2017). 
 After attending the demonstration and listening to the interview online, I wrote down the 
following passage in my field diary:  
The liberal Orthodox in Israel, many of whom made Aliya from the United States, are now 
anxious that they will no longer be able to maintain their social networks intact and sustain 
their relations with the Modern-Orthodox world, both here and “there.” These people made 
Aliya out of a Religious-Zionist vision to live in Israel as moderate Orthodox Jews. The 
Chief Rabbinate was supposed to support them and help them to realize their vision. But 
something went wrong. The Rabbinate disrespects them and does not allow them to live in 
Israel according to their beliefs.91 (Field diary, 7.6.2016) 
 In this rally I could finally sense anger because things got personal. Many of the 
speakers, Rabbi Farber included, were American rabbis or students of American rabbis. The 
rejection of Rabbi Lookstein’s conversions was for them a personal rejection. The Israeli 
Rabbinate was rejecting them and their Judaism. The demonstration, therefore, was not driven 
only by a sense of injustice but also, and perhaps more so, by organizers’ feelings of alienation, 
disappointment, confusion, and anger. It was alienation by the state’s religious system that 
pushes them away from institutional power and any possibility of making an impact from within. 
It was disappointment because of how things turned out in the Jewish state that was supposed to 
be, in a Zionist vision, “a Light unto the Nations.” It was confusion because of their realization 
that history played a joke on them and that, somehow, they found themselves expelled from the 
                                                 
91 See Hebrew origin in Appendix B item 5. 
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centers of political power, marginal in a country that was founded on a vision of their ideological 
forefathers. And they were angry for all these reasons.  
 I argue that in order to understand ITIM’s work it is important to consider these 
emotions. To Rabbi Farber and his colleagues, activism is a way of attempting to claim their 
place in the “Jewish State.” They have a vision of how Israel should be, and their activism 
attempts to bring that Israel into life.  
 In her ethnography of queer activists in India, Dave (2012) argues that activism begins in 
the gap between the world the activists imagine and the existing social reality. She writes, 
“Activism begins, then, precisely as the virtual in the actual world, the previously unthinkable 
that is now a flickering possibility, just on the verge of entering upon the world of norms” (ibid, 
10). The activism of the managers of ITIM is a way to eliminate the gap between the “virtual” 
Israel they imagine, to use Dave’s concepts, and actual Israel in which they live.  
 As I was writing this chapter, Rabbi Farber published an article in a volume of the liberal 
Religious-Zionist journal De’ot dedicated to the relationship between American and Israeli 
Jewry. In the article, he describes his feelings of alienation and confusion in his first year in 
Israel. He was already an experienced rabbi and teacher and, yet, in Israel he felt his experience 
did not count. His first attempt to be a high school teacher in Israel failed: “I was a successful 
rabbi-teacher in Boston and still, when I tried to teach here after my Aliya, I failed. I was not 
familiar with the cultural norms of students, the rigidity of the curriculum and the system in 
general” (Farber 2017, 36).92 As the years passed, he became more familiar with the Rabbinate. 
He realized that the state’s religious establishment was a “closed clique” and a “network formed 
by men who studied in the same yeshivot, were part of the same congregations, and formed 
                                                 
92 English translation form the Hebrew origin is mine, O.F. 
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solidarity that is based on their years-long familiarity.” He was not part of that network (ibid, 36-
37).  
 One of his priorities over the past several years has been to change the Rabbinate’s 
opinion of Orthodox rabbis from abroad. Farber writes, “It is ironic that almost all the reporters 
in Israeli media who write about Judaism see me as an expert on American Jewry, while the 
Rabbinate does not acknowledge my expertise” (ibid). His US background shaped and defined 
the organization he founded. He writes that the organization’s legal approach seemed “obvious” 
to him, as a US citizen, while many of his Israeli friends were “astonished.” Suing the Rabbinate 
is an almost inconceivable idea to Israel-born Religious-Zionists.  
 Finally, he writes that through his activism he was able to feel integrated into Israeli 
society. In his work, he engages in “intensive interaction with diverse sections of Israeli 
society…I feel my decision to step out of my comfort zone and to work among Hebrew speakers 
in my congregation and in my public activity contributed to my ability to integrate and to make a 
difference (ibid, 37).” 
 These quotes from Rabbi Farber’s article reflect an array of affects surrounding his 
position as an immigrant in Israel and as an activist: confusion because of his lack of familiarity 
with Israeli norms; alienation by not belonging to the closed clique of Israeli rabbis; and 
frustration that the Rabbinate does not appreciate his expertise. These affects are his motivations 
to be an activist; to “step out” of his comfort zone and to insist on trying to influence wider 
audiences in Israeli society. It is his activism as the head of the organization that enabled him to 
feel at home in Israel.  
 Rabbi Farber’s position as an American rabbi in Israel has shaped the organization he 
founded and its ways of action, as he writes in his essay. In this sense, Rabbi Farber is a cultural 
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broker that mediates his American-based notions of religiosity to Israeli audiences in a language 
that is intelligible to them. The organization’s mission to pursue a voluntary religious institution 
is another example of this work of mediation.  
This mediation work was also evident in the demonstration I described above. The US 
organizers of the demonstration, Farber included, had personal motivation to protest. Their 
language against extremism in the Chief Rabbinate found a sympathetic audience among Israel-
born liberal Religious-Zionists. Israel-born liberal Religious-Zionists have also resisted the 
increasing religious stringency of Israel’s Chief Rabbinate. For example, in my conversations 
with Shimon from Ne’emanei Torah Va’Avoda movement (which I depict in chapter two) he 
emphasized that Israel’s current religious establishment does not represent his movement’s 
liberal Orthodox religiosity. Therefore, the “American” vocabulary of religious voluntarism, 
autonomy and pluralism that Rabbi Farber employs in his activism makes sense to some Israeli-
born Religious-Zionists. 
 My conversations with Ilan, one of the organization’s leaders, further demonstrates this 
point. Unlike Rabbi Farber, Ilan grew up in Israel. At the time of my fieldwork, he was in his 
early thirties. He was born in the United Kingdom to a British-Jewish family and made Aliya 
with his parents as a young child. The Aliya was ideologically motivated, he says. His family is 
“very Zionist” and it was always important to them to think of ways they could participate in the 
shaping of Israel. He grew up in south Jerusalem and studied in Religious-Zionist schools. He 
has been an activist in different liberal Orthodox and inter-faith initiatives since high school.  
 Ilan joined ITIM around 2011, shortly after he completed his internship as a lawyer. 
When we met for an interview in May 2016 I told him I was also studying religious 
congregations, too. He did not understand at first how the two case studies, his organization and 
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religious congregations, were related. “What we do is very different,” he argued. He then paused 
for a moment and added, “but it is also similar.” “Similar how?” I asked. “It is similar,” he said, 
“because all of us seek to reclaim Judaism.” He then added that members of both groups were 
motivated by their belief that their Jewish way is important. “We are religious people who are 
committed to halakha,” he said, “but we “do” Judaism differently [than the state Rabbinate].” 
Their way of doing Judaism, Ilan maintained, was not inferior to that of the Chief Rabbinate but, 
in fact, better.  
 Ilan, obviously, believed that his legal work was right and just, and that the work of the 
organization was advancing a better reality. But he was also motivated by feelings that his 
personal identity as a halakha-observing liberal Jew was being undermined. In his work he 
“fights for a better and truer Judaism,” as he puts it, not only to bring about social and political 
change but also to make his Judaism more central and influential in Israel. In this sense, his 
activism is, similarly to Rabbi Farber’s, a “personal matter.”  
Reaching Back to Authentic Judaism   
 The activism of Rabbi Farber and Ilan is as much about carving a more central space to 
their Jewish identities as it is about improving the religious institutions of the state.  This is 
related to yet another dominant aspect of the organization: its commitment to advancing 
solutions that coincide with halakhic traditions. By recruiting a halakhic discourse on their 
behalf, staff members seek to legitimize their own Jewishness vis-à-vis the solutions they 
promote. Consider the following. In January 2016, a conference titled “Alternative Marriage” 
was held in the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset. This conference was part of the activities of The 
Forum for People, Religion and State, which focuses on concerns pertaining to the relations 
between religion and the state, such as marriage and divorce, conversion, the Shabbat and the 
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status of the Chief Rabbinate (Knesset, n.d.). Ilan was one of the organizers of this Forum and its 
activities, and he suggested that I attend the conference. “You will probably find it interesting,” 
he told me.  
 When I arrived at the Knesset, after passing the mandatory security screening at the 
entrance, I hurried to the conference hall where the meeting was about to take place. By then I 
had already attended several conferences and meetings in which representatives of ITIM 
participated, and I knew my way around the Knesset’s elaborate network of hallways and 
corridors. When I arrived there, Ilan stood with a group of activists from other religious 
organizations that operate in the field of religion and state relations. I was familiar with a few of 
them from my fieldwork in the liberal Orthodox “scene” of South Jerusalem. 
 Inside the large conference hall, people had already taken their seats. At the center of the 
hall, there was a large circular table with signs for speakers’ names. I recognized most of the 
names; about half of them were from Religious-Zionist organizations and communities and the 
rest were representatives of the Reform and Conservative movements and of secular civil-society 
organizations. All speakers, and it seemed that all attendants, were Jewish. Although the 
meeting’s agenda was to examine alternatives to the existing marriage procedures of the state, 
non-Jewish marriage or inter-faith marriage were not addressed. 
 The conference started with a short introduction by Members of the Knesset Elazar Stern 
and Aliza Lavie of Yesh Atid party, who facilitated the meetings of this forum. They introduced 
the context of the meeting, which was the increasing numbers of Israeli citizens who cannot or 
would not turn to the state’s Rabbinate to perform their marriage ceremony, although the 
Rabbinate’s procedure is the only one that grants the state’s legal recognition. After the 
introduction, each of the speakers had about five minutes to introduce his or her opinion. Rabbi 
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Farber was among the speakers. He opened by stating that “as an Orthodox rabbi,” he wanted 
people to be able to marry according to halakha. However, to many people this was not possible 
because of the monopoly of the Rabbinate over marriage. The Rabbinate was “afraid of 
diversification,” he said, and this fear was damaging to the Jewish people, to the state of Israel 
and to halakha. The Jewish public in Israel needs “diverse options.”  To sum up, he said: “we 
need to stop the authorities’ use of punishments and monopoly. These are things that never 
existed throughout the history of the Jewish people and should not exist now in the state of 
Israel.” 93 
 A key concept in Rabi Farber’s speech was decentralization. He often repeated this term 
when he articulated the organization’s vision in public – either in conferences, in meetings at the 
Knesset or in training activities offered to other organizations. To him, decentralization means 
ending the monopoly of a particular version of Orthodoxy over the Jewish religious institutions 
of the state and allowing a greater diversification within these institutions. 
 Another key notion in his speech was that the current centralized system of religious 
institutions, which works according to narrow ultra-Orthodox guidelines, is foreign to the history 
of Judaism. Judaism, according to him, has never been a centralized religion; it always allowed 
pluralist discussions and opinions. Ilan expressed a similar view when I interviewed him in May 
2016, when he said: “The Jewish people have always been founded on a culture of disagreement. 
Throughout history we viewed different opinions as a valued thing, a right thing. In the Mishna 
and the Talmud, they did not ignore minority opinions; they included them in the text and 
preserved them.”  
                                                 
93 Rabbi Farber spoke in Hebrew. I took field notes of his speech during the conference. These excerpts 
are my English translation to his words. 
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According to Ilan, therefore, it was the Rabbinate, rather than ITIM, that went against 
Jewish history in imposing a single way of Jewish life. The Jewish commandments are “based on 
free choice,” Ilan told me. Imposing the commandments, therefore, was “not Jewish at all,” 
according to him. As demonstrated by these excerpts, the NGO’s vision of decentralized and 
more diverse religious institutions was a return to what they believed was an authentic, truer 
Judaism. They consider the state Rabbinate’s monopoly over Judaism as contradictory to this 
“true” Judaism.    
A Case Study: ITIM’s Legal Struggle for Women’s Autonomy 
Let me now demonstrate how this stance is translated into a concrete line of action. In the 
summer of 2015 ITIM petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court arguing against the state’s religious 
authorities and Jerusalem’s religious council. This petition concerned the authorities’ policies 
regarding women visitors in the municipal mikva’ot (ritual purification immersion baths) in 
Jerusalem.94 The organization represented thirteen women, most of them feminist activists (many 
of them Orthodox), who sued the state for enforcing bathing guidelines that, according to them, 
violated their rights to privacy and autonomy.  
 The women referred to the practice of mikva’ot staff in Jerusalem to require women to 
undergo inspections by the female attendant of the mikveh (called balanit) before and during 
their immersion in the mikveh’s water. Although the Ministry of Religious Services issued 
guidelines to religious councils’ employees, according to which the role of the attendants was 
                                                 
94 Married Jewish women who observe halakha laws immerse themselves in a mikveh once a month at the 
end of their menstrual cycle as a ritual of purification, after which they are allowed to resume sexual 
relations with their husbands. The clients of mikva’ot in Israel are, therefore, mostly halakha-observing 
women. Another group of women who use mikva’ot are brides-to-be who intend to undergo marriage via 
the only state-recognized procedure, which is the one offered by the Chief Rabbinate. As part of this 
procedure, they are required to bathe in one of the state’s mikva’ot. Therefore, although the bathing ritual 
is intimate and related to personal aspects of women’s lives, in Israel it is supervised and regulated by 
representatives of the state (Avishai 2008). Mikva’ot are part of the bureaucracy of the state’s religious 
institutions, and, as such, they are one of the primary realms ITIM activists seek to reform. 
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only to assist women and not to intervene in their bathing, 95 women had called ITIM and 
complained that mikva’ot staff across Jerusalem required them to undergo inspections. These 
inspections often included intrusive questions and even physical contact to ensure that women 
were “prepared” to immerse themselves according to Chief Rabbinate’s standards.  
ITIM’s litigation team argued that women should be free to bathe according to their own 
standards. They argued that by requiring women to undergo such inspections, the state violated 
their basic rights to autonomy, dignity, privacy, and equality (ITIM 2015a, 33-9). Moreover, they 
argued that women’s autonomous bathing was also based on halakhic principles. While mikva’ot 
staff, both the female attendants and their rabbi supervisors, assumed that there was one correct 
way of bathing according to halakha, ITIM lawyers argued that there are many ways of bathing 
in accordance with halakhic principles. They included in the petition a halakhic review that 
showed that past rabbis did not require women to undergo an inspection during their purification 
in the mikveh (ibid, 47). 
Based on civil law principles and supported by halakhic evidence, ITIM petitioned that 
women would not be required to be inspected during their bathing, and eventually won the legal 
struggle in June 2016. In this case, ITIM’s legal team presented women’s autonomous bathing 
not only as more just in civil law standards but also according to halakhic standards. This 
example illustrates how ITIM’s activism “turns back” to Jewish history as a way of showing 
“loyalty to a traditional past” (Clifford 2004, 156) that is, in fact, a way forward toward an 
improved Jewish life in contemporary Israel.  
ITIM’s Halakhic Discourse as an Identity-Centered Discourse 
This insight about activist movements’ reliance on what they view as “tradition” as a 
“way ahead” holds even greater weight in the context of religious groups, who often evoke past 
                                                 
95 These updated guidelines were a result of ITIM’s legal struggles in 2013 and 2014. 
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religious traditions as a way of authenticating and legitimizing their religiosity (Deeb 2006; 
Fader 2009). This evoking of the past, however, is not a mere utilitarian strategy. Instead, it is the 
way followers of a certain religion constitute their subjectivity and self-understanding, and, thus, 
their understanding of their present and future (Mahmood 2005, 115). Although this 
anthropological insight grew out of the historic context of Islam (Asad [1986] 2009), I find it 
illuminating in the present-day context of liberal observant Jews in Israel.  
As I have shown in the above examples from ITIM’s work, evocations of what they 
consider as “authentic” Judaism, in which a pluralist view of halakha occupies a central place, 
constitute the way ITIM activists justify and legitimize the initiatives they promote. The Jewish 
values according to which they seek to reform the state’s religious establishment are also the 
values that guide them in their personal lives as halakha-observing Jews who hold a liberal 
worldview. Their own religiosity, therefore, also represents a “truer” version of Judaism. 
Furthermore, there is a dimension of social belonging in ITIM’s reliance on halakhic 
principles. The organization only promotes solutions that coincide with halakha for political and 
strategic reasons but also as a way of remaining within what is considered in Israel as “Orthodox 
society.” Iris, a member of the organization’s management team, illustrated this point when I 
interviewed her on May 2016: 
If we [ITIM] kick ourselves out of Orthodoxy, no one will speak to us…The Rabbinate does 
not talk with Reform rabbis, so we must remain within Orthodoxy. We might be at its liberal 
margins, but we are within it, nevertheless. It is a constant balance. On the one hand, we 
122 
 
want to promote change, so we follow rabbis’ liberal views and decisions. On the other 
hand, we want to stay within Orthodoxy. It is a constant balancing work.96  
 ITIM promotes Judaism that is committed to halakha, yet it is moderate, tolerant and 
liberal, like the Judaism its staff members practice. They argue that their activism is meant to 
benefit a greater number of Israeli Jews (observant and secular alike). This stance is evident in 
Ilan’s conviction that “fighting for Judaism is one and the same as fighting for human rights.” I 
argue, however, that their activism is also meant to promote their Jewish identity and make it 
more central. By employing halakha, they not only validate the institutional reforms they 
promote but also the Jewishness they practice.  
Connecting to the People 
I now want to examine the organization’s orientation toward maintaining close contact 
with “the People.” This orientation, I argue, is part of what I call the organization’s emphasis on 
“personalizing” public Judaism. The organization maintains its connections with Jewish-Israeli 
publics through its Assistance Center and its website and Facebook pages. The organization’s 
claims to represent the interest of the public are meant to facilitate the reforms they promote and 
to justify them. Paradoxically, however, the organization’s reliance on individuals’ requests for 
assistance perpetuates the Rabbinate’s dominance. 
 In the protest described above against “extremism” in the Rabbinate, Rabbi Farber spoke 
on behalf of the Jewish-Israeli public – “The People wants a moderate Rabbinate.” This 
objective, of representing the public and serving its needs, also came up in my interview with 
Ilan. To him, an ideal system of state-funded religious services was one that is “bottom-up” –
shaped by the public rather than imposed from above. One of the primary foci of ITIM, he told 
                                                 
96 See Hebrew origin in Appendix B, item 6. 
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me, was to “decrease the establishment’s capability to decide for citizens, and increase [citizens’] 
freedom of choice.” This point resonates with the organization’s mission to enable Israeli 
citizens a greater freedom of choice in their interactions with the religious institutions of the 
state. 
 To a certain extent, this objective is being met. Among the organizations that work to 
reform the state’s religious services, ITIM is unique in its widespread outreach capacity, enabled 
first and foremost by the organization’s Hotline. Rabbi Farber takes pride that the Assistance 
Center is the organization’s “ear to the ground”; it allows him to learn what happens on the 
ground and to remain connected with “hashetach,” the “field.”  
 During the time of my research, the administration team of the organization was busy 
thinking of how to publicize their activities and to increase the number of cases assisted by the 
Hotline. In addition to the organization’s webpage and Facebook page, they designed a radio 
campaign that was meant to bolster the organization’s advertising efforts. Helping as many 
people as possible meant that the organization fulfilled its main objectives. As a staff member 
once told me, “If people won’t call us, we will not be able to accomplish our mission.”  
 The Hotline’s activity is also important in terms of the organization’s funding. According 
the organization’s 2015 financial report (ITIM 2015b), their financial resources are based solely 
on donations from private entities, mostly Jewish organizations in Israel and abroad. ITIM 
competes for funding with other organizations who share similar objectives. In order to ensure 
continuation of funding, the organization has to show that it is being active and productive.  
 Between 2015 and 2016, for instance, there was a rise in the number of callers. There 
were 821 calls in the second quarter of 2015 but 1,095 calls in the second quarter of 2016.97 This 
increase might represent an escalation in the Rabbinate’s restrictive policies, resulting in a larger 
                                                 
97 Overview of Assistance Center – an internal document of the organization.  
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number of people seeking assistance. It might also represent an increased effectiveness in the 
organization’s advertising mechanism, which brought its services to a wider audience. 
Regardless of the reason for the increase, these numbers illustrate ITIM’s emphasis on being 
connected to “the People” and targeting topics that are based on public needs.   
 Another way of connecting to what happens on the ground is through the organization’s 
website and Facebook page. The organization’s website provides detailed information about the 
various religious services provided by the state in the areas of marriage and divorce, conversion, 
burial, and mikveh bathing. The website is a channel through which the public can obtain 
information about various procedures without calling the local Rabbinate authorities or ITIM’s 
Hotline.   
 Ferziger (2008), who compared ITIM’s work to that of Tzohar, an organization of 
Religious-Zionist rabbis that, like ITIM, assists Israeli Jews to undergo the Rabbinate’s 
procedures, argues that ITIM’s website is not only informative but also “empowering” (ibid, 76). 
Ferziger argues that the website empowers individuals to explore intimate issues in depth 
without depending on rabbis or other authority figures and without committing to a particular 
way of action. Having a choice, he argues, empowers citizens as they approach the state’s 
institutions and, eventually, allows ITIM to propose an alternative to the state’s Rabbinate (ibid, 
83).  
 While the website is highly informative and user-friendly, and it does enable people to 
approach the state’s religious services from a more knowledgeable position, I argue that it also 
reaffirms the current system. Although the website includes brief discussions of non-Rabbinate 
alternatives, such as non-Orthodox conversions, it focuses on informing people about the 
Rabbinate’s procedures, so they can navigate them better.  
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 The website, therefore, helps Israeli Jews to become more knowledgeable about the 
religious institutions but this newly acquired knowledge does not help them to become less 
dependent on these institutions. A Jewish couple seeking to get married in a state-recognized 
ceremony must go through the Rabbinate’s marriage procedures.98 ITIM might assist them to 
undergo this procedure with greater ease, but they are still without alternatives. The website 
informs the public, secular and religious, about the state’s religious policies yet it is still focused 
on Orthodox procedures. Again, the cosmos of ITIM is Orthodox: they promote pluralism and 
reform but within the boundaries of Orthodox interpretations of halakha. By doing so, the 
organization reaffirms a dominant perception in Israeli society that “true” Judaism equals 
halakhic Judaism.   
 The other medium through which the organization communicates with the people is its 
Facebook page, which is central to the organization’s marketing and public relations activities. 
The organization employs a staff member who is responsible for marketing and advertising 
activities. In terms of Facebook, she administers the webpage, publishes posts, and replies to 
comments daily. It is an active page with 36,543 followers (as of 5/15/2019). 
  The Facebook page has diverse purposes. First, it serves as a medium for letting the 
public know about the organization’s achievements and activities. Second, through Facebook, 
the organization can raise public awareness of the flaws of the Rabbinate’s policies and of ways 
in which ITIM’s staff tries to amend them. According to Ilan, the organization’s Facebook page 
ultimately enables including the public in a conversation about the state’s religious services: 
“Facebook opens the door of the closed chamber in which sixteen rabbis convene and secretly 
make decisions.” Facebook enables ITIM to publicize the political debates in which decisions 
                                                 
98 As long as they are eligible to receive this service from the Rabbinate. Many couples, including same-
sex couples and couples in which one or both members are not Jewish by halakhic standards, are not 
eligible to go through the Rabbinate’s marriage procedures.  
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about the religious policies of the state are made, and to expose them to public scrutiny. This 
move, Ilan argues, “empowers” Israeli citizens.  
Ironically, as part of their efforts to inform the public about the malfunctions of the 
religious authorities, ITIM publicizes the policies of the state. The organization’s website and 
Facebook page, therefore, reproduce a current state of affairs in which people are forced to turn 
to the Rabbinate, because of an absence of alternative state-recognized institutions, and then to 
turn to the organization when things go wrong. The organization’s work is, at times, a double-
edged sword; they strive to improve the system, and, at the same time, their existence depends on 
the continuance of the current reality.99  
 I argue that ultimately, the significance of the organization’s Hotline and online platforms 
is not necessarily in setting a concrete alternative to the Rabbinate but in contributing to shifting 
the discussion about state-funded religious services from its focus on the state and its concerns to 
the concerns of Israeli citizens. At the beginning of this chapter I argued that ITIM’s activism 
centers on making public Judaism personal. In their endeavors to improve the religious services 
the state provides to its citizens, ITIM activists seek to redirect the spotlight of public Judaism 
and aim it at “the People.” Rabbi Farber’s words at the end of my interview with him illustrate 
this point: “At the end, I want to see our impact on people, people are still the center [of ITIM’s 
work] … I want to leave no stone unturned before I tell someone, the Jewish life you wish to 
lead is currently impossible in the state of Israel.” 
 
 
                                                 
99 A notable exception to this policy of ITIM is the organization’s key involvement in the 2015 founding 
and operations of Giyur K’halakha, as described in chapter two. This move, and others that followed it, 
represents ITIM’s transitioning from an organization that focuses on aiding Israeli Jews within the 
constraints of the existing structure of religious institutions to an organization that combats these 
institutions and attempts to reform them drastically.  
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Conclusion 
 The activism of ITIM is very different from the activism of minority groups like queer 
activists in the United States and India (Dave 2012; Gould 2009). Staff members in the 
organization do not protest being marginalized for who they are. They protest being marginalized 
despite of who they are. They have a vision of another Israel, an Israel in which halakha is used 
to promote justice rather than injustice. Through their activism, they aim to bring this Israel to 
life. However, since they operate in a reality in which critics of the Rabbinate and the Judaism it 
represents are perceived as “not religious enough” or as “Reformed Jews” (Ferziger 2015), 
ITIM’s activists work hard to reiterate that they do, in fact, work in accordance with Orthodox 
interpretations of halakha.  
 ITIM’s decision to promote solutions that are compatible with halakha has consequences. 
ITIM’s activism confronts the state’s bureaucracy but not the premises on which it is established. 
Their focus on promoting solutions within a halakhic framework does not undermine dominant 
premises that Judaism should shape Israel’s public sphere, and that public Judaism in Israel 
should be commensurate with halakhic conventions. In this sense, their activism does not 
transgress the norms of the existing hegemonic paradigm (Dave 2012). The changes the 
organization promotes involve different norms and values than those of the state’s Rabbinate; but 
they do not challenge a main premise in Israel according to which legitimate Jewish religiosity 
entails following halakhic conventions. Although the organization collaborates with non-
Orthodox organizations, and leading staff members support greater representation of non-
Orthodox Jews in the state’s religious authorities, as an organization they are committed to 
promoting halakhic Judaism.100  
                                                 
100 The only time, that I recall, in which a member of ITIM supported a non-halakhic procedure was in a 
panel about civil marriage in a conference on Jewish pluralism, which took place in October 2016 in Tel-
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An illuminating illustration of this duality came up in my interview with Rabbi Farber, 
during which he told me that he cannot afford to be too liberal himself in his hometown 
congregation because this might taint his credentials as an Orthodox rabbi and, consequently, 
damage ITIM’s work. Activism is not only about “cold” strategic calculations but also about 
matters of social belonging and identifications. Rabbi Farber’s dilemma is representative of a 
struggle I identified throughout my fieldwork among liberal observant Jews. Whether they work 
in a formal setting that is focused on institutional change, like the activists of ITIM and NTA, or 
they are members of a religious congregation that debate which changes to introduce to their 
communal religious life, liberal observant Jews constantly negotiate their pro-change 
motivations and their efforts to maintain their social reputation as Jews who take halakha 
seriously. 
This chapter demonstrates how this tension plays out in the organized activism of liberal 
observant Jews. In the balancing work the activists of ITIM do between aligning themselves with 
progressive forces in Israeli society and remaining within the Orthodox mainstream, their 
activism impedes, at times, the exact changes they seek to bring about. At the same time, ITIM’s 
activists are successful in bringing to the fore a discourse that is centered on “the People.” They 
do not say that Judaism is not a matter of the state. Instead, they say that the religious matters of 
the state should be shaped by its citizens. Through activism that is focused on institutional 
reform ITIM members seek to validate their identities as liberal observant Jews. In doing so, they 
redefine public Judaism in Israel as a personal matter. It is certainly a personal matter to them, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Aviv’s Seaport. In the panel, organized by ITIM, Ilan spoke in favor of constituting civil marriage 
arrangements in Israel. According to him, allowing people to marry in a non-religious wedding would 
solve the problem of religious coercion that currently exists in the marriage procedures of the Chief 
Rabbinate. Ilan emphasized, however, that as an organization, ITIM focuses on helping those Jewish 
couples who are interested in a religious-halakhic wedding.  
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and in the virtual Israel they envision, it would be a personal matter to a greater number of Israeli 
Jews.  
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CHAPTER 4 
A NEW CITY SQUARE: PUBLIC PLACE-MAKING IN SOUTH JERUSALEM  
 It is almost midnight on a Friday night and I walk back to my Katamon neighborhood 
apartment with Ariel, Adva and their baby, tucked in her stroller. Ariel and Adva are in their 
thirties, they pray regularly at the Baka Minyan, and they live nearby me, as I just learned over 
Shabbat dinner. We were all invited to dinner by the Zilbermans, a young family that also prays 
regularly at the Minyan. After dinner, we leave the Zilbermans’ house together and begin to pace 
slowly up Katamon’s main street. Half way through, Ariel notices a small group of people ahead 
of us and calls out to one of the women in the group. She approaches us, and I recognize Ayelet. 
I met Ayelet a couple of months earlier to interview her about the organization she administers, 
which provides private Orthodox kashrut services. I also saw her a couple of times in a nearby 
egalitarian Minyan whose Shabbat services I attended occasionally.  
I ask Ariel how he knew Ayelet, and he says he is a board member in that organization. 
Ayelet seems happy to see Ariel and Adva. She joins our small group as we walk together a little 
further until she turns into her street. After a few meters she turns around and shouts at Ariel and 
Adva – “I just blessed over the food from your wedding’s birkonim” [blessing booklets]!101 
“Where were you at dinner?” Ariel and Adva ask. Ayelet mentions the name of a friend, and 
they nod and smile in recognition. After Ayelet leaves, Ariel and Adva walk another fifty meters 
with me and then we say goodbye as they turn into their street.  
                                                 
101 During my fieldwork I learned of a popular practice in Religious-Zionist celebrations. Mostly in 
weddings and in Ben and Bat Mitzvah celebrations, the hosts hand out as souvenirs booklets that contain 
the text of common religious blessings, like the Food Blessing (birkat hamazon). I describe this practice 
in greater length later in the chapter as part of my discussion of “dinner table sociability.”  
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  This ethnographic snippet is significant for several reasons. First, it illustrates the density 
of interrelations between residents in these neighborhoods. Ariel, Adva, and the Zilbermans pray 
at the same congregation. Ariel and Ayelet are associated with the same activist NGO, and they 
are neighbors. Second, the kind of encounters described here, which is only one example of 
numerous neighborhood encounters I witnessed, mostly during Shabbat, is shaped by the urban 
environment. Many of the people I met during my fieldwork who lived in South Jerusalem and 
were associated with one of the liberal, halakha-observing congregations in the neighborhood 
knew one another. They knew where others lived, prayed on Shabbat, and worked during the 
weekdays. This social interaction between Ariel, Adva and Ayelet was shaped by the spatial 
environment; Ayelet joined us because she knew Ariel and Adva lived nearby and walked in the 
same direction, and that the joint walk would allow them five minutes or so to chat and catch up. 
This interaction exemplifies the sense of familiarity residents of South Jerusalem share with one 
another and with their environment. 
 This kind of sociability, I argue, creates a community. It is a community that is bigger 
than the smaller social circles in the neighborhood or its numerous religious congregations. This 
community is comprised of halakha-observing Jews of Orthodox orientation, who share a similar 
worldview of pluralist, moderate and liberal religiosity. The fact that in a relatively small area of 
three neighborhoods – Baka, Katamon, and the German Colony – there are many residents who 
share similar worldviews and lifestyles opens possibilities for experiencing and enacting this 
religiosity in public.  
 In this chapter I explore how the urban space of South Jerusalem, its topography, and 
specific sites in it play roles in constructing the neighborhood, in the eyes of its liberal observant 
residents. These residents construct it as a distinct public “place” that embodies their kind of 
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Jewish religiosity. My discussion in this chapter is informed by scholars who study urban space 
as a “social space,” such as de Certeau (1984), Lefebvre ([1974] 1991), and Low (2000). They 
emphasize that the urban landscape is always produced through human behaviors and 
interactions (ibid). I will show how liberal observant residents of South Jerusalem produce their 
neighborhood as a Jewish place of liberal, halakha-observant religiosity (Gurevitch 2007; Mann 
2012; Tavory 2016). The boundaries of this place and the kind of interactions that are formed in 
it are shaped by the Jewish practices of its liberal observant residents.  
Specifically, this process echoes Tavory’s (2016) ethnography of ways that Jewish 
Orthodox residents of a Los Angeles neighborhood produce their urban space as embodying their 
Orthodox subjectivity. The South Jerusalem case furthers this discussion by demonstrating how 
the dynamics formed in the neighborhood represent a scaled down mode of engagement with 
matters of citizenship, national belonging, and the state.  
It is through interrelations between individuals and congregations and in group activities 
in the public sphere that liberal Jews of Orthodox orientation “construct” their neighborhood as a 
place of liberal observant religiosity (Low 2000). By social construction, Low refers to the 
“phenomenological and symbolic experience of space as mediated by social processes,” which 
results in the “actual transformation of space… into scenes and actions that convey meaning” 
(ibid, 128). Following her definition, I argue that through social relations between people and 
congregations in South Jerusalem, residents make their neighborhood into a place where they 
enact their liberal Orthodox religiosity in public.  
 I demonstrate how this social construction occurs on three different scales: at the intimate 
scale of interactions between people; at the level of relations between congregations; and at the 
scale of the urban public space. As I will show in each part of my discussion, the physical 
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characteristics of the neighborhood and specific locations in it are part of this social construction 
of the neighborhood as a public place of liberal halakhic Judaism. Although South Jerusalem is 
the home of residents of diverse Jewish orientations, I focus on practices of its liberal halakha-
observing residents, and how these practices make the neighborhood into a “public religious 
place” to them.  
The demarcation of an urban territory at the heart of Jerusalem as a public place of liberal 
religiosity is politically significant. The demographic composition of Jerusalem over the past few 
decades has changed dramatically, with the building of new Haredi neighborhoods and the 
relocation of Haredi families to neighborhoods that had been considered non-Haredi until then. 
The “Haredization” of Jerusalem is described in popular media in terms of a “threat” to the urban 
fabric of Jerusalem, and it is often mentioned in tandem with the secular “flight” out of the 
city.102 The efforts of South Jerusalem’s residents (whether through organized, deliberate 
activism or through informal community-building practices) to make their neighborhood into a 
public domain of liberal Jewish religiosity are parallel, in a way, to the dynamics within Israel’s 
Jewish society between liberal Jews (secular and religious) and the Haredi population. These 
antagonistic dynamics have been the backdrop to the liberal observant activism I have described 
in chapters two and three. In South Jerusalem, these dynamics are scaled down to the municipal 
level.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
102 See for instance Livneh (2012) in Israeli media and Kordova (2011) in an English-language website 
oriented toward US Jews. 
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Spatializing Community: Liberal Observant Sociability in South Jerusalem 
Geography Matters 
 
Figure 4: The neighborhoods of South Jerusalem. The First Station Compound is marked by a 
cursor. (Map data: Google, Mapa GISrael). 
 
I moved to South Jerusalem in the summer of 2015. My first apartment was a summer 
sublet in a building overlooking Hebron Road, the busy route that connects the most southern 
neighborhoods of Jerusalem with the city center. The location was convenient; it was a mere ten 
minutes’ walk from the Baka neighborhood, where I did most of my observations. But Hebron 
Road was not part of the social “scene” I was seeking to study; although it is located in the 
southern part of Jerusalem it is not what people think of when they refer to “South Jerusalem.”  
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When residents of Jerusalem talk about “South Jerusalem,” Drom Yerushalayim, they 
refer to the neighborhoods of Baka, Old Katamon, the German Colony and, to a certain degree, 
Arnona.103 These neighborhoods are wealthy residential areas with large stone buildings and 
quiet streets rich with vegetation that are dotted with small urban parks. In contrast, the 
neighborhood on Hebron Road consisted of dilapidated three-story tenement buildings 
surrounded by half-empty parking lots. It was populated by working class families, many of 
them Mizrahim (Jews from majority Muslim counties) or immigrants from the former Soviet 
Union. Only a few hundred meters separated the shabby projects of Hebron Road from the 
spacious, formerly-Palestinian villas of Baka neighborhood but it seems like a world apart. 
South Jerusalem is not merely a geographical location; it denotes a particular type of 
worldview and lifestyle.104 When people talk about Drom Yerushalayim, they refer to a social 
group characterized as Ashkenazi, educated, middle-class, liberal in terms of their social outlook, 
inclined to centrist or leftist political views, and that many of whom are either Israeli-born or 
first-generation immigrants from North America or Western Europe (Zaban 2013, 133).105 The 
area of South Jerusalem is exceptionally religiously diverse. It is particularly known for its 
liberal-religious flavor, that is, congregations of diverse Jewish orientations (from Orthodox 
                                                 
103 Arnona is somewhat isolated from the three other neighborhoods as it is located east, rather than west, 
Hebron Rd. Its demography, however, is similar to that of the other South Jerusalem neighborhoods and 
some of its residents walk on Shabbat to pray in one of the minyans in Baka and the German Colony.  
104 Two American-born writers who reside in Jerusalem, Haim Watzman and Gershom Gorenberg, write a 
blog titled, “South Jerusalem: A Progressive, Skeptical Blog on Israel, Judaism, Culture, Politics, and 
Literature” (http://www.southjerusalem.com/, accessed 5/9/2017). The blog contains critical notes about 
the Israeli social and political reality from a left-wing, liberal-Jewish perspective. The writers’ decision to 
name their blog “South Jerusalem” indicates that to them, and to members of their social group, the 
neighborhood represents the worldview they express in their blog.  
105 In her research on the gentrification of the Baka neighborhood, Hila Zaban (2013) estimates that at the 
time of her research, between 30% and 40% of Baka residents were first-generation immigrants from the 
United States, United Kingdom, or France.   
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through Reform, Conservative and non-affiliated) that are willing to alter the traditional protocol 
of public Jewish prayers to various degrees (Zaban 2013).  
At the end of the summer I moved from Hebron Road to an apartment in the Old 
Katamon neighborhood. That area was officially part of “South Jerusalem”; there, I finally felt 
“in the field.” The scene I was looking for was right there, beyond the threshold of my door. 
Residents of the neighborhoods of South Jerusalem refer to it fondly, as well as critically, as 
HaBitza, the “swamp.” While the term bitza in South Jerusalem is most commonly identified 
with the singles’ “scene” of young Religious-Zionists (Engelberg 2016), it is also used more 
loosely by liberal Orthodox residents of South Jerusalem to refer to the elaborate social circles 
they have formed in the neighborhood.  
South Jerusalem is a dense neighborhood, in terms of the social activity that takes place 
in its territory. By density I mean “vibrant associational life,” a network of social ties in which 
residents are linked to one another (Tavory 2016, 5). South Jerusalem’s residents associate 
themselves with one another by affiliating to the same local religious congregations, 
participating in public cultural events in locations throughout the area, attending various Limmud 
(study of Jewish texts) groups, and sending their children to schools in the neighborhood. 
The neighborhoods that comprise South Jerusalem can be traced on a map, but the area’s 
distinct quality is first and foremost social. As I described above, South Jerusalem does not 
encompass all southern Jerusalem. It is an anthropological category rather than a geographical 
reality; the category refers to a particular way of life and worldview, social-economic status, and 
political and religious inclinations. South Jerusalem, therefore, is a meaningful cultural category 
to its residents, and my discussion throughout this chapter stems from this emic category.  
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A Community of Shabbat Walkers 
The boundaries of South Jerusalem – the German Colony in the North, Baka 
neighborhood in the South, HaPalmach Street in Katamon in the west, and Arnona just east of 
Hebron Road – became the boundaries of most of my fieldwork in the neighborhood. Altogether, 
it is a small geographic area that amounts to about three square kilometers (1.5 square miles). 
The territory of this area is fairly small, and one can cross it easily on foot. This “walkable” 
quality of the neighborhood is analytically significant.  
On Shabbat and on Jewish holidays, Jews are forbidden to ride motor vehicles according 
to Orthodox-oriented interpretations of halakha.106 Although not all residents of these 
neighborhoods are Orthodox, many of them observe this tradition. During Shabbat and Jewish 
holidays, motor vehicles are scarce and the streets of South Jerusalem swarm with pedestrians 
who are on their way to or from synagogue, or to join friends and family for Shabbat meals. In 
my analysis, I distinguish between this distinct pedestrian group and other pedestrians, who may 
be walking on the streets on Shabbat but not because they observe halakhic law. I could discern 
the few people who were not on their way to synagogue by their “profane” activities – either 
jogging around the neighborhood or walking with their car keys in hand toward a parked car. 
This group is not at the center of my analysis. I focus on the former group, people I call here 
“Shabbat walkers.”  
As I mentioned, many of South Jerusalem residents participate in dense networks of 
social ties that are anchored in physical locations across the neighborhood: homes, schools, and 
synagogues. This dense social reality in a geographically limited and walkable terrain produces a 
web of walking routes, along which residents walk back and forth during “Jewish times” in 
                                                 
106 Using motored vehicles is forbidden in Orthodox-oriented interpretations of halakha because it 
involves igniting fire and is considered labor, which are two activities banned by halakhic laws of 
observing Jewish holidays. 
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which motored locomotion is not an option. People walk the streets of South Jerusalem during 
week days, obviously. But pedestrian activity on Shabbat and holiday has a different quality. 
First, the number of pedestrians is significantly larger, and the number of cars smaller. It makes 
the impression that pedestrians have taken over the streets. Second, Shabbat walkers are dressed 
differently than weekday walkers. I grew to recognize them by their elegant clothing and 
synagogue “accessories.” Men wore kippot, white buttoned-down shirts and ironed pants, and 
were holding square plastic cases for their tallit, prayer shawl, and siddur, prayer book, for 
Shabbat services. Women wore fashionable dresses, wide hairbands around their foreheads, and 
most importantly, did not carry purses. It was my religious housemate, who explained to me that 
purses or small bags were not items people carried with them on Shabbat. A purse usually holds 
everyday items like a wallet, a cellular phone, and car keys. Even if one takes these “forbidden” 
items out of their purses before Shabbat, the purse itself is perceived as “profane,” in Durkheim’s 
([1912] 1995) terminology – a mundane object that does not belong in a synagogue during 
Shabbat or holiday service. After that conversation, I stopped carrying a purse to my Shabbat 
observations in the neighborhood’s synagogues. 
In this sense, South Jerusalem is a place that is produced, in part, by its residents’ 
walking. According to de Certeau (1984), the act of walking in the city is to the urban system 
what the speech act is to language: “it is a process of appropriation of the topographical system 
on the part of the pedestrian (just as the speaker appropriates and takes on the language); it is a 
spatial acting-out of the place (just as the speech act is an acoustic acting-out of language)…It 
thus seems possible to give a preliminary definition of walking as a space of enunciation” (ibid, 
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97-8). Through walking, I argue, this community of Shabbat Walkers “enunciate” the physical 
boundaries of the area that is known as South Jerusalem.107  
While there are many other neighborhoods in Jerusalem and across Israel that are heavily 
populated by halakha-observing Jews who primarily walk on Shabbat, the uniqueness of South 
Jerusalem is in its dense, religiously diverse character. Shabbat walkers recognize each other and 
can tell who is on his or her way to synagogue. They also know that the synagogue to which the 
other is walking is not necessarily the same kind of synagogue they are walking to as Shabbat 
Walkers are Jews of various religious orientations. This act of Shabbat walking makes the 
neighborhood’s religious pluralism palpable. In this sense, Shabbat walkers not only cross the 
neighborhood’s physical terrain on foot. They also produce the neighborhoods’ metaphysical 
terrain as a “place” of Jewish religious pluralism.  
Dinner Table Sociability  
Shabbat meals offered another significant dimension of neighborhood-based relations 
among liberal observant Jews in South Jerusalem. Soon after I began my fieldwork I realized that 
it was a common practice to invite people over to a meal on Shabbat – either on Friday night 
after the evening service or on Saturday noon after the morning service. I grew to recognize 
people who were on their way to a Shabbat meal by the plastic bags they carried to synagogue, 
containing a bottle of wine or a home-made dish - their contribution to the meal.  
People invited members of their congregation to one of these meals as a way of getting to 
know them better. I was invited once to Shabbat lunch by a couple who recently moved to 
Jerusalem from a different town in Israel. They became regular members of the Baka Minyan 
                                                 
107 In his ethnography of the urban practices of Hasidic residents of a Los-Angeles neighborhood, Tavory 
(2016) also emphasizes the importance of walking (on Shabbat as well as on weekdays). Walking, 
according to him, allows the phenomenological “mapping” of the neighborhood – which he calls 
“neighborhood cartography” – as a “safe” place for their Orthodox sensibilities (ibid, 125-30).  
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and were still getting to know other congregation members. I was not their only guest that day; 
they also invited another couple from the congregation, a young couple with their newborn baby. 
As we were chatting in the living room while the hosts were setting the table, a neighbor, also a 
regular at the Minyan, stopped by to say hello, and when she saw the young guests from the 
congregation, she said to the hosts, jokingly, “so, you’re done hosting all the “old” couples in our 
Minyan and now you’ve moved on to hosting the young folks?”  
I mentioned earlier the birkonim – the blessing booklets that Religious couples hand out 
as souvenirs to their wedding guests. There are also birkonim from other family celebrations like 
Bar or Bat Mitzvah and the birth of a new child. The birkonim are personalized – the hosts print 
their names on the cover, along the name of the event and its date. The birkonim contain the 
Food Blessing (birkat hamazon) and related religious hymns, and they are distributed during the 
celebration for guests’ use. This way people have the blessings’ text in hand.108 After the event, 
the guests get to keep the booklets as souvenirs from the event.  
After participating in a couple of Shabbat meals – either on Friday night or Saturday after 
the morning prayer – I realized that every household had a drawer with numerous birkonim. At 
the end of the meal, when it was time to recite the blessing over the food and sing Shabbat 
hymns, the birkonim were taken out and circulated around the dinner table so guests could have 
the texts in front of them. The significance of the birkonim, however, was not only practical; it 
was also a way to present the hosts’ social circle. It allowed guests to position the hosts in a 
network of social ties, to identify common friends, and to catch up on recent family celebrations. 
The ritual of taking the birkonim out of the drawer always initiated conversations about 
friends in common who were absent from the dinner table. These interactions reminded the 
                                                 
108 Not everyone who identifies as religious knows birkat hamazon by heart. When I volunteered at ITIM 
and participated in staff meals, some staff members took out their mobile phones at the end of the meal 
and recited the blessing from an online source.  
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people present that they were of the same social circle. Sentences such as, “oh, I didn’t know you 
knew them!” and “You were at their wedding, too?!” were common at this stage of the meal.  
Shabbat dinner and lunch, therefore, were opportunities not only to expand one’s social 
circle but to reaffirm the perception that they were all, in fact, members of the same community. 
These meals become possible because participants, who are halakha-observing Jews for the most 
part, lived within walking distance of one another. Participants in these social scenes are acutely 
aware that they refer to the same urban environment as “home.” These interactions, therefore, are 
platforms for invigorating social ties among residents of South Jerusalem and of constituting 
them as members of the same community.  
South Jerusalem as a Religious Marketplace   
I now shift my gaze from interrelations between people to dynamics between religious 
congregations. I mentioned above that South Jerusalem is unique in its religious diversity and 
density, a result of this area’s gentrification over the past several decades. In what follows I 
examine the outcomes of this religious intensification and argue that current day South Jerusalem 
is a “religious marketplace” of liberal Judaism. The abundance of liberal religious congregations 
that cater to the same crowd and are within walking distance of one another form a religious 
marketplace. My discussion below demonstrates that this “marketplace” is viewed by residents 
as pluralistic and voluntary. I call it a marketplace rather than a market because the “place” is 
important here. Continuing my argument about the impact of Shabbat walking, the proximity of 
these congregations to one another and their high number in a small geographic area contribute 
to the construction of the neighborhood as a “place” of liberal halakhic Judaism.  
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 In other neighborhoods populated by Orthodox Jews, people attend a nearby synagogue 
that is relevant to them in terms of religious tradition and custom.109 In South Jerusalem, the 
liberal Orthodox residents of the area have numerous relevant congregations to choose from. In 
my conversations with residents about their religious congregations (as depicted in this chapter 
and the next), they described the process of choosing a congregation as based on free choice. In a 
way, the social space of South Jerusalem facilitates liberal halakhic religiosity and, at the same 
time, is enabled by it. 
 While this marketplace is not strictly Orthodox, it is particularly significant to the 
Orthodox-oriented residents of South Jerusalem. The plethora of liberal Orthodox congregations 
and synagogues allows liberal Orthodox residents of south Jerusalem to “shop” between 
congregations, taste different religious flavors, and choose whether to commit to one 
congregation. This pattern echoes my discussion in the first chapter about social shifts in Israel’s 
Orthodox society, shifts that entailed a decrease in the social centrality of institutional political 
and religious centers and an increase in social fragmentation (Friedman 2004). Orthodox society 
today has much greater diversity of Orthodox congregations, educational institutions and 
religious practices than before the 1990s (ibid).110  
 My use of the term “religious marketplace” is based on Roof’s (1999) concept of 
“spiritual marketplace.” Roof’s thesis refers to the religious map at the United States at the turn 
of the twentieth century. He identifies a qualitative shift in the religiosity of people who are 
considered part of the “baby boomers” generation, people who were born after the Second World 
                                                 
109 Orthodox synagogues usually lead their services according to either Ashkenazi or Sephardi traditions 
(the former is identified with Jews of eastern and western Europe and the latter with Jews of North Africa, 
the Middle-East, the Balkans, and certain areas in western Europe). Each tradition has different prayer 
protocols, religious songs and religious practices. Additional variations exist within each of these 
traditions, depending on the country of origin of the dominant group in the congregation.  
110 See the first chapter for a more elaborate discussion of this process, and possible explanations to it. 
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War. Roof writes about a shift from a religiosity of “unquestioned belief” to a religiosity of 
quest. This shift, he argues, is part of larger social and cultural transformations that created a 
“culture of quest” – a search for more authentic life (ibid, 9-10). As part of this new “quest 
culture,” according to Roof, the US religious sphere was reshaped: boundaries of religious 
communities were redrawn, and a spiritual marketplace, in which people reevaluated their 
“religious and institutional loyalties,” has risen (ibid). Roof suggests that we think of this 
marketplace as a social field “where all the agents, conventionally religious or not, try to 
generate and/or preserve religious capital, i.e., legitimacy, acceptance, and influence” (ibid, 80). 
 As I describe below, members of South Jerusalem’s liberal congregations that identify as 
either Orthodox or halakhic draw distinctions between the different religious options in the 
neighborhood and hierarchize them. The religious marketplace of South Jerusalem, therefore, is 
a “field” in Bourdieu’s (1984) term, in which social actors constantly distinguish between 
congregations and assign to them different degrees of prestige and legitimacy. These 
marketplace dynamics are made particularly visible on major Jewish holidays and the result, I 
argue, is the social construction of South Jerusalem as a public “place” of liberal Judaism.  
Marketplace Dynamics in South Jerusalem on Shavu’ot Holiday 
To demonstrate my argument that South Jerusalem is a “marketplace” of religious 
congregations I focus on what happens in the neighborhood every spring during Shavu’ot, the 
holiday that celebrates the revelation of the Torah on Mt. Sinai. During the night of Shav’uot, 
religious congregations open their doors to the public to a night of study. For the past decade or 
so, a new Israeli tradition was developed. Israelis of various Jewish orientations, both men and 
women, gather to study Jewish texts throughout the night of Shavu’ot. This practice, called 
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Tikkun Leil Shavu’ot (lit. Shavu’ot Night Study), 111 is based on a tradition that was developed 
among Jews in the Middle Ages in Europe and was first mentioned in a 13th century Zohar book, 
the primary text in the Kabbalah literature (Altshuler 2008). 112 The first historically recognized 
Tikkun took place in Salonica in Greece in 1533 (ibid). This tradition grew popular among the 
16th century Mekkubalim, rabbis based in the city of Sefad (also known as Tzfat in contemporary 
Israel) who composed additional Kabbalist texts, and later spread to other Jewish communities in 
Eretz Israel, as well as to Turkey and the Balkan area (Bar-Ilan 2007). 
 Throughout the history of this ritual, it was exclusive to rabbis and their male students. 
However, since the mid-1990s, Tikkun Leil Shavu’ot has become a popular activity as part of the 
Jewish Renewal Movement in Israel (Sabar Ben-Yehoshua and Sorek, 2012). “Jewish Renewal” 
in Israel refers to a growing interest among secular Israelis in Jewish texts, practices, and rituals 
from a non-Orthodox perspective (Werczberger and Azulay 2011). This interest is manifested in 
the increasing numbers of secular Batei-Midrash (Houses of Learning), Batei-Tefillah (Houses of 
Prayer), and Jewish secular mass events and festivals taking place seasonally (ibid). Sabar Ben-
Yehoshua and Sorek (2012) have observed that Tikkun Leil Shavu’ot has become one of the 
main Jewish Renewal events, and each year there is an increase in the number of institutions that 
host public Tikkunim. On these nights, classes are held on diverse topics ranging from Jewish 
texts about the holiday to other Jewish-related topics and themes relevant to Israeli culture and 
society (ibid). 
 Over the past several years, public Tikkunim that do not focus on the study of religious 
texts but offer discussions about cultural and intellectual topics have become popular among 
                                                 
111 Tikkun (pl. Tikkunim) has two meanings in Jewish mystical literature; it means both correction and 
decoration or adornment. The Tikkun on Shavu’ot night is both a repair, “a correction of the Torah by 
learning it with a pure heart and the best of intention,” and the “decoration of the celestial bride” 
(Altshuler 2008). In Kabbalist literature the Torah is often referred to as the Bride of God. 
112 Corpus of Jewish mystical literature from the Middle Ages. 
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Religious-Zionist Jews. This trend is part of the increased interest among Religious-Zionist Jews 
in the academic study of Jewish religious texts (Sheleg 2010, 92-4). Nowadays, Religious-
Zionist communities and cultural centers hold public Tikkunim in which participants study 
Jewish religious texts from philosophical, cultural, and historical perspectives, similarly to the 
“secular” Tikkunim. These events are particularly prevalent in Jerusalem (ibid, 94).  
 As part of my fieldwork in South Jerusalem I attended Shavu’ot night events on 2015 and 
2016. On these evenings, I “hopped” between different congregations and sampled their holiday 
events. These visits allowed me to note differences between congregations. The Baka Minyan, 
that is known for its high number of academics, offered study sessions, led by congregation 
members, that were mostly academic in their style and contents. The lessons took place in the 
gym hall where the congregation holds its communal prayers, and the small audience, between 
30 and 40 people, set in a circle of plastic chairs. The audience consisted of Minyan members 
who listened attentively and often interrupted the speaker with comments and questions. The 
communal Tikkun looked more like a seminary in the academia rather than a festive event on a 
major holiday. Although it was open to the public, the feel was of an intimate gathering that was 
not oriented toward guests who were unfamiliar with academic language.  
More established congregations offered bigger Tikkunim with a greater number of 
speakers and a wider and more popular range of topics. For instance, when I attended the Tikkun 
at Yedidia congregation, a liberal Orthodox congregation adjacent to the Baka Minyan, the 
lessons were held in the congregation’s spacious prayer hall. There were approximately 200 
people there. These lectures were of academic too, but the speakers, who were public figures and 
scholars well-known among liberal religious-Zionists, presented the material in an accessible 
language. The crowd was diverse in terms of age, and I saw many teenagers as well as people in 
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their sixties and seventies. Other congregations also held large-scale Tikkunim with “celebrity” 
speakers. The most popular speakers in those events give talks in two and even three or four 
different locations during the night.  
Congregations, large and small, publish their Tikkun in an annual “Tikkunim Map” that 
has been published before Shavu’ot annually since 2014.113 I asked Rinat, one of my primary 
interlocutors in the Baka Minyan and a long-time resident of South Jerusalem, about the 
Tikkunim in the neighborhood. She said that the map was important because it let the larger 
public know which congregations were active and relevant. “You had to be there [in the map] so 
people know you exist,” she told me.  
These maps are published by an organization called “Rashut HaRabim: The Jerusalem 
Forum of Jewish Renaissance Organizations.”  The organization was founded in 2011 as an 
umbrella organization that coordinates and facilitates collaborations between “Jerusalem 
organizations that share a Jewish, Zionist, pluralistic world view” (Rashut HaRabim, n.d.). Every 
Shavu’ot, the organization posts a downloadable map on their website listing Tikkunim across 
the city. It also distributes hard copies to religious congregations and cultural centers across 
Jerusalem. One of the main goals of the organization is to make Jewish religious pluralism 
visible in Jerusalem’s public space,114 and these maps, I argue, correspond well with this agenda. 
The name of the organization means in English the public sphere or domain. This name indicates 
the organization’s aspirations to make liberal Judaism public in Jerusalem’s urban space.  
The Tikkunim maps, I suggest, are graphic representations of the “religious marketplace” 
of Shavu’ot. The maps capture the density of congregations and religious institutions in south 
Jerusalem and their interconnectedness. The maps show roads and paths that connect between 
                                                 
113 See a copy of the 2016 map in Appendix C. 
114 Personal correspondence with Inbar Bluzer Shalem, Director of Rashut HaRabim, 1/27/2015. 
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clusters of venues. These roads do not represent real streets in Jerusalem, unlike the drawings of 
buildings that represent real locations. The roads create an impression that one looks at a 
network, a system in which elements are connected to one another. The Tikkunim on Shavu’ot, 
therefore, are not isolated events that take place independent of one another; they are 
components that compose together a large picture. This picture, I argue, is the religious 
marketplace of Jerusalem in general and of South Jerusalem in particular.  
After attending Shavu’ot night events, I wondered what the purpose was of trying to 
appeal to wider crowds. After all, these events are free; the outside guests who attend the tikkun 
do not pay an entrance fee. Rinat corroborated what I already sensed, that the Tikkunim 
contribute to the prestige of congregations. A crowded synagogue on Shavu’ot night, she said, 
meant that the congregation was popular and had something to offer the public.  
By designing a popular Tikkun, with “celebrity” guest speakers and topics that are less 
academic and more contemporary, congregations aimed to attract wider audiences. A large 
number of participants meant a popular “vote of confidence” in the host congregation, its 
religious way, and social legitimacy. The night of Shavu’ot, therefore, is a time in which 
congregations compete with one another in matters of prestige and legitimacy. The religious 
marketplace of South Jerusalem is not motivated by finance but by symbolic capital.  
Not all congregations, however, seek to attract the masses. As described above, the Baka 
Minyan, as well as other smaller congregations, hold intimate Tikkunim that are mostly geared 
toward congregation members. When I asked Rinat about the congregation’s choice to have a 
small Tikkun, she replied: “What will we earn if we attract ‘shiny’ speakers and a big crowd? 
We have enough congregation members; we do not seek to advertise ourselves.” A big Tikkun 
means advertising of the congregation and the Baka Minyan, according to Rinat, was not 
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interested in this kind of Public Relations. This decision is also related to questions of symbolic 
capital, I argue. As Shavu’ot night is a time in which each congregation publicly presents its 
distinct characteristics, the Baka Minyan shows its self-identification as a cohesive group of 
friends who are not seeking to expand and diversify their circle.   
On my two Shavu’ot nights in the field I also noted the special atmosphere in the 
neighborhood. People went in and out of the venues, and there was constant traffic of people 
between congregations in the neighborhood. While some people preferred to stay in their 
primary congregation throughout the night, others walked around and “sampled” Tikkunim in 
different congregations. Some of my interlocutors, I noticed from reviewing the Tikkunim map, 
were guest speakers in congregations other than their primary one. All throughout these nights, 
even well past midnight, the streets were crowded with pedestrians. Most of them walked in 
small groups and wore white clothes as per Shavu’ot custom among both religious and secular 
Israeli Jews. There was almost no vehicle traffic, and people gathered in groups and chatted in 
the middle of streets, traffic circles, and outside of synagogues. There was a commotion of 
people, a buzzing. It seemed that what was happening between the locations in which the 
Tikkunim took place was as important as what happened at each congregation. 
 The Tikkunim were not originally designed to include outside guests. They are first and 
foremost a communal event. However, the growing popularity of this tradition made the 
communal Tikkunim a public event. On that night, congregations in the neighborhood have an 
opportunity to present their religious and social characteristics in public. I argue, however, that 
this self-presentation is also “inward oriented.” This night allows congregation members to 
reaffirm their communal identity. For Baka Minyan members, for instance, this was an 
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opportunity to reestablish their self-perception as an “exclusivist” Minyan that is not interested in 
appealing to outsiders.  
The neighborhood’s year-round religious abundance and diversity is especially visible on 
Shavu’ot night because of the increasing popularity of Tikkunim in Jewish-Israeli culture. This 
makes the neighborhood a popular destination for outside guests seeking to participate in these 
events. The public appearance of congregations is particularly visible on these nights, and so are 
the differences between congregations. Overall, Shavu’ot nights contribute to the social 
construction of South Jerusalem as a public domain of religious pluralism.  
Life in a Religious-Pluralist “Hub”: Residents’ Narratives  
In this section I demonstrate how life in a “hub” of liberal religious congregations is 
experienced by residents of the neighborhood. I focus on narratives provided by Moshe and 
Ilana, both members of the Baka Minyan who recently moved to the neighborhood from 
outside Jerusalem. Therefore, when I met with them the religious marketplace of the 
neighborhood was still somewhat new to them, as it was to me. 
Moshe’s Story: “Like a Bee, Each Week Landing on a Different Flower.”  
I met Moshe for an interview half-way through my fieldwork. I read an essay he 
published in a Religious-Zionist newsletter in which he described his recent move to South 
Jerusalem and his membership in the Baka Minyan. I came across it because it was 
circulated in the weekly communal email. I was interested to learn more about his 
perspective as a newcomer to the neighborhood. 
Even in our first meeting, I felt I related to Moshe. Part of it was due to our common 
background as former kibbutzniks,115 and part was because of his curious, sincere 
enthusiasm for the religious diversity of South Jerusalem. This enthusiasm, I thought, was 
                                                 
115 Kibbutznik in Israeli Hebrew slang refers to a person who grew up in a kibbutz.  
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related to his phase in life. Prior to South Jerusalem, he lived in small homogeneous 
communities. The move to South Jerusalem, therefore, was a dramatic change. In addition, 
he was in his mid-forties and had grown-up children who no longer required close attention. 
This allowed him time and availability to explore what the neighborhood had to offer.  
 In his text, Moshe depicted the experiences of his recent move to South Jerusalem. 
What caught my attention the most was his description of the image he had of Jerusalem 
before he and his wife moved there. In South Jerusalem, a place of “Jewish renewal of all 
kinds,” as he put it, he envisioned he could “fly around, like a bee, and land on a different 
flower each week.” There, he wrote, he could experience different congregations and taste 
different religious flavors– “Moroccan religious poems (piyutim) one week, Carlebach the 
following.” 116 As a newcomer to South Jerusalem myself and as a kibbutz veteran who, like 
Moshe, grew up in a small community and chose to leave that community and move to the 
city, I felt I could relate to his words. I appreciated his plain, minimalist style of writing that 
succeeded in conveying his search for a community in the city.  
 At the end of the article, there was a photograph of Moshe standing in front of the 
entrance to the gym hall building where the Baka Minyan holds its prayers. I then 
recognized his face; I remembered seeing him at the men’s section at weekly Shabbat 
prayers. His greying hair disclosed his age although his overall appearance was youthful and 
athletic. In the photo he wore jeans and open-back clogs, a casual outfit that, as I later 
realized, was not very different from how he used to dress for Shabbat prayers. In the article 
                                                 
116 Shlomo Carlebach (1925-1994) was an American Orthodox rabbi and musician, born in Germany, 
who developed a musical style of synagogue service and was influenced by Hasidic Judaism. After his 
death, Carlebach’s music and his model of spiritual and musical Judaism became popular among young 
Religious-Zionist Jews in Israel (Sheleg 2000, 21-22). 
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he mentioned that this was part of what he loved about the Baka Minyan – that it was not a 
judgmental community and that he could come to prayers as he liked. 
 I contacted Moshe the following week and asked if he would be willing to meet with 
me for an interview. I mentioned that I read his text and that I was a kibbutznik myself. He 
agreed right away. We made an appointment to meet in a Café near his workplace at a High-
Tech firm in a town not far from Tel Aviv. Immediately as I walked into the Café, Moshe 
approached me with a warm smile and shook my hand firmly. This was an exceptional 
behavior in the field. I got used to not extending my hand for a handshake when I met kippa-
wearing men as I assumed they observed the prohibition on physical contact (issur negi’ah) 
between non-related men and women. Moshe’s handshake implied what I confirmed as I got 
to know him a little better, that he was searching for his individual way of being dati, a 
Jewish religious man.  
 Moshe was born and raised in a religious kibbutz, and he lived there part of his adult 
life. Like other kibbutzim, his kibbutz was a small, socially cohesive community, and Moshe 
actively participated in organizing communal events. At some point, however, he and a 
group of friends tried to lead a process of change in their kibbutz; nothing revolutionary, he 
told me, only to “air out dominant paradigms” about members’ individual responsibility, 
initiative, and personal liberties. They came to realize, however, that most kibbutz members 
were not interested in change, so they gave up. Shortly afterwards, he and his wife applied to 
become official members of the kibbutz and were rejected by the community.117 
Subsequently, they decided to leave. They moved to a small town in central Israel, where 
they lived for over a decade. The religious congregation there became their home 
                                                 
117 Being born in a kibbutz does not automatically grant membership in the kibbutz community. Most 
kibbutzim have a formal procedure of accepting new members. These decisions are usually made by the 
assembly of kibbutz members, who vote on whether to approve or reject membership applications.  
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community. They hoped that the congregation would be willing to open to more egalitarian 
religious practices but were disappointed. The congregation preferred to maintain a 
traditional, non-egalitarian Orthodox style of prayers.  
 It was his teenage daughter that brought up the idea that the family move to 
Jerusalem. She met new friends from Jerusalem at a summer camp and was intrigued. 
Moshe and his wife already knew by then that there was something going on in the terrain 
between Baka, Katamon, and the German Colony. It seemed to them that “that something” 
might suit them, and they decided to move.  
In Jerusalem, Moshe told me, he and his wife found the “flavor” they were looking 
for at the Baka Minyan. They visited there several times as they had relatives and friends 
who went there regularly, and they decided to make it their home congregation. The 
congregation, he said, offered the flexible and experimental approach to religiosity that he 
appreciated. At the same time, members were “serious and confident about their religiosity,” 
according to him.  
Although Moshe eventually decided to dedicate his loyalty to one congregation, he 
enjoyed visiting other congregations every once in a while, participating in limmud groups 
and attending public events and festivals celebrating religious pluralism. As a newcomer to 
the neighborhood, he was enjoying the religious and spiritual diversity of the area. When we 
last spoke on my final visit to the Baka Minyan in September 2016, he told me excitedly 
about a festival dedicated to sacred music from different religious traditions that he had 
recently attended in Jerusalem. In Moshe, I identified an enthusiastic “consumer” of the 
vibrant religious market that is South Jerusalem.  
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Ilana’s Story: The Pluralist Mile as a Social Field  
I first met Ilana at a temporary job I held in Tel Aviv before I began fieldwork. I worked 
at a center for Hebrew and Jewish culture where Ilana, who holds a PhD in Gender Studies and 
Jewish Thought, led a study group for women. I started chatting with her about my research 
plans, and from her responses I realized she was part of my field. She identifies as an Orthodox 
feminist woman and has been a key figure in various Orthodox feminist groups and activities. I 
asked to meet with her again to discuss my research further, and she suggested that we meet in a 
Café on Emek-Refa’im – the bustling shopping, dining, and business artery in South Jerusalem.  
I arrived at the Café a little early. Most of the people around me seemed dati’im. Men 
wore kippot and women, wide hairbands that I later learned to identify as the popular head cover 
among married liberal observant women in South Jerusalem. When Ilana finally entered the 
place, she waived hello to a couple of women who sat nearby, and she stopped by their table to 
chat. She then approached me, apologizing, and said she “had to say hello.” During our 
conversation, she was approached a couple of times by acquaintances. At that point, she told that 
she brought me to the “heart” of my field. “Everyone here,” she said, “belongs to the group you 
study.”  
When I started my fieldwork in Jerusalem a few months later, I ran into her again. In fact, 
my first time at a Shabbat service at the Baka Minyan was her first Shabbat in Jerusalem, too, 
after her recent move to Baka from a West Bank town in the southern outskirts of Jerusalem. She 
then formally became one of my interlocutors, someone I met regularly in my field.  During my 
first few months at the Baka Minyan, she often invited me to sit next to her during service and 
explained to me what was going on, knowing I was not familiar with Orthodox prayers and 
rituals.  
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In a subsequent conversation I had with her, Ilana told me more about her recent move to 
South Jerusalem. She said:  
It was dramatic move from a small town to a city. In terms of liberal religiosity, it was 
moving to a place where there are many people like you. I can rest. I am no longer the “left 
cursor” that constantly challenges the system. And this is true not only of the Baka Minyan 
but to Shira Hadasha, Zion, and Sod Siach118 – the whole spectrum of the “Pluralist 
Mile.”119 
In South Jerusalem Ilana found a liberal religious milieu that suited her. This milieu was not 
limited to one congregation. She decided to make the Baka Minyan her main congregation, but 
her milieu extended beyond that Minyan.  
Ilana referred to this milieu of liberal-oriented congregations in a spatial term: “The 
Pluralist Mile.” During my research, I heard another version of this concept: the “Egalitarian 
Mile” (HaMile HaShivyoni). The Pluralist, or Egalitarian, Mile refers to the intersection of Baka 
and the German Colony, where there are numerous congregations of various liberal-Jewish 
orientations in close proximity.  
According to Ilana, religiosity in the congregations of the “Pluralist Mile” is much more 
voluntary than in other Orthodox spaces. To illustrate her point, she described her father’s 
Orthodox synagogue that is physically located in the “Pluralist Mile” but is not a part of it. In 
that traditional-Orthodox synagogue, regular congregants feel obligated to arrive each week. If 
one does not come on a certain week, people take notice. In the liberal congregations of the 
Pluralist Mile, however, participation is voluntary, and the codes are “less strict,” she told me. 
                                                 
118 Zion and Sod Siach are liberal congregations in South Jerusalem that are non-affiliated with any of the 
formal Jewish streams. Both are less than a decade old (as of 2019).  
119 See Hebrew origin in Appendix B, item 7. 
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No one expected that one would show up at a particular congregation. People know that there are 
other options nearby. The fact that persons showed up in synagogue on Shabbat meant that they 
came because they wanted to, not because they felt obliged to show up. 
I asked Ilana to tell me how people choose between congregations in the “Pluralist Mile.” 
She said that congregations were roughly divided into two groups: those oriented toward 
Orthodox traditions and maintain gender partition and those that do not maintain gender 
partition.120 Liberal Orthodox residents choose their primary congregation among congregations 
that observe gender partition. Ilana told me that she enjoys the prayers in a nearby congregation 
that does not maintain gender separation but that she could never make it her primary 
congregation because, according to her, “my body is not comfortable there. For me, a synagogue 
is not a place where men and women sit together.”  
The halakha-observing congregations in the “Pluralist Mile” like the Baka Minyan, Shira 
Hadasha, and Yedidya appeal to people of similar demographic background who grew up in 
Orthodox-oriented homes. Even within this spectrum, however, congregations vary from one 
another in their style of prayer, the dominant age group, and the dominance of Israeli-born 
members versus immigrants. Ilana knew which congregation she would attend once in Jerusalem 
even before her move. When we first met, before she moved to South Jerusalem, she told me she 
was familiar with both Shira Hadasha and the Baka Minyan but that she preferred the latter 
because it was “younger, more Israeli, and less pompous,” according to her.  
The “Pluralist Mile” is a social field of congregation in which social actors constantly 
draw distinctions and position themselves in relation to the different congregations. During my 
fieldwork, I witnessed numerous conversations in which residents compared congregations, 
emphasized ways that their congregation was “better” than others, and made jokes about the 
                                                 
120 I discuss the significance of the mehitza, gender partition in synagogues, in chapter five. 
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shortcomings of other congregations. I noticed that some people chose a primary congregation 
and attended secondary congregations on various occasions.121 I realized they visited friends and 
relatives in other congregations and even switched their primary congregation if their preferences 
change. One woman told me over Shabbat dinner that she and her husband go regularly to as 
many as four different congregations in the neighborhood.  
There is also a competitive aspect to these marketplace dynamics, although a subtle one.  
In a conversation among members of the Baka Minyan, one member commented that their 
Minyan is perceived as “snobbish,” and that the congregation should make efforts to change this 
reputation. Another member, who is one of the founding members of the Minyan, observed that 
while they were “cutting edge” during the Minyan’s first years, this was no longer the case. 
“There are many alternatives in South Jerusalem today,” he said. This meant, he continued, that 
they had to think about how to preserve existing members rather than how to attract new ones. At 
the Baka Minyan, therefore, the “marketplace” of South Jerusalem meant that congregation 
members had to compete with other congregations that offered a similar mix of gender equality 
and halakhic commitment.   
Ilana’s and Moshe’s narratives demonstrate that residents view their religious 
participation in the neighborhood’s religious life as based on free choice. They view their 
neighborhood as a place of religious pluralism and voluntarism. At the same time, their 
narratives demonstrate that choosing a congregation is not based solely on religious preferences. 
                                                 
121 One Shabbat morning at the Baka Minyan, I noticed that the Hazzan, prayer leader, was Aaron, a long-
time member of another congregation nearby, one of the first liberal Orthodox congregations in 
Jerusalem. I knew him because I attended a Talmud study group he led. At the end of service, I 
approached him to say hello. Even though I did not ask why he was there and not in his primary 
congregation, he said he woke up late that morning and missed the other prayer. The Baka Minyan, which 
relies primarily on families with small children, holds their Shabbat morning prayers that start relatively 
late, at nine in the morning. As an Orthodox resident of the neighborhood, Aaron knew this fact and was 
able to decide at the last minute to attend a congregation different from his primary one. 
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Questions of social belonging matter as well. Ilana and Moshe chose the Baka Minyan as their 
primary congregation because of social considerations. This was where they felt that they 
belonged. Therefore, the religious marketplace of South Jerusalem is a social field in which 
actors position themselves based on their wider social identifications and belongings.  
A Public Square of Liberal Religiosity: The First Station Compound  
In December 2015, on a winter night during the eight-day long holiday of Hanukkah, I 
attended a public “Interfaith candle lighting” in the First Station Compound, an old train station 
that was transformed into a place of urban recreation that caters mostly to the Jewish residents of 
South Jerusalem and to visitors from out of town. The event was co-organized by a Jewish 
organization that promotes collaborations among Jews and Palestinians and one of the liberal 
congregations in the “Pluralist Mile” whose musical services, that are not held according to the 
Orthodox protocol, have grown increasingly popular over the past few years. The female rabbi of 
that congregation has become one of the key figures in Jerusalem’s liberal Jewish “scene.”  
I arrived at the Compound the night of the event, approached the crowd that had already 
gathered in the Compound’s main area, and sat on one of the black plastic chairs that were 
arranged in circular rows around a table with a Menorah. I looked around and recognized 
numerous people from my fieldwork during Shabbat prayers in different South Jerusalem 
congregations. For the purpose of the event, the Compound’s central area was surrounded with 
plastic sheets that protected it from the infamous Jerusalem chill. As a result, the central area 
became even more separated from the rest of the Compound, intimate even.  
 The rabbi who led the event stood near the Menorah at the center of the circle and invited 
Jewish, Muslim and Christian speakers to light a candle and to talk about interfaith aspects of 
their lives in Jerusalem. There were teachers whose schools participate in Israeli-Palestinian 
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dialogues; teenagers from an organization that joins Jewish and Palestinian youths in 
volunteering activities; and Palestinian and Jewish residents of Jerusalem who spoke about the 
need to share the common urban environment. After the guests lighted the candles, a small band 
of musical instruments began to play, and people started to dance around them.  
 A friend of mine, who was a member of the congregation who organized this event, 
pointed at two young men who were dancing at the center of the circle and said they were 
Palestinian peace activists from East Jerusalem. Other than those two and the non-Jewish guest 
speakers, it seemed that most of the people who attended the event were Jewish residents of the 
surrounding neighborhoods. There were people from the liberal-Orthodox congregations and 
partnership minyans in south Jerusalem; students from the Hebrew Union College, the Reform 
Movement’s Rabbinical College; and members of the congregation that organized this interfaith 
event. The other two large groups of Jerusalem, Palestinians and Haredi Jews, were not part of 
the audience (as much as I could tell). I enjoyed the event very much and was moved by the 
organizers’ genuine and sincere messages, so rare in the polarized public discourse in Jewish 
Israeli society. And yet, I could not stop wondering if these messages ever reach beyond the 
boundaries of South Jerusalem. 
The Interfaith Candle Lighting event is one of the numerous events I attended during my 
fieldwork at the First Station Compound. While previous sections demonstrated how South 
Jerusalem is being constructed as a place of liberal religiosity through residents’ daily activities, 
interactions, and communal practices, this section depicts deliberate efforts by local community 
leaders and activists to appropriate this South Jerusalem site and to make it a public stage for 
liberal religiosity. In this site, Jewish residents of diverse religious orientations collaborate in 
promulgating ideas of religious pluralism and tolerance.  
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The First Station Compound is a newly renovated Ottoman train station that was 
transformed into a recreation center that hosts events promoting religious pluralism. This place is 
imagined by the organizers of events of religious pluralism and by key participants in these 
events as a “new city square,” a public place that makes liberal Jewish religiosity visible beyond 
the boundaries of South Jerusalem. I do not know whether these events are successful in this 
sense. Based on my observations, however, I argue that they are successful in creating an 
intimate, almost private, space in which liberal religiosity can be experienced as dominant and 
influential, and in which people who value this religiosity can feel they are part of a community. 
By doing so, they construct the First Station and its South Jerusalem setting as a distinct place, 
separate from other parts of Jerusalem, in which their kind of Judaism has a meaningful public 
role.  
 The First Station, whose construction was completed in 1892, was Jerusalem’s first 
railway station. It is a large, two-story stone building whose design was influenced by European 
and Templar architecture of the late 19th century (“History of the First Station,” n.d.). The station 
was part of the Jerusalem-Jaffa railroad, which was constructed during the Ottoman regime, and 
allowed accessible and faster transportation between Palestine’s coast and mountainous 
Jerusalem. The station operated until the 1990s and it was ultimately closed to transportation in 
1998 (Travis 2009). In 2013, the Municipality re-opened the First Station as an urban recreation 
place with restaurants, cafes and shops. It is one of the few places in West Jerusalem that has 
restaurants that are opened on Shabbat. This fact has made it into a popular leisure place for 
secular families over the weekends. It is also the beginning of Park HaMesillah, the “Railway 
Park” – a pedestrian trail about five kilometers long that stretches along the old Ottoman railway 
tracks. Shortly after its 2012 opening, the Railway Park became a popular area of recreation, 
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jogging, and strolling. Together with the First Station Compound, the Park is a primary 
recreation spot in South Jerusalem. 
 
Figure 5: The First Station. A view from Hebron Road.  
Even before moving to South Jerusalem, I heard of this place. An acquaintance of mine, 
who is the Director of a nongovernmental organization that promotes religious pluralism in 
Jerusalem, recommended that I check out the activities at the First Station. It was among the few 
places in Jerusalem, she said, in which religious pluralism had any “public visibility” in the city.  
 The compound is centrally located at the intersection of three main roads: Emek-Refa’im 
Street, the main route in the German Colony, Beit-Lehem Road, which leads to the Baka 
neighborhood, and Hebron Road, which connects the Old City with southern Jerusalem. One 
enters the First Station Compound through the building’s main entrance and steps into the 
compound’s central area now enclosed by old train cars. The buildings’ stone columns, which 
support its second floor, are covered with historic photographs from the station’s Ottoman and 
British past.  
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The central area of the compound, a large space enclosed between old train cars and 
shops, is where public events are held. The floor of this area is covered with wooden boards, and 
comfortable wooden benches are scattered throughout. The Municipality holds various events in 
this place, ranging from art exhibits to musical concerts, a farmers’ market, activities for 
children, and historical tours. Although the First Station is one of the few places in Jerusalem 
that offers “secular” recreation options on Shabbat, it has become the home turf for events of 
religious pluralism. Within this category, the First Station hosts public events that celebrate 
Jewish holidays and rituals from diverse Jewish perspectives. Some of these events include 
Orthodox, Reform, and secular participants who hold Jewish rituals together. Other events 
incorporate Jerusalem-based Christian and Muslim clergy and Palestinian residents of the city. 
 
  
Figure 6: The central area in the First Station Compound. 
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Figure 7: During an event for the Jewish High Holidays (September 2015).  
Many of the events in the First Station are co-organized by two organizations: Rashut 
HaRabim, which I introduced above as part of my discussion of Shavu’ot, and Ginot HaIr (lit. 
“City Gardens”) Community Council. Ginot HaIr is one of Jerusalem’s Community Councils: 
non-for-profit organizations that work with the municipality and are responsible for developing 
communal services in the different neighborhoods in collaboration with local residents. Ginot 
HaIr Community Council oversees neighborhoods in south Jerusalem such as the German 
Colony, Rehavia, Talbiya, and Katamon (not including Baka, which has its own community 
council). The Council facilitates educational, cultural and recreational programs in collaboration 
with residents.  
 One of the primary areas of activities of Ginot HaIr Community Council is promoting 
religious pluralism. The Council has a unit that is dedicated to facilitating programs of Jewish 
renewal in the neighborhoods it oversees. In 2015 and 2016, I attended several events co-
organized by Ginot HaIr and Rashut HaRabim that were held in the First Station Compound. 
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These events were held under the title “Kikar HaIr (City Square): Creating a Joint Spiritual 
Space.” Although these events are centered on Jewish rituals such as kabbalot-shabbat on Friday 
evening and events related to the Jewish holidays, they adapt the rituals and present them in a 
way that would also appeal to non-religious crowds. These events include live music 
performances, sing-alongs, and discussions. The events are not strictly “religious,” but they are 
also recreational and intellectual.  
I discussed these “City Square” events with Shaike El-Ami, the Director of Ginot HaIr at 
his office in the Community Council’s building in Emek Refai’im street. El-Ami is in his mid-
40s. He wears a small knitted kippa identified with Religious-Zionist men. He was born and 
raised in a religious kibbutz before he moved to South Jerusalem and became active in various 
grassroots community activities. He told me that as the First Station Compound was being 
reconstructed several years ago, it became clear to him that “the place was ours.”  
When I asked him to tell me what the phrase Kikar HaIr (City Square) meant to him, he 
said: 
The City Square is where people meet. It is a public space that belongs to everybody. Like in 
the old days, when there was only one City Square. In today’s Jerusalem there are many 
squares… The First Station Compound is our home square. When I want to do something 
big and important that will be heard all over town, I do it there.122  
The First Station, therefore, is a public space in which religious activists in South 
Jerusalem celebrate religious pluralism in order to make it visible to wider crowds. The 
Compound is visited by secular Jerusalemites, as well as Haredi families and groups of tourists. 
                                                 
122 See original Hebrew excerpt in Appendix B, item 8. 
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The events, therefore, are meant to reach wider audiences than the already liberal crowd of the 
neighborhoods of South Jerusalem.  
 In those events I often saw people that I knew from my fieldwork. On several occasions I 
ran into Ilana from the Baka Minyan, whose narrative I discuss above. Ilana was one of the 
invited guest speakers in the Interfaith Candle lighting on Hanukah. When I asked her about 
these events, she said that to residents who are part of the “liberal scene of South Jerusalem,” as 
she put it, the contents of these events were too basic. These events did not teach anything new to 
liberal religious Jews like herself. These events, she said, are important, nevertheless, because 
they created the feeling that liberal religious participants “projected” their ideas “outward.” For 
the organizers of the City Square events, and to the neighborhood residents who participated, 
these events are an opportunity to perform their worldview in a place where it could be visible to 
visitors from outside the “Pluralist Mile.” By doing so, I argue, they make a political statement 
about South Jerusalem as a liberal-religious place that belongs to liberal religious Jews.  
In a Booklet on Kabbalot-Shabbat issued by the Community Council I found evidence to 
yet another purpose of these events. They are not meant only to present ideas of religious 
pluralism outwards. They also aim to create a community of residents who value religious 
pluralism. It says: 
Jerusalem’s first train station has become a space that brings us together, to sing, to 
pray, to reflect – in a friendly and inclusive way…. Here, in the charm of the First 
Station, we have come together to celebrate Shabbat. In this unique Jerusalem spot, we 
are all meeting: local Jerusalemites, Israelis from out of town, and visitors from abroad. 
Together, we welcome Shabbat and create a community of meaning that can only 
happen in Jerusalem (El-Ami, Ezrachi, and Rubin 2016, n.p.). 
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This text illustrates that the Community Council sees itself as a vanguard of religious pluralism 
and the First Station – as their “City Square,” a public urban center that embodies the values they 
seek to promulgate to the people of the Jerusalem metropolitan area.  
Shaike reiterated the community-building aspect of these events. According to him, the 
place’s location at the heart of South Jerusalem makes it the perfect gathering place for his 
events. Through these events, he told me, he sought to “build a community.” When I asked him 
why it was important to build a community he said: 
A community is a value. For ages we were a people of communities. When we arrived in 
Israel, Ben-Gurion said, mamlakhtiyut (statehood). We thought that the Mamlakha (state or 
kingdom) or the authority will solve our problems and the community became restricted to 
the synagogue. As it turned out, the state can solve only some of the problems. There is no 
substitute for community as a space of belonging, of identity, of solidarity, of humanism. 
There is no substitute for community.123  
To Shaike, therefore, these events are attempts to build a local community, rooted in 
South Jerusalem, which would set alternatives to wider national frameworks of belonging that 
have failed. Shaike imagines the First Station as a place where people act out their citizenship 
and their belonging to a wider community – a public political sphere that is alternative to the 
political sphere of the state (Navaro-Yashin 2002; Özyürek 2006). These events at the First 
Station provide platforms for liberal Jewish activists, religious leaders, educators, and 
neighborhood residents to negotiate political questions of citizenship and social belonging in a 
public place that is not part of the state’s political sphere.  
                                                 
123 See Hebrew origin in Appendix B, item 9. 
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In the context of the overall argument of my study, Shaike’s words demonstrate the re-
location of public Judaism to spaces that, until now, were perceived as unrelated to the state. I 
argue that this is an example of the scaling down of public Judaism – the political engagement 
with public Judaism in places and sites that are considered local or communal. The events of 
religious pluralism that take place in the First Station deal with questions that are pertinent to 
Israeli politics and to being an Israeli Jew, yet they are negotiated at the level of a neighborhood 
and aim to influence Jerusalem’s public sphere rather than national political arenas.  
 However, I could not ignore my impression that these events were not as public as the 
organizers thought of them. In fact, the First Station Compound is the mere opposite of a city 
square or plaza: it is an enclosed space surrounded by a brick wall. The central area, where the 
“City Square” events take place, is even more enclosed. It is nestled in the Compound’s interior 
space and in winters it is bounded by plastic sheets that created an intimate space that felt 
separated from the outside world. In a way, the intimacy of this space enabled the creation of ad-
hoc communities that existed for the duration of the events. It is exactly because the area within 
the First Station where these events are held is only semi-public that these events succeeded in 
constructing it as a place in which religious pluralism is dominant.   
 The events that take place in the First Station bring to life a Judaism that “South 
Jerusalemites” yearn for; it is moderate, open, pluralist, tolerant, and egalitarian. It is a Judaism 
that has very limited presence in the broader social and political spheres in Israel. It is even 
nonexistent in many places in Israel. In these events, however, liberal Judaism has a place. The 
people who attend these events celebrate their Judaism with people like them. The fact that they 
are a small minority among the Jewish population of Jerusalem is irrelevant.124 These events are 
                                                 
124 As of 2016, religious Jews (not including the Haredim) represented 19% of the 550,000 Jewish 
residents in West and East Jerusalem (Korach and Hoshen 2018, 18). However, I do not have precise data 
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an opportunity for them to enact what Israel would be like if their vision of Judaism were more 
influential. The cultural significance of these events is less in promulgating their contents. It is 
probably in enabling the liberal Jews of South Jerusalem to perform their Jewishness as a group 
in a place that they envision as public and influential on a municipal level.  
Conclusion: Public Place-Making in South Jerusalem   
 This chapter has explored ways in which social interactions and communal events 
contribute to the construction of South Jerusalem as a public place of liberal Judaism. I have 
focused on the perspective of liberal Orthodox residents who belong to various social circles 
organized around particular interests (a religious congregation, a local school, a study group, or a 
street). Yet, as I have shown in the first section of this chapter, various ties and interactions 
among people create a sociability that transcends these immediate social circles. The social space 
of South Jerusalem – its streets and the proximity of congregations – facilitates this sociability 
and, at the same time, is produced by the Jewish practices of its halakha observing residents. I 
have further argued that there is a religious marketplace in South Jerusalem that is particularly 
evident during the night of Shavu’ot. This marketplace plays a central role in the construction of 
the neighborhood as a public place of liberal Judaism. Events of religious pluralism that take 
place in the First Station Compound are another example of this process.  
 It was Ilana who shared with me her insight that members of the liberal congregations in 
South Jerusalem are constantly busy drawing social boundaries that demarcate who belongs in 
the community and who does not. “It is the same as at a national level,” she said, “only on a 
                                                                                                                                                             
about the percentage of religious Jews who identify as liberal, probably because the definition of this 
liberal-religious subgroup is not clear-cut. My estimation that they are a minority among the city’s 
Jewish-religious population is based on my fieldwork observations in South Jerusalem. It is supported by 
Zaban’s (2013) finding that Orthodox immigrants from North-America and Europe who immigrated to 
South Jerusalem since the 1990s are more conservative than their liberal predecessors in the 1970s and 
1980s.  
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smaller scale.” Shaike’s quotes above demonstrate that, like Ilana, he sees public urban life in 
South Jerusalem as a platform to negotiate questions of national belonging and identity. I argue 
that in their participation in public events of religious pluralism in South Jerusalem, both Ilana 
and Shaike, as well as other liberal Jewish activists I met on these events, scale down public 
Judaism. They view their religious congregations and their South Jerusalem neighborhood as 
their primary social framework in which they act out what it means to them to be Jewish citizens 
of current-day Israel. South Jerusalem, therefore, is not only constructed as a place of a certain 
religiosity but as a place of a certain subjectivity. In light of the rise in social and political 
influence of Haredi Jews in Jerusalem and in Jewish-Israeli society more broadly, liberal Jews in 
South Jerusalem have constructed their neighborhood as a meaningful public place of pluralist 
and liberal Judaism.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ORDINARY: TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN A 
JERUSALEM MINYAN  
 
Figure 8: A view from outside the gym hall of the Baka Community Center, where the Baka 
Minyan hold their communal prayers. 
 
It was a warm Friday night in July when I first walked the ten-minute stroll from my 
apartment to the Community Centre in the Baka neighborhood in Jerusalem, where the Baka 
Minyan holds its communal prayers. The Baka Minyan is a “partnership minyan” – a 
congregation that promotes gender equality within the legal framework of Jewish religious laws. 
The congregation’s prayer hall is, in fact, the Community Centre’s gymnasium; it is a typical 
gym hall with linoleum floors, basketball hoops on each side, and a pile of exercise mats stacked 
in one corner. On Shabbat and holiday eves the gym hall is transformed into a prayer hall: from 
“ulam hit’amlut” to “ulam tefillah.” Congregation members keep a roster of weekly volunteers 
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who are responsible for preparing the place for Shabbat services. On Friday afternoons, the 
volunteers place black plastic chairs across the hall, take the Torah Ark, a large wooden cabinet, 
and the siddurim (prayer books) bookcase out of the storage room and roll them into the 
gymnasium. Finally, the volunteers set up the mehitza, the partition that separates men and 
women during communal prayers. They place black metal poles along the gymnasium’s half-line 
and hang bright sheer curtains that serve as the partition. The mehitza divides the hall into two 
sections; one for men and one for women. The sections are located next to each other, in equal 
proximity to the Torah Ark. The prayer hall stays in this formation until the end of Shabbat 
prayers.    
 The mehitza at the Baka Minyan separates men from women during prayers, like in any 
Jewish Orthodox synagogue, yet it also serves another role. To congregants, as I learned during 
my fieldwork, the mehitza evokes a physical sensation that the gym hall is an “ordinary” 
synagogue in Israeli Orthodox standards. When I talked to Haim, a man in his mid-thirties who 
has been a member of the congregation for nearly a decade, he described to me this sensation: 
It’s elusive, I find it hard to define even to myself… it’s an instinctive, physical sensation a 
person feels when he walks through the door [of the prayer hall]. The impact of this 
sensation is enormous, I think, and it leaves an indelible impression. For a person who walks 
through the door, does it look to him like an ordinary synagogue, does he feel that he’s in an 
ordinary synagogue, or not? 125 
The words “feel” and “look” are important here; the “feeling” the prayers evoke among 
congregants and the appearance of the prayer hall are crucial to how members of the 
congregation and their guests experience and perceive these prayers. In the Baka Minyan, whose 
                                                 
125 See Hebrew origin in Appendix B item 10. 
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communal prayers are considered nontraditional and even radical by mainstream Orthodox 
standards, being an “ordinary” synagogue matters a great deal.   
 In the previous chapter I investigated various ways in which South Jerusalem is 
constructed as a public place of pluralist Judaism. This chapter zooms in to examine one of the 
main congregations in the “Pluralist Mile” of South Jerusalem – the Baka Minyan. In this 
chapter, I depict how the process of “scaling down” happens at the level of a religious 
congregation. I look at communal debates that focus on how, and whether, to increase gender 
equality in communal prayers. In those debates, members assume religious authority and 
autonomy in matters that are commonly perceived in Orthodox society as belonging to the 
jurisdiction of rabbinical leaders. I argue that members’ willingness to demonstrate halakhic 
innovation is influenced by their perception of their congregation as an intimate, almost private, 
setting. On instances when members perceive their communal prayers as public events that are 
exposed to the gaze of other members of Orthodox society, they are not as willing to transgress 
Orthodox norms.  
As Haim’s words illustrate, bodily sensations play a key role in members’ intimate 
familiarity with their setting of communal prayers. My analysis in this chapter follows an 
anthropological approach that considers bodily dispositions and sensations as sources of 
anthropological knowledge (Csordas 1990, 1994; Hirschkind 2006; Van Wulputte 2004). Within 
this paradigm, the body is not an object of study but the subject of culture – the “existential 
ground of culture” (Csordas 1990, 5). I focus on ways in which communal prayers are shaped by 
members’ “nonreflexive registers,” their patterns of perception and sensory experience 
(Hirschkind 2006, 28-31). In particular, I examine how members’ perceptions of what is an 
“ordinary” religiosity are embodied in the spatial organization and sound of communal prayers. 
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In this sense, the congregation’s prayer hall is an “embodied space,” a space shaped by 
congregants’ experience and consciousness (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga 2003, 2).  
Another theoretical lens that is important to my analysis is Bourdieu’s notion of habitus – 
“the universalizing mediation which causes an individual agent’s practices, without either 
explicit reason or signifying intent, to be none the less “sensible” and “reasonable”.” (Bourdieu 
1977, 79). Habitus is “history turned into nature” (Bourdieu 1977, 78) and, as such, one of its 
primary effects is the “production of a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity secured 
by consensus on the meaning (sens) of practices and the world” (ibid, 80).126 As my analysis 
shows, key dimensions of the communal religious practices at the Baka Minyan are shaped by 
members’ “commonsense” knowledge as sons and daughters of Religious-Zionist society. 
My analysis in this chapter demonstrates that the exercising of religious autonomy is not 
always a matter of awareness. At the Baka Minyan, members determine what is an “ordinary” 
religiosity based on their bodily sensations and on their Religious-Zionist habitus. Members of 
the congregation feel comfortable, literally speaking, at their prayer hall and this comfort 
facilitates their innovative approach to halakha. 
Partnership Minyans in Israel and Abroad 
Before I describe the characteristics of the Baka Minyan, this section depicts the 
congregation’s social context. The Baka Minyan is part of a growing movement of partnership 
minyans in Israel and North America. This movement started in 2002 with the founding of Shira 
Hadasha in Jerusalem and, shortly after, Darkei Noam congregation in New York (Sztokman 
2011). Prior to that, Orthodox women found ways to increase their religious participation mostly 
by establishing all-women prayer groups (Cohen Nusbacher 1999; Hartman 2007). These prayer 
                                                 
126 The emphasis is in the original text. 
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groups hold services in which women read from the Torah scrolls. However, since they do not 
constitute a minyan according to the traditional Orthodox view, they may not perform all parts of 
the service (Cohen Nusbacher 1999, 97). In Israel, an important development in terms of 
women’s participation in Orthodox prayers was the founding of Yedidya congregation in 
Jerusalem in 1980 by immigrants from North America, Western Europe and Australia.127 
Yedidya was the first Modern Orthodox synagogue in Israel that had a clear feminist agenda, and 
it has integrated women into some aspects of communal prayers as well as in leadership 
positions (Teitlbuom 2011).  
 Partnership minyans take gender equality further by altering the service to maximize 
women’s equal participation within a halakhic framework (Sztokman 2011). In these 
congregations, women read the Torah and participate in the Aliyot (blessings during the reading 
of the Torah); they carry the Torah scrolls in and out of the Torah Ark and pass it in the women’s 
section; and serve as prayer leaders in some portions of the prayer (Sztokman 2011). The same 
religious practices that were previously performed in all-women’s settings are performed in 
partnership minyans in the forum of the entire congregation, men and women.  
 In Israel, partnership minyans have developed within communities that belong to the 
Religious-Zionist society. Consequently, they are predominantly Ashkenazi, middle-class, and 
with above average education (Leon 2010).128 According to NTA’s website (accessed 
2/20/2017), as of January 2017, there had been approximately twenty partnership minyans in 
Israel that meet regularly, about 30% of them in Jerusalem. Most of these congregations are in 
upper-middle class Israeli neighborhoods and towns like Ra’anana, Modi’in, Shoham and 
                                                 
127 Email correspondence with Dr. Debbie Weissman, who was among the founders of Yedidya, 
9/13/2017. 
128 During my fieldwork, I became familiar with only one non-Ashkenazi prayer group that identifies as 
Halakhic and gender-egalitarian: Degel Yehuda in Talpiyot neighborhood in south Jerusalem. It identifies 
as egalitarian and Sephardi, and members follow a Sephardi protocol of communal prayer.  
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Zikhron Ya’akov and in several West Bank settlements in the settlement blocs surrounding 
Jerusalem.129 Only one of these congregations is located in what is considered a peripheral 
location, both geographically and socially, in the city of Be’er Sheva.  
The Baka Minyan – A Community Portrait   
Past and Present 
 The Baka Minyan was founded in 2006 by a group of seven or so young families, all in 
their early to mid-thirties and with young children, who at the time belonged to another minyan 
in the Baka neighborhood. Members of this group wanted to increase women’s participation 
during communal prayers but failed to obtain their congregation’s support. The group decided to 
hold occasional Shabbat services outside their congregation where they could pray according to 
their liking.  
 At first, the group met once a month on Shabbat mornings at the living room of one of 
the families. A mehitza was set up in the middle of the room and women took part in the Torah 
reading. The group grew bigger every month until it had several dozen participants. These 
monthly prayers lasted for a few months. As Rosh Hashana approached, the group realized that 
the living room could no longer sustain all the men and women who wanted to participate. They 
rented a space at the local Community Center and held their holiday services there. The place 
was packed, I was told by Ora, who has been in the minyan’s founding group and has been on its 
                                                 
129 Although West Bank settlements are not considered “central,” neither in terms of their geographical 
location nor in terms of the social consensus about them in wider Israeli society, the settlements in which 
partnership minyans are currently operating are among the most established settlements in the West Bank. 
Some of them, like Efrat, are the home of large communities of US-born Jews of Modern-Orthodox and 
Conservative backgrounds who identified at the United States with liberal and leftist politics (Hirschhorn 
2017). These settlements are well-connected to Jerusalem by a modern system of highways and are 
considered by its residents as part of the metropole of greater Jerusalem. Residents in those settlements 
are upper-middle class, their level of education is above average, and they are considered part of the 
social mainstream of Religious-Zionist society.  
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managing team for over a decade. After the holidays, they realized they had reached a “point of 
no return,” she told me. They had started their own independent prayer group.  
 Today the congregation continues to hold its communal prayers and activities at the 
Community Center’s gym. The congregation has a managing team that is directed by two 
gabbai’im, a man and a woman. In Jewish congregations, gabbai’im are usually members of the 
congregation who are responsible for facilitating the communal prayers. During the time of my 
fieldwork, the gabbai’im at the Baka Minyan had a much greater role. Before 2010, there was no 
formal decision-making process in the congregating, and the gabai’im, who were among the 
founding members, made many of the communal decisions. This had changed in 2010, when 
congregation members decided on a formal decision-making procedure. According to this 
procedure, significant changes to the protocol of communal prayers require the support of at least 
60% of congregation members.130 Still, there are many smaller, week-by-week decisions that are 
made by the gabbai’im.  
Furthermore, during communal services, the gabai’im are the most dominant figures. 
They are on the bimah, the space in front of the Torah Ark, during most of the service. From 
there, they orchestrate the communal prayer and make sure it runs smoothly. With the managing 
team, the gabbai’im run the congregation, both logistically and ideologically. Other members of 
the managing team are responsible for different aspects of community life – finance, charity, 
communal help, hospitality, and assigning members to give monthly lessons and to participate in 
the weekly Torah readings and dvar Torah. The congregation approves the composition of the 
management team once a year at the annual members’ meeting. 
 
  
                                                 
130 This information is based on community protocols from 2010, provided to me by Ronen. 
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An Orthodox Congregation? 
 As of December 2016, the minyan had about 120 family units registered as members. The 
vast majority of congregation members were born in Israel to Ashkenazi households that are 
considered part of Religious-Zionist society. Their life paths follow what is considered in Israel a 
typical Religious-Zionist narrative: they attended the state’s religious school system (Mamlakhti 
Dati); participated in the activities of the Religious-Zionist youth movements – Bnei Akiva and 
HaTzofim Hadatiym (the Religious Scouts); attended post-secondary religious schools –Yeshivot 
Hesder and Midrashot; and served in the Israeli military. Their children follow similar paths. The 
overall level of education and social-economic status of congregation members is above average. 
There is a high percentage of academics, many of whom are in areas related to Judaic Studies. 
Others work in professional areas that require advanced education such as medicine, law, 
education, and Hi-Tech. Most members, therefore, grew up in the “heart” of Religious-Zionist 
society and in many ways are still part of it.  
 At the same time, the congregation does not officially identify as Orthodox. First, not all 
members grew up in Orthodox settings. Some, mostly those who immigrated from the United 
States, grew up in households that were closer to Conservative Judaism. Others were not raised 
religious at all. Secondly, many members I spoke with do not identify as Orthodox as adults but, 
rather, as dati or as observant. Moshe, for example, told me that for many years he felt 
uncomfortable wearing a kippa because it labeled him as “dati,” which in Israel is commonly 
perceived as right-wing and socially conservative. Similarly, Avigail, a woman in her mid-
thirties, told me that in the years following Prime Minister Rabin’s assassination by a dati man in 
1995, when she was a teenager, she had not disclosed her identity as a religious woman. As 
adults, both Moshe and Avigail found ways to accommodate their religiosity with their critique 
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of Orthodox society. Moshe told me that being a member of the Baka Minyan facilitated this 
accommodation.  
 Dress code during communal prayers also does not follow conventional Orthodox 
standards. While in Haredi society, married women cover their hair following Orthodox modesty 
norms, Religious-Zionist women’s hair covering norms are much more diverse (Caplan 2017, 
227). Most married women at the Baka Minyan wear wide hairbands over their foreheads instead 
of the traditional shawl that covers a larger portion of the hair. Some women do not cover their 
hair at all during service. In the summer, many women wear fashionable hats that are common 
among young secular Israeli women. Both the hats and the hairbands are not traditional head 
covers and they can easily be mistaken for a fashionable accessory rather than an item of 
religious modesty. Yet, married women in the congregation wear them to signal that they are 
religious women but not in the mainstream way.131 
 Men’s dress code in synagogue includes head covers: a small knitted kippa, either 
uniformed black or white with patterned rims, or a hat. All men were a tallit (prayer shawl) 
during service. Their clothes are diverse. While some men dress up to synagogue by wearing 
shoes, long tailored pants, and a tucked-in dress shirt, others dress more casually, particularly 
during the summer. Sandals, short pants, and a loose, untucked shirt are quite common. This 
casual look fits well with the congregation’s overall self-perception of being a “laid-back,” 
informal congregation that does not align with Orthodoxy’s strict norms.  
The most explicit way in which leading members in the congregation express their 
ambivalence toward Orthodoxy is in their self-identification as a kehila mutredet –a “deeply 
                                                 
131 I noticed that many of the women who wear these “liberal observant” hair bands for service (hence, to 
a religious occasion) do not cover their hair at all on week days.  
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concerned” congregation.132 This is a phrased coined by the gabbai’im during the early days of 
the Minyan. In my interview with Ronen, who had been on the gabai’im team since the first days 
of the congregation, he told me more about his vision of a “deeply concerned” congregation. 
Ronen is a Talmudic scholar in his early forties. When he and his wife, Rinat, moved to the 
neighborhood as a young couple they joined an already-existing prayer group in Baka. He soon 
became a gabbai and a dominant figure in that congregation. When he and a group of friends 
tried to advance women’s participation in public roles during communal prayers, there was 
strong opposition followed by months of heated debates. This eventually led to the founding of 
the Baka Minyan, as I described above. The ethos of the founding group, according to him, was 
that of a congregation that is constantly questioning, always restless: “[our] consciousness has 
been of a deeply concerned congregation, of flow, of authenticity, of a sense of unraveling; that 
we unravel and then re-weave things.” 
Ronen further told me that he does not identify as Orthodox although he grew up in a 
household that observed an Orthodox-oriented Judaism. He does not feel that Religious-Zionist 
society is his wider group of identification, either. He told me about the first meeting of the Baka 
Minyan, in which one of the members suggested that the Minyan does not identify as Orthodox 
but as “committed to halakha.” Ronen liked his suggestion and preferred it over a 
denominational affiliation that sets “social boundaries,” according to him. In the new prayer 
group Ronen and his friends established, he had tried to express his own ambivalence toward 
what is perceived in Israel as Orthodox Judaism through questioning and re-evaluating halakhic 
conventions in their communal prayers. Nevertheless, as I show below, being considered part of 
Religious-Zionist society has remained an important factor in Minyan members’ decisions 
whether, and to what degree, to remain a “deeply concerned congregation.”  
                                                 
132 This is how Ronen translated the concept to English. 
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The Inward Orientation of the Minyan  
 Even before my arrival in South Jerusalem I started to collect information about the 
various partnership minyans and liberal Orthodox congregations in the neighborhood by reading 
congregations’ websites and Facebook pages. Some congregations had detailed web pages with 
information about the congregation, its mission, and its activities. Others had active Facebook 
pages with updates about current events and activities. The Baka Minyan had none. The 
congregation has a web page but it is not very detailed, and it does not get updated often. For 
instance, the week before my first Shavu’ot in the field, I browsed through websites of different 
congregations to learn about the Tikkunim they offered. The Baka Minyan’s website did not 
offer any information about the holiday events. In fact, their website still had an old publication 
about Rosh Hashanah events, which took place eight months prior to that Shavu’ot. It seemed 
like they were not interested in publicizing their Tikkun too much. My visit to the congregation 
on that Shavu’ot, which I describe in chapter four, corroborated my feeling that it was an internal 
community gathering rather than a public event geared toward wider crowds.  
 As I became familiar with the Baka Minyan, I learned that their infrequently maintained 
website was part of what I identify as the congregation’s overall “inward orientation.” As 
described above, the congregation started as an intimate prayer group of friends, similar to the 
Jewish havurot in the United States.133 Quickly enough, it grew to be one of the largest and most 
established congregations in South Jerusalem. In many ways, however, the congregation still 
operates as a small, friends-based prayer group.  
                                                 
133 The havurah (fellowship in Hebrew) movement in American Judaism developed from the late 1960s 
through the 1970s. These were friends-based prayer groups whose members rejected some of the core 
elements of institutional American Judaism like denominations and impressive buildings and were 
committed to maintain their small size and independence from institutional affiliation (Prell 1989, 16).  
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 Shortly after I started to attend the congregation regularly, I realized that the best way to 
be informed about the congregation’s activities was to join its email list serve. The gabbai’im, 
who knew me and my research, added me to the email list upon my request. The email 
announcements are sent on Thursday night or Friday morning, before the Shabbat services. 
Another announcement is sent in the middle of the week, when necessary. The announcements 
inform recipients about the schedule of weekend prayers and any special events related to the 
prayer, like the honoring of congregation members’ celebrations, such as new births, weddings, 
and Bar or Bat Mitzvahs, which are usually accompanied by a Kiddush, a ceremony in which the 
community blesses the celebrating family over wine, followed by a luncheon. Announcements 
also include information about the congregation’s charity activities, classes, and events 
surrounding the Jewish holidays and national memorial days. Members of the congregation use 
this list serve as a communal bulletin board and post various requests and announcements such 
as renting out houses, selling furniture, and looking for childcare services.  
 I read the weekly emails regularly as a way of following up on the congregation’s 
activities. But even these emails were not always enough; some announcements about the 
congregation’s activities were sent last minute, a day or two before the activity took place. Other 
information did not even make it to the emails. About eight months into my fieldwork, Na’ama, 
a regular congregant, mentioned to me in a conversation that much of the communication 
between regular members goes through a WhatsApp group.134 This group is used as a forum to 
“joke around,” she said, but also to seek assistance on issues related to the congregation’s 
activities and to life in the neighborhood more broadly. The WhatsApp group is where regular 
members who belonged to the core circle of the congregation communicated with one another 
                                                 
134 An instant messaging application for cellular phones that is popular in Israel, particularly to form 
group chats. 
181 
 
most frequently. It allowed a smaller group of members to sustain communal ties that go beyond 
their meetings during Shabbat services. In fact, services were only the “tip of the iceberg,” in 
Na’ama’s words, in terms of members’ interactions with one another. The WhatsApp group, 
therefore, formed a community within a community. It is, perhaps, reminiscent of the original 
intimate group of friends in the Minyan’s early days.  
 Another dimension of this inward orientation is the congregation’s attitude toward 
hospitality. The congregation does not seek to become bigger, I heard members say on different 
occasions. In fact, members are aware of their reputation as a “snobbish” congregation that is not 
very welcoming to visitors, guests, and newcomers who do not already have social or family ties 
in the congregation. Other congregations in the neighborhood take pride in their communal 
custom of welcoming and hosting guests and newcomers –based on the Jewish custom of 
hospitality (hakhnasat orchim). Some congregations, for instance, maintain a list of families who 
are willing to host guests for Shabbat dinners to ensure that out-of-town visitors will not spend 
Shabbat meals alone.  
Until recently, the Baka Minyan did not have any communal mechanism of hospitality. In 
the annual members meeting in March 2016, one of the women in the Minyan proposed to 
initiate a “hospitality group” whose members invite guests and visitors for Shabbat meal at their 
homes. Her proposal was approved and in the communal emails over the following weeks I saw 
announcements that invited members to join this group and become hosts. Still, I sensed that the 
emphasis of the Baka Minyan is to sustain a community that is focused “inwards,” toward 
fulfilling the need of existing members rather than “outwards,” toward attracting new members.  
Finally, the “inward orientation” of the Baka Minyan plays out in the role the 
congregation plays in the personal lives of members. I was told repeatedly by my interlocutors 
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that they enjoyed coming to communal services on Shabbat for social reasons. To many of the 
core group of the Minyan, it was first and foremost a social circle – the place where they went 
once a week to meet friends and hang out together. During and after service, the concrete yard 
outside of the Community Center is bustling with children running around while their parents 
gather in small groups on the concrete benches that surround the yard to chat and catch up. Eran, 
a congregation member in his mid-thirties, told me of a “tradition” in the Minyan: on Shabbat 
mornings, around mid-service, a group of men gather outside on the concrete benches, and enjoy 
a shot of whiskey together. Other men told me about their running group on Saturdays before the 
morning service and basketball games in the concrete yard on Saturday night, after Shabbat had 
ended.  
This strong sense of a community and of an identification that I heard from many of my 
interlocutors is important to my argument that the Baka Minyan is not a “public” place. Although 
the Minyan’s prayers are open to the public and on major Jewish holidays hundreds of people 
pack the communal prayer hall, to Minyan members, it is a place that represents home, personal 
identity, and friends. To them, it belongs to the realm of “private” life.  
“Assuming Responsibility over Our Environment”: Tzedakah at the Minyan  
 Like most Jewish congregations, the Baka Minyan holds charity (tzedakah) activities. 
Three congregation members make up the congregation’s charity committee. The committee 
manages several ongoing charity projects; all of them take place in the Baka neighborhood. The 
oldest and most regular project is the congregation’s support of a local shelter for teenage girls. 
The congregation holds several events in the shelter every year. These are family-oriented events 
in which congregation members and girls from the shelter co-organize creative activities. The 
congregation’s children are typically involved. In an activity that celebrated the beginning of the 
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school year, for example, girls from the shelter helped children from the Minyan bake cookies, 
make collages from magazines, and paint. Outside, in the facility’s garden, children ran around 
and played.  
 Other charity activities are also local. The congregation holds events of various kinds 
with a women’s shelter and with a shelter for teenage boys, both in the Baka neighborhood. 
These projects, however, are not as regular. Members offer ad-hoc assistance to dwellers of these 
shelters. Every few weeks, the charity committee posts requests on the weekly emails to help the 
teenage girls prepare their school assignments, assist women from the women’s shelter move 
their belongings to new apartments, or organize birthday parties for these women’s children.  
 I interviewed Haya, who has been a member of the charity committee since its inception, 
about the congregation’s charity activities. She emphasized that it was important to her to 
maintain two things. First, she wanted the congregation’s relationship with the people they assist 
to be as “egalitarian” as possible. During the activities in the girls’ shelter, for instance, the girls 
served as facilitators and guides, rather than as passive recipients. By doing so, she said, they 
could communicate with congregation members “as equals.” According to her, this kind of 
interaction is “empowering” to the girls. Secondly, Haya said that the charity committee tries to 
choose projects that are “local.” This was part of her “social agenda” to “assume responsibility 
over your environment, where you live, beyond what is happening within your own home.” In 
the Baka Minyan, the charity work aims to establish relations between congregants and 
vulnerable groups who live in the neighborhood. These relations are meant to cultivate social 
awareness among congregation members, on the one hand, and to “empower” the recipient 
groups, on the other.  
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 The congregation also donates money, a more traditional tzedakah activity. Each 
summer, the congregation purchases entry tickets to Jerusalem’s swimming pool for families in 
need. This cause, like the congregation’s ongoing tzedakah projects, is also local and focused on 
the congregation’s immediate environment. Although the families in need are from a different 
socioeconomic background than members of the Baka Minyan, the cause itself is local. The 
swimming pool is located on Emek Refai’im, one of the central and busiest streets in South 
Jerusalem, only a few minutes’ walk from the congregation’s prayer hall. Therefore, the 
boundaries of the neighborhood set the Minyan’s boundaries of social engagement.  
The fact that the social engagement of the congregation is focused on supporting 
vulnerable populations in the neighborhood surprised me because I knew that many congregation 
members either work for, or have founded, organizations and initiatives with explicit left-wing 
political and social agendas. I, therefore, expected that the congregation would be more 
“political.” However, it seemed to me that they were not searching to make their congregation 
into a platform of organized political activity. While other congregations in the neighborhood 
organized and participated in protests and in public events against faith-based violence in 
Jerusalem and in Israel (the Interfaith Candle Lighting event I describe in chapter four is one 
example), the Baka Minyan did not take a formal part (as far as I know) in such public events.135 
It is not that Minyan members do not have a wider political and social vision. In my 
interviews with leading Minyan members, those who founded the Minyan and have been leading 
it throughout its first decade, they told me about their view of the Minyan’s social significance. 
                                                 
135 During a year-long of observations, I recall only a few instances in which the congregation addressed 
contemporary politics in a formal community gathering. One of these instances was at the end of a bloody 
week in July 2015 during which a teenage girl was stabbed to death by a Haredi man at the Jerusalem’s 
Pride Parade and members of a Palestinian family died when Jewish settlers set their house on fire. In the 
weekly blessing of healing (mi sheberach laholim), Ora, who was gabba’it that Shabbat, mentioned the 
names of the other teens who were injured in the parade and the Palestinian toddler who survived the 
arson. 
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Ora, for example, told me that it was clear to her that they were doing “something bigger than 
here and now.” In their critical reading of halakhic texts and their willingness to question 
Orthodox norms, they have set up a “model” for smaller, newer minyans across Israel, according 
to her. Ronen told me that he sees the Minyan as being part of a wider social process in which 
people and organizations “participate in shaping their own religious spaces and in shaping the 
place of religion in Israel more broadly.” Although leading members of the Minyan think about 
the public significance of their congregation, they chose not to translate this into organized 
political or social activism. Instead, they prefer to keep the Minyan a local, “private” endeavor.  
The Politics of Change at the Baka Minyan   
When I began my fieldwork at the Baka Minyan in 2015, I heard of the ongoing 
discussions in the congregation about increasing women’s participation in leading roles. In fact, 
these debates were one of the main reasons I chose to focus on this congregation. The specific 
change that was being considered was integrating women as prayer leaders on Shabbat morning 
prayers – Shacharit and Musaf. When I found out that the Minyan has already introduced 
“radical” elements into their prayers such as counting women for a minyan of ten congregants 
and integrating women as prayer leaders on Friday nights, I did not understand why there were 
such strong objections to continuing this process of gender equality.   
 As I became more familiar with the Minyan, I realized that integrating women as prayer 
leaders on Shabbat morning involved public visibility. Previous changes that were passed in the 
congregation were related to parts of the communal prayer that occur when it is mostly regular 
Minyan members who are present in the prayer hall, and their number is relatively small. I argue 
that these distinctions between “public” and “private” times during the communal prayer are 
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crucial to whether members were willing to accept certain changes or whether they insisted on 
rejecting them.   
 The willingness to modify traditional elements of the Orthodox-oriented prayer is 
characteristic of partnership minyans in Israel and abroad (Sztokman 2011). Partnership minyans 
do not have rabbis who serve as congregation leaders. Each congregation has its own mechanism 
of determining the format of communal prayers. Some congregations have a committee of 
members who are literate in halakhic texts and who study sources to find legal leeway that 
allows increasing women’s participation in communal prayers.  
This autonomy is related, in part, to a wider process in liberal circles of Religious-Zionist 
society of studying Jewish legal texts from an academic-critical perspective (Schwartz 2009,116; 
Sheleg 2000, 67-9). Many members of Israeli partnership minyans are Judaic Studies scholars 
who are familiar with Judaism’s legal corpus and are used to studying, analyzing, and 
interpreting it. The Baka Minyan is no exception.  
When I interviewed Ora, she situated this kind of independent approach to halakah in the 
context of Religious-Zionist history. According to her, the autonomy that members of the Baka 
Minyan exercise in deciding how to design their communal prayers represents a return to 
Religious-Zionist ethos of the “sacred revolt”:  
We [at the Baka Minyan] want that our discourse will be halakhic and that every 
change will be made in the language of study and of halakha. We have in our 
community many scholars… In a sense, this is a return to the ethos of HaPo’el 
HaMizrachi and of Bnei Akiva – it is called the “sacred revolt.” Unlike the Haredim, 
who go to the rabbi for everything… we were raised according to this ethos, which 
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says that you don’t go to a rabbi with every question you have. Instead, you, each 
person, must assume his own responsibility, open a book, and investigate.136 
By “sacred revolt,” Ora was referencing to an ideological component of HaPo’el 
HaMizrachi, the labor-socialist fraction of Religious-Zionism, which was founded in Palestine in 
1922 (Schwarzt 2009, 43). As described in the first chapter, HaPoel HaMizrachi rebelled against 
the bourgeois orientation of HaMizrachi, the main Religious-Zionist party at that time (ibid). The 
rebellion was also meant to create a “new religious type… that was neither bounded by 
rabbinical constraints nor intimidated by the ultra-Orthodox” (ibid, 49). HaPo’el HaMizrachi 
generated a new type of “non-rabbinical leadership that emphasized individual decision and 
responsibility” (ibid).  
As we see in Ora’s words, she views herself and her friends in the Baka Minyan and in 
other partnership minyans across Israel as continuing this Religious-Zionist ideology. They were 
not laborers by any means. In fact, they were at the heart of the Religious-Zionist bourgeoisie 
(Leon 2010). But in socialist Religious-Zionism they find a model of religious autonomy and 
individual responsibility that they seek to replicate. In the following two sections, I demonstrate 
how this halakhic autonomy is expressed in the communal prayers and in the decision-making 
process at the Baka Minyan. 
Go with the Flow: Counting Women for a Minyan  
 The founding of the congregation, according to members of the founding group, was not 
a deliberate act. They did not aim for it to be the beginning of a new congregation. According to 
Ora, those early monthly living-room prayers were simply a way for her and her friends to pray, 
occasionally, according to what they felt was right. They did not intend at first to start a new 
                                                 
136 See Hebrew origin in Appendix B, item 11. 
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congregation; it turned out that way as their intimate, informal prayer group grew larger and 
larger. This type of ad hoc actions and decisions has been a fundamental aspect of the Baka 
Minyan to this day. The congregation is no longer a small, intimate group of friends but one of 
the large and popular congregations in South Jerusalem. And yet, as I observed during my field 
work, the “on-the-spot,” “as-we-go” approach that characterized the Minyan in its early days was 
still very much evident in the congregation’s communal prayers when I participated in its 
communal services and activities.  
 This ad hoc approach is evident first and foremost in what is known in the congregation 
as the “flow principle.” This phrase, which was coined by the gabbai’im, represents their wish to 
maintain a dynamic, flexible, and an “on-the-move” congregation. This principle becomes 
particularly important in the question of whether to count women for a minyan. According to 
Orthodox tradition, a minyan is composed of ten Jewish men. Jewish prayers begin with texts 
that do not require a minyan of ten congregants and can be recited individually. The segments of 
the prayer that require a minyan come a short while after the opening segments. Since the early 
days of the Baka Minyan, it was clear to the gabba’iim, who are responsible for either leading 
the prayers or nominating other members to be prayer leaders, that communal prayers should not 
be halted when there are no ten men present in the room. Instead, the prayer leader may continue 
the prayer and begin the portions that require a minyan as long as there are ten adults present, 
both men and women. According to Ora, since the early days it has been clear to her and her 
friends that a minyan meant both women and men.  
 The “flow principle” had made counting women for a minyan a norm in the 
congregation. According to Ora, if prayer leaders stopped the communal prayer and waited for 
more men to arrive, it would not only be offensive to women, but it would also interrupt the 
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prayer. Although some prayer leaders prefer to wait until there are ten men present, I observed 
numerous instances in which prayer leaders did not wait and started the communal prayer as 
soon as there were ten adults in the prayer hall.  
 What came first – Ora’s wish that women be counted for a minyan or her emphasis on 
continuous, smoothly flowing prayers? I do not have a conclusive answer to this question. But I 
do not think it matters, either. What matters is the outcome: women are counted for a minyan in a 
congregation that considers itself committed to halakhic principles. Even Ora admits that 
counting women for a minyan does not really meet halakhic standards. Counting women has 
become a convention in the congregation without ever being raised in a formal communal 
discussion or voted on in a communal meeting. A practice that is considered non-traditional, and 
even radical, by Orthodox standards has become conventional in the Baka Minyan without any 
formal decision-making process and without the congregation ever declaring that counting 
women is being practiced de-facto. Actually, the congregation deliberately avoids making that 
declaration because they do not want “to open a Pandora’s box,” as one member told me. This is 
perhaps the most salient example of the congregation’s overall orientation as progressive yet not 
radical, innovative yet not revolutionary.  
Decision Making (and Not-Making)  
 Members’ perception of their congregation as an intimate space is also important to their 
debates over when and how to further gender equality. Increasing gender equality in communal 
prayers has been the primary aspect of being a “deeply concerned congregation.” They split from 
another congregation because they wanted to increase women’s participation in public services 
and were denied. They added the title “shivyoni,” egalitarian, to the name of their new prayer 
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group, although they were not fully egalitarian, as a declaration of intent. Gender equality was 
the goal toward which they were moving.   
 Since the congregation was founded in 2006, its members considered numerous proposals 
to increase women’s participation in communal prayers. In 2008, they held sessions of halakhic 
study, led by congregation members, that considered the halakhic aspects of integrating women 
as prayer leaders on Arvit (the evening prayer) on Friday night.137 The study relied on halakhic 
sources that determine that Arvit prayer is not an obligatory prayer (unlike Shacharit and Musaf 
on Saturday morning, that are mandatory to men). Members also examined halakhic rulings that 
determine that women cannot serve as prayer leaders because it offends the men who are present. 
Members of the Baka Minyan weighed this ruling and determined that in their congregation, it is 
not considered an insult for men if women serve in leading roles and, therefore, there were no 
halakhic barriers that prevented them from making this modification.138  
 Based on these study sessions, congregation members decided that in their communal 
prayers, women could lead Arvit and it would not be considered violation of halakhic principles. 
By doing so, they became the most progressive congregation among Israeli partnership minyans, 
in terms of their religious practices. Congregation Shira Hadasha later joined them in adopting 
this practice.  
 Over the past few years, congregation members have been divided about this question. 
Approximately half of the members support furthering gender equality by integrating women as 
prayer leaders in all communal prayers, and the other half objects this change. In 2015, the 
management team of the Baka Minyan decided to hold a pilot: once a month there was a fully-
                                                 
137 Study sessions’ protocols were provided to me by Ronen. For a detailed discussion on halakhic aspects 
of women’s role as prayer leaders on Arvit see Ben-Shahar (2014).  
138 This kind of reading is based on halakhic discussions by Mandel Shapiro (2001) and Rabbi Daniel 
Sperber (2002, 2007), who argue that women’s participation in reading the Torah is permitted under 
certain circumstances. 
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egalitarian prayer on Saturday mornings, in which women could serve as prayer leaders in all 
parts of the communal prayer. These pilot prayers were held in the main building of the 
Community Center, across the yard from the gymnasium, during the same time of the main 
service. Members of the congregation could choose which prayer to attend. At the end of 
prayers, congregants from both groups convened for a joint Kiddush luncheon held in the 
concrete yard between the two locations.  
That year, these pilot prayers occupied a central place in the congregation’s communal 
life and created restlessness among members. I attended a couple of these pilot prayers and 
noticed the uneasiness among congregation members – those who attended the pilot prayers as 
well as those who attended the main service. At the end of one of those pilot prayers, I returned, 
with everyone else who attended the “alternative” service, to the main prayer hall to listen to the 
concluding dvar-Torah. As I was passing by the men’s section on my way to the women’s 
section, I noticed that the men who were already in the prayer hall turned their heads to see who 
attended the other service. I was under the impression that people took notice of who was where. 
Participating in the pilot service was not a “casual” decision. It meant identifying with a certain 
position in the congregation – socially as well as ideologically. 
At the annual members’ meetings in March 2016, after a year of pilot prayers, members 
considered whether to hold egalitarian prayers once a month on a regular basis. At that meeting, 
51% of members voted in favor of this proposal. However, this majority was still less than the 
60% support that is required in the congregation’s protocol, and the proposal was not approved.  
At the annual members’ meeting and in personal interviews I held with members, I 
noticed that a main reason for members’ objection to full gender equality was for social, not 
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halakhic, concerns. Some members thought that that the time was not ripe for a change in terms 
of social norms in Orthodox society.  
In my interview with Oded on April 2016, he explained to me the social dilemmas 
surrounding this issue. Oded and his wife were among the founding members of the Minyan. 
Oded does not consider himself Orthodox although he grew up in a Religious-Zionist home. “I 
am not interested in putting myself into boxes,” he told me. He and his wife are not very 
observant, much less observant than their parents’ generation, he said. And yet, he objected 
increasing gender equality in communal prayers arguing that it would push the Baka Minyan 
outside of a social group that is considered as “light Orthodoxy.” If women were equally 
integrated into the prayer services as prayer leaders, the Minyan would “fall out” of Orthodox 
society, he argued. He was concerned that this would change the Minyan profoundly. They 
would become a non-Orthodox Minyan: there would be mixed-gender sitting in prayers, and 
greater number of congregants who did not cover their heads during the week days. “It wouldn’t 
be the same,” he concluded. 
I asked him about this contradiction. On one hand, he did not consider himself Orthodox. 
On the other hand, he cared about belonging to Orthodox society. He admitted that he was 
ambivalent about this issue. For him, it was not about being able to call himself an Orthodox 
man but about the “social milieu” to which he belonged. In terms of his halakhic observance, he 
is closer to Conservative Judaism than to Orthodoxy, he told me. “But there is a difference 
between what you are at home and what you are in public,” he said. It was important for him to 
belong to a congregation that was still considered part of the Orthodox public, albeit on its 
periphery.  
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One of the consequences of “falling out” of Orthodox society, in Oded’s words, pertained 
to members’ relations with their extended families. In communal debates about gender equality 
in which I participated, members expressed their concerns that if the Minyan were to become 
fully egalitarian, their family members would refuse to join them for Shabbat services. Being 
able to invite relatives for Shabbat service is crucial. At the Baka Minyan, like in other Jewish 
congregations of all affiliations, congregation members who celebrate a family event such as the 
birth of a new child, Bar or Bat Mitzvah, or a wedding, also celebrate this event during Shabbat 
service. At the Baka Minyan, these members are blessed by the gabbai’m during the Torah 
reading and host a festive Kiddush luncheon at the end of service. Members often invite family 
members from outside the congregation to attend these celebrations.  
Oded told me about these dilemmas in his own family. When his eldest daughter 
celebrated her Bat-Mitzvah, the family invited relatives to join the communal prayer. He and his 
wife had to tell them in advance that women participate in various roles during the prayer, “so 
they knew what to expect,” he said. Some relatives loved it, but some decided to pray elsewhere 
and to join them for the Kiddush after the service. At his second daughter’s Bat-Mitzvah, they 
did a more “conservative ceremony” so more family members would attend. After that, they felt 
they should not have compromised: “We should have told them, this is who we are. If it suits you 
– you’re welcome to join. If it doesn’t suit you – join us later. In my son’s Bar-Mitzvah we did 
not change a thing.”  
 As we can see from Oded’s words, objections to increasing gender equality in communal 
prayers are mostly driven by concerns about social belonging and social ties to other members of 
Orthodox society. Therefore, the difference between Arvit on Friday night and Saturday 
morning’s prayers was not only due to their different halakhic status. The primary difference was 
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that Friday night service is mostly small, intimate, and attended almost exclusively by regular 
members, while Saturday morning services were much bigger and more festive events. These 
prayers “have audience,” they are attended by visitors, family members, and guests. Shabbat 
morning prayers, therefore, were the “frontstage” of the congregation while Friday night was its 
“backstage” (Goffman 1956). And, as Oded put it, what one does at home is not the same as 
what he or she does in public.  
 The congregation’s convention that women are counted as part of a minyan of ten is also 
done in a “private” setting, in a way. Women are counted for a minyan when there are not 
enough men. This scenario happens at the beginning of the communal prayer – either on Friday 
evening, when there are fewer congregants anyways, or at the beginning of the morning service 
on Saturday, when only devoted regular congregants rise early enough to attend. The 
controversial practice of counting women for a minyan, therefore, is done at a “private” time of 
prayer when it is mostly regular congregation members that are present. 
My analysis of debates about increasing gender equality in the Minyan shows that 
members’ opinions about ritual change depend more on social considerations than on halakhic 
ones. Members feel comfortable with changes to their communal prayers as long as they are not 
too public and, thus, would not risk their status as legitimate members of Religious-Zionist 
society. The next section, which is an ethnography of the Minyan’s prayers, further develops this 
point.  
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Innovative Ordinariness in the Communal Prayers of the Baka Minyan 
 
Figure 9: The Gym Hall’s transformation to a Prayer Hall. 
 
 
Figure 10: The Prayer Hall is ready for Shabbat service. 
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When I first started to attend the Minyan prayers I was struck by what seemed to me a 
contradiction between the congregation’s reputation as progressive and innovative and its 
unexceptional, mundane, and even casual communal prayers. During my fieldwork, I began to 
make sense of these seemingly contradictory qualities, as I noticed that the congregation 
cultivates a discourse of “ordinariness.” In the opening paragraph of this chapter, I describe the 
transformation of the gym hall into a prayer hall. An important component of this transformation 
is the partition, the mehitza. Haim and other members with whom I spoke said that maintaining 
gender separation during prayers was not that important to them. They do think, however, that 
the mehitza is important because it creates a spatial organization that looks and feels familiar to 
people who are used to praying in Orthodox synagogues. Another element that contributes to 
experiencing prayers as “ordinary” is the production of prayers as “Israeli.” A sense of 
Israeliness is evoked first and foremost by the soundscape in the prayer hall during prayer, which 
includes casual and “not too pretty” singing, and the voices of children.  
 Members’ perceptions of what is “ordinary” religiosity are based on bodily dispositions 
and sensations. In particular, the spatial organization created by the mehitza and the sound during 
services create an experience of familiarity, of religiosity that feels “right” and “authentic.” 
Bodily dispositions, therefore, play a central role in transforming the gym into an “ordinary” 
prayer hall. In Bourdieu’s (1977) terminology, what members perceive as ordinary depends on 
their predisposition. In the case of the Baka Minyan, members experience their communal 
prayers as continuing a specific tradition of Israeli-Orthodox religiosity, and this experience 
becomes embodied in how they enact their communal prayers.  
 Both the spatial organization of the prayer hall and the sound of prayers play an 
important role in members’ political discourses on religiosity. Their views of what is Israeli 
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religiosity and what is not are shaped by visceral, embodied and non-reflexive modes of 
appraisal (Hirschkind 2006) – by what “feels” and “sounds” to them as familiar, ordinary Israeli 
prayer. The landscape and soundscape of their prayer hall produce the sensation of familiarity, of 
listening to a familiar Israeli prayer. In this sense, the congregation’s prayer hall is an “embodied 
space” (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga 2003). While it allows members to feel “at home” in their 
religiosity, the elements that evoke this sense of familiarity are also those that destabilize 
traditional Orthodox distinctions.  
 The congregation’s communal prayers illustrate the “innovative ordinariness” of the Baka 
Minyan. Congregation members create in their prayer hall a familiar spatial and auditory 
environment that constructs their communal prayers as “ordinary.” This ordinariness, I argue, 
facilitates creative and innovative uses of traditional religious practices and imbues them with 
new meanings. 
The Mehitza – Creating a Familiar Landscape 
 In rabbinic law, as outlined in the Talmud and in later Jewish juridical texts, all the 
negative mitzvot (that is, the prohibitions) of the Torah apply to both men and women. Women 
are also obligated to carry out most of the positive mitzvot. Women are generally exempt from 
positive mitzvot that are “time-bound” – that is, those performed at specific times of the day or 
year (Ross 2004, 15-17). This gender hierarchy is evident in women’s marginal place in public 
religious life, and the spatial organization of traditional Orthodox synagogues reflects and 
reproduces their marginality (Sztokman 2011, 182).  
 One of the structural elements within synagogues that are mostly imbued with gender-
related meanings is the mehitza, the partition between the sections (Zuckerman 1999, 183). 
Orthodox congregations’ decision whether to use a high impermeable divider or a lower and 
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visually permeable one, is a political matter and tells a lot about the congregation’s social 
orientation as either “conservative” or “progressive” (Gurrock 2009, 261). In Israel, 
congregations in moderate Orthodox communities, and, more recently, partnership minyans, 
design partitions that do not set rigid separation between the sections (Teitlbuom 2011, 95-6).  
At the Baka Minyan, the mehitza is made of clear, light, see-through curtain that is hung 
from metal poles. The mehitza is mobile and adjustable; it is not fixed. The metal poles are 
installed with wheels, so they could be easily moved around. The fabric curtain that serves as the 
mehitza can easily be drawn back and forth. The mehitza in the Baka Minyan is not an 
“ordinary” one – it is not stable and permanent. The spatial organization it creates is also 
unusual; it divides the prayer hall into two equal halves that are located in equal proximity to the 
Torah Ark. While this organization is common among partnership minyans, it is uncommon 
among traditional Orthodox congregations. And yet, members of the Baka Minyan insist that the 
mehitza has an important role in producing their communal prayers as prayers that look 
“ordinary” to congregants who are used to Orthodox prayers. How can the mehitza be both 
“ordinary” and nontraditional? 
  Based on Gurevitch’s discussion of boundaries as “fine lines” (2007), I argue that in the 
Baka Minyan, the mehitza serves as a “thin” boundary. It is literally made of thin, fine, 
transparent fabric. But it is also “thin” by the possibilities it opens for crossings-over between 
sides and by destabilizing and disquieting worlds that are perceived as separate (Gurevitch 2007, 
189). In this congregation, the mehitza does not just separate men and women; it also 
distinguishes between secular and sacred “modes.” It is a “thin” boundary, however, because it 
facilitates and encourages the undermining and blurring of the distinctions it is set to establish. 
The mehitza in the Baka Minyan, therefore, enables the Minyan’s “innovative ordinariness” as it 
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both reproduces and subverts dominant traditions of an Orthodox synagogue. It evokes a 
“familiar” landscape among congregants of Orthodox upbringing while, at the same time, it 
deconstructs this familiarity by facilitating the dissolving of boundaries.  
Setting a Thin Boundary between Men and Women 
 Women in the Baka Minyan, as I learned in my first visit to the congregation, have to 
cross the men’s section in order to get to the women’s section. However, they cross it behind the 
back row of men’s seats, in an area that serves as a walkway, so their temporary presence in the 
men’s section is not very visible. Men, on the other hand, often cross over to the women’s 
section139. Sometimes it is the hazzan, prayer leader, who wants to ask the main gabbai’it some 
details about the prayer, or a husband that hands a baby to his wife. I do not recall ever seeing a 
woman cross into the men’s section. Men’s crossing to the women’s side is very visible, 
however, because it is not part of their attempt to merely walk to “their” side; it is a deliberate 
crossing.  
 The mehitza, therefore, sets a border that is meant to be crossed. This border is important; 
it signals to people who walk through the door that the congregation “has boundaries.” They do 
not transgress halakhic confines as far as removing gender partition altogether. However, the 
mehitza is a “thin boundary.” Members are cognizant of the rigidness and the strictness the 
mehitza creates by separating husbands from wives, and brothers from sisters. So, they resist this 
strict structure imposed by the mehitza and diffuse and mollify it by having men cross over to the 
other side. Women, however, still do not feel confident enough to destabilize the structure and 
cross over to the men’s side. At the end of the day, women’s public place in Orthodox Judaism is 
still fragile, still in the process of becoming, even in a progressive and accommodating 
congregation like the Baka Minyan.  
                                                 
139 I thank Ma’ayan Levinson for this observation.  
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 As Haim describes above, the mehitza evokes a “familiar” sensation. It creates a familiar 
synagogue landscape by dividing the prayer hall into two gendered sections. This familiarity, 
however, is not universal. Not everyone who walks through the door experiences a sense of 
familiarity by the mehitza. My own experience as a woman, who walked through the door right 
into the men’s section, was not one of familiarity and comfort. I expect the men who walk 
through the prayer hall’s door for the first time and find themselves surrounded by other men 
wrapped in prayer shawls not to feel as out of place as I did, and as perhaps other women on 
their first visit to the Baka Minyan. 
 Furthermore, the mehitza that separates men from women is not a universal experience of 
all religious Jews and not even of all Orthodox Jews. Communal prayers in Reform 
congregations around the world, for example, are held without any gender partition, as is the case 
as well in many Conservative congregations in Anglophone countries. Some Modern-Orthodox 
congregations in the United States had no mehitza, either, in the 1950s and 1960s (Sarna 1987, 
380). Moreover, Sephardic synagogues, which historically were not part of Jewish Orthodoxy, 
developed traditions and practices different from Ashkenazi Orthodox synagogues (Sztokman 
2011, 27). The sense of familiarity Haim depicts, therefore, is specific to people, men in 
particular, who grew up in Orthodox Ashkenazi congregations in Israel.  
 The purpose of the mehitza, therefore, is not to separate men from women but to create a 
familiar spatial organization. This familiarity is particularly important in terms of maintaining 
their social belonging with other members of Orthodox society. Shalom, a member of the 
congregation, describes the social significance of the mehitza:  
Sometimes I see mothers of congregation members who come to our prayers and are called 
up for an Aliya during the Torah reading for the first time in their lives and they weep, they 
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shed tears, and I shed a tear with them. One might say, they could have gone to a 
Conservative Minyan nearby… but it is not for them; that is not their community, these are 
not their beliefs. I know for certain that these women feel comfortable here because we have 
a mehitza and because this is a minyan that is considered Orthodox.140 
Shalom’s words demonstrate that debates about gender equality in the congregation are, in fact, 
debates about social belonging. Having a mehitza during prayers allows them to perceive 
themselves, and to be perceived by others, as part of Israel’s Orthodox society. At the same time, 
men’s crossings to the women’s side undermine Orthodox conventions of gender partition.  
Setting a Thin Boundary between Sacred and Secular 
 The mehitza not only separates men from women during prayer but it also helps to 
transform the gym into a prayer hall every Friday afternoon and to distinguish between sacred 
and secular “times.”141 The mehitza has to be portable and easily movable as the congregation 
does not have its own permanent space. They “build up” their synagogue every Friday afternoon 
and dismantle it merely twenty-four hours later. The adjustability of the mehitza allows 
congregation members a great deal of flexibility in shifting between “sacred” activities that 
require gender partition and “secular” activities that do not require it (Levinson 2015). The role 
of the mehitza therefore, is double. It transforms the gymnasium into a prayer hall and it shifts 
between sacred and secular “modes.”  
 In the following paragraphs, I demonstrate the flexible quality of the mehitza through an 
ethnographic description of a special ceremony the congregation held at the end of Simchat 
Torah celebrations. Simchat Torah is the last day of the holiday of Sukkot, in which Jewish 
congregations celebrate the completion of a year-long cycle of reading the five books of the 
                                                 
140 See Hebrew origin in Appendix B, item 12. 
141 I thank Ma’ayan Levinson for this observation. 
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Torah and the beginning of a new cycle. The ceremony I attended is called Hakhel (“to gather” 
in Hebrew). It is not part of Simchat Torah celebrations. In fact, it is not a ceremony that is 
celebrated regularly in Jewish congregations. It is based on an ancient ceremony mentioned in 
the Mishnah. During this ceremony, that took place after the closing of a shmita year, 142 the 
people of Israel assembled at the Temple in Jerusalem on the last day of Sukkot to listen 
collectively to the king reading from the Torah (Rabinowitz 2007). The ritual is based on a 
biblical mitzvah in which Moses commends leaders of the Israelites to assemble all “men, and 
women, and children, and the stranger that is within thy gates” (Deuteronomy 31:12) once every 
seven years to listen to the priests preach the words of God. 
 The Baka Minyan decided to hold a renewed Hakhel ceremony at the end of Sukkot in 
2015, which was after a shmita year. This ceremony holds a special significance to the Baka 
Minyan. They consider the Hakhel mitzvah representative of the communal religiosity they seek 
to create in their congregation, in which women participate as equal members in the 
congregation’s religious life. The shmita year in 2015 was an opportunity for them to celebrate 
this mitzvah and the values it represented.   
 I returned to the prayer hall merely a few hours after the lengthy prayers of Simchat 
Torah ended and was surprised to see that it was already quite full. The mehitza was moved to 
the side, and members, both men and women, sat on plastic chairs arranged in a large circle at 
the middle of the prayer hall. Ronen was about to teach about the mitzvah and ancient ceremony 
of Hakhel. He reviewed the relevant Torah verses and their Talmudic interpretations and 
concluded that “what we are trying to do here is tikkun katan,” to repair the world just a bit. In 
                                                 
142 In Jewish tradition, a Shmita, a sabbatical year, happens once every seven years. According to the 
Bible, in the seventh year all land had to be fallowed and debts were to be remitted (Rothkoff 2007, 623). 
In modern day Israel, some aspects of this mitzvah are observed, particularly regarding the ban on 
farming the land. 
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light of centuries in which women were excluded from their congregations’ religious lives, the 
Baka Minyan refers to the ancient Hakhel ceremony as a model of integrating women into the 
religious community as equal members.  
 After the lesson ended, members stood up and quickly re-arranged the black plastic chairs 
in rows. Someone set up the mehitza along the gymnasium’s half line and drew the curtain. The 
modes had shifted from hol, profane, to kodesh, sacred. The space was now ready for the evening 
prayer. As soon as the prayer, which lasted only ten minutes, ended, the mehitza was once again 
rolled to the side, the chairs pushed back, and a group of young teenage boys with musical 
instruments stepped to the front for a short musical Havdalah (lit. distinction or separation), the 
ceremony at the end of each Shabbat or Holiday distinguishing between sacred times and profane 
ones. Husbands and wives recoupled, children ran around, and friends gathered in small groups. 
The drawing back of the mehitza signaled to everyone that sacred time was over. Gender 
partition was no longer required. Members of the Baka Minyan, therefore, use the mehitza to 
shift quickly between gym and prayer hall, and between secular and sacred modes. By doing so, 
they undermine the assumption that a synagogue is solely a place of religious worship.  
 The mehitza is considered a required component of Orthodox synagogues in Israel. It sets 
essential boundaries between men and women and constructs the synagogue as a “sacred” space. 
In the Baka Minyan, however, the mehitza is important for creating the prayers as 
simultaneously innovative and ordinary. Its unique quality as a “thin boundary” that facilitates 
transgressions allows members to question and critique some aspects of Orthodox religiosity 
while, at the same time, maintaining religious elements which they consider essential in 
Orthodox tradition. 
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“Not Pretty Enough Prayer” –Setting a Familiar Soundscape  
 In the previous chapter, I mentioned that a favorite topic of conversation for residents of 
South Jerusalem was the differences between the congregations in the neighborhood, and what 
those differences meant. In conversations I held with local residents, including with members of 
the Baka Minyan, they often described the Minyan’s prayer style as unexceptional, even 
mundane. A typical communal prayer is accompanied by a constant indistinct chatter of 
congregants, along with a murmur of babies, and the cries of children. The reciting of prayers is 
fast-paced and low-toned. Children run back and forth between the sections. All of these produce 
a soundscape (Hirschkind 2006; Samuels et al. 2010) which evokes what is considered by 
members to be an “ordinary” Israeli prayer. This means that prayers at the Baka Minyan sound 
familiar, culturally speaking, to people who are used to the synagogues of Religious-Zionist 
society.  
An “Israeli” Sounded Prayer 
 When the Baka Minyan first began its communal prayers, they followed the gender 
protocol designed by congregation Shira Hadasha, the first partnership minyan in Israel founded 
in 2002. The Baka Minyan, however, developed a distinct style of prayer that is very different 
from Shira Hadasha’s communal prayers. Shira Hadasha was formed by a group of friends, most 
of whom were first or second generation Jewish American immigrants who were influenced by 
the American feminist movement and by Orthodox Jewish feminism (Teitlbuom 2011). To this 
day, it is attended by many American Jews who either reside in Jerusalem or are visiting town. 
Consequently, it is perceived in south Jerusalem as an “American” congregation. The 
congregation’s emphasis on singing in communal prayers as spiritual practice is part of its 
“American” reputation.  
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 According to Shira Hadasha’s homepage as of 7/9/2019, they approach communal prayer 
as an “aesthetic” and “uplifting spiritual experience.” This approach cannot be farther away from 
what I observed during my fieldwork at the Baka Minyan. The prayers at the Baka Minyan are 
not particularly musical, fervent singing is rare, hand clapping is not very common, and the 
gabbai’im make sure that prayers do not linger too long. Some members told me that they 
wished the prayers were “prettier” and that communal gatherings had a “spiritual atmosphere.” 
Other members, however, are happy with this current matter-of-fact style. For them, the Minyan 
is first and foremost a place of social gathering, of catching up and spending time with friends.  
 How did this plain, matter-of-fact style of prayer take hold in the Baka Minyan? In my 
interview with Ora she told me of a partnership minyan in the United States she and husband 
attended while they lived there for her husband’s academic training. That American minyan had 
influenced how they shaped the new congregation in Baka after they returned to Jerusalem: 
We were influenced by their relaxed atmosphere. When you walked into the synagogue, 
even when a woman led the prayer, it didn’t look different from any other ordinary Israeli 
synagogue. You walk into the synagogue and it looks as if women have been praying like 
this for the past two thousand… It’s not pompous, there is no PR, just a regular prayer. It 
was an eye-opener. Like you see something for the first time and you can’t see reality the 
same again.143 
To Ora, therefore, the American partnership minyan with its “relaxed” style of prayer evoked a 
sense of familiarity she later tried to recreate in Jerusalem. Interestingly, her first encounter with 
a more egalitarian prayer that also felt “Israeli” and familiar was not in her home town of 
                                                 
143 See Hebrew origin in Appendix B, item 13. 
206 
 
Jerusalem, where there was already an active partnership minyan by that time, but across the 
ocean, in the United States.  
 Other members use the discourse of “Israeliness” when they talk about their 
congregation. Eran, a congregation member in his early thirties, explained to me why the Baka 
Minyan appealed to him so much when he first started to attend it nearly a decade ago: 
The style of prayer is Israeli and not American; there isn’t as much singing. It is more “to 
the point,” it does not take as long, it is not over-decorated, it does not stretch like a chewing 
gum… It was the perfect combination, surreal even, between the synagogues I used to pray 
in as a child and a more egalitarian synagogue. It was like a dream, something I always 
wanted and never had.144 
 Eran and Ora identify a plain, matter-of-fact style of prayer as “Israeli,” and a musical, 
festive, and elaborate style as “American.” What sounds “Israeli” to them, is formed by their 
social backgrounds as individuals who grew up in Religious-Zionist settings in Israel.  
Discussions about which congregation is “Israeli” and which is foreign or “American” 
are political, of course. In Israeli Orthodox popular imagination, “American” religiosity is 
conflated with Reform or Conservative religiosity (Sztokman 2011, 171), which in their eyes 
evokes cultural connotations of non-legitimate religiosity (Ferziger 2014). In the Israeli context, 
dubbing a certain type of religious practice as “American,” therefore, deems it not only foreign 
but also illegitimate. By talking about their congregation as “Israeli,” members of the Baka 
Minyan differentiate themselves from “American” congregations and, indirectly, legitimize their 
own congregation.  
                                                 
144 See Hebrew origin in Appendix B, item 14. 
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 As I mentioned earlier, not all members are happy with the congregation’s prayer style. 
Avigail, for example, told me that, in her opinion, too much attention is given to the question of 
gender equality during prayers and not enough attention to how the congregation prays. I argue, 
however, that the congregation’s casual prayer style is not a result of lack of attention but a 
deliberate, albeit informal, decision made early on by members of the founding group in an effort 
to create a congregation that is innovative in terms of women’s participation and yet not 
revolutionary and, above all, legitimate by Israeli Orthodox standards. The soundscape of the 
communal prayers plays a key role in manufacturing this sense of legitimate Israeli religiosity.  
Children Friendly Prayer 
 Services at the Baka Minyan are also known as particularly friendly to children. During 
prayers, children constantly run between rows of chairs, and cross back and forth between the 
sections in search of a playmate, parental attention, or a snack. Children also enjoy climbing the 
pile of exercise mats that is stacked at the back corner of the women’s section and they do it 
throughout the prayer services. When children’s’ cries and talk become too loud one of the 
gabbai’im voices a loud sshhh, usually with no notable impact. The commotion of children, 
therefore, is part of the soundscape of prayers.  
 The quietest times during prayers are after Shacharit on Shabbat mornings when the main 
gabbai’it calls out, “children’s service in the lobby.” Her announcement initiates a caravan of 
children escorted by their parents out of the prayer hall and into the lobby of the building. Once 
in the lobby, children and parents sit down on the floor in a large circle and a volunteer 
congregation member leads the children’s service. This service is a combination of simplified 
stories about the weekly portion and some songs. While this happens, the remaining congregants 
in the main hall continue with Musaf prayer, the additional prayer of Shabbat’s morning service.  
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 The children’s service is famed across the neighborhood and some families even come 
especially for it, without attending the main service. In addition, the congregation holds a special 
prayer every August to celebrate with the children who begin first grade. The congregation’s 
celebrations of the holidays of Purim and Israeli Independence Day are also popular 
neighborhood events, and many families who are not regular members attend them particularly 
because they are oriented toward children. 
 The “noise” of children – their cries, talk, play, and babble – is part of the “ordinary” 
soundscape of prayer. Children’s prominent presence in the congregation’s communal prayers 
shapes the prayers as family-oriented and, thus, normative. Considering the strong emphasis on 
pro-natalism in Jewish Israeli society and particularly in Orthodox society (El-Or 2002; Kahn 
2000; Teman 2010), the minyan’s policy to accommodate children and their “noise” during 
prayers establishes the congregation as normative and its communal prayers as events that are 
part of daily life, not outside of it. 
 The soundscape during prayers allows members to produce and experience their prayers 
as genuinely “Israeli.” The congregation’s Israeliness is established by emphasizing similarities 
to other Religious-Zionist synagogues in Israel and marking their difference from “American” 
congregations that are perceived in the wider Religious-Zionist society as foreign to Israeli 
Orthodox culture. This soundscape, however, is different in one substantial respect from 
members’ childhood synagogues: in the centrality of women’s and girls’ voices during the 
communal prayers. In some prayers, women’s voices rise loud and clear from the women’s 
section and the bimah, and outvoice the men. Some central prayers, like Yom Kippur’s Kol 
Nidrei, have been led by women since the foundation of the Minyan and this would not happen 
at a typical Israeli Orthodox synagogue. On Shabbat services, it is usually young girls, and not 
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boys, who are honored and called up to sing the piyut, a liturgical poem, which closes the 
communal prayer.  
 To Ora and Eran, the “ordinariness” of communal prayers at the Baka Minyan is due to 
its similarity to typical Ashkenazi, Religious-Zionist synagogues, but it is also due to the 
incorporation of women. While in Orthodox Jewish tradition, women are not allowed to sing in 
front of men, let alone in synagogue, to members of the Baka Minyan, women’s voices in public 
religious ceremonies are as ordinary as women’s voices in their work places, on the bus, and as 
news broadcasters, school teachers, professors, or Knesset members.  
Therefore, what is produced and experienced as “ordinary” by congregation members 
encompasses nontraditional gender roles by the standards of most Orthodox Jews in Israel. The 
incorporation of women into the religious routines of the congregation assigns new meanings to 
traditional Orthodox categories. In traditional Orthodox Judaism these roles are exclusive to men 
as they, and they alone, are considered individuals with religious agency. In the Baka Minyan, 
however, the definition of who counts as a person of religious agency has been modified to 
include women. An “ordinary” prayer is a prayer that includes women and is led by women. The 
Minyan’s prayers are, thus, ordinary yet innovative. 
 As my discussion of the landscape and soundscape of communal prayers shows, 
innovations to communal prayers in this congregation are enabled by elements that are 
considered “traditional” in Israeli-Orthodox terms, and that facilitate the production of the 
minyan as an “ordinary” congregation. However, the ordinariness of the minyan is not universal; 
it is considered ordinary in a Religious-Zionist, Israeli-born, Ashkenazi, and family-centered 
context. By framing their religious practices as “ordinary,” congregation members also highlight 
what is considered “not ordinary.” They apply their Orthodox toolkit to create “embodied 
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spaces” that are shaped by members’ gender-egalitarian values, beliefs and lifestyles and, at the 
same time, produce religiosity that is experienced and understood as socially legitimate. By 
doing so, they challenge prominent perceptions of religiosity within Israel’s Orthodox Jewish 
society while, at the same time, reaffirming who is “in” and who is still considered “out of 
bounds.” 
Conclusion 
 Like the liberal observant activists whom I discuss in chapters two and three, members of 
the Baka Minyan seek to redefine who can count as a religious Jew in Israel today. Unlike them, 
however, most Minyan members do not view their enterprise as political. To them, the Minyan is 
first and foremost a place where they hang out with friends, a place where they can be 
themselves among similar others. Long-time members still think of their congregation as a small, 
local prayer group although it has not been so for several years. However, whether intentionally 
or not, members of the Baka Minyan have created a political place. Their Shabbat services, 
holiday celebrations, and tzedakah activities are political endeavors. They are political because 
members articulate what it means to them to be a religious person in Israel through “private” 
aspects of communal life. In this case, the “scaling down” of public Judaism is done through the 
religious and social life of a congregation.  
As I have shown in this chapter, members of the Baka Minyan construct their 
congregation as a “private” space, and this perceived privacy allows them to experiment with 
political, social, and religious questions of public significance. However, what happens in their 
prayer hall is not as private as they envision it. Their congregation grew to be one of the largest, 
most established partnership minyans in Israel. Moreover, members of the Baka Minyan are 
positioned high in the social hierarchy of Orthodox society in Israel. They are Ashkenazi, 
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educated, and middle-class. What they deem as legitimate religiosity has an authoritative element 
to it. The hundreds of congregants that pack the Minyan’s prayer hall on the Jewish High 
Holidays demonstrate that their formula of “innovative ordinariness” works. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE SCALING DOWN OF PUBLIC JUDAISM AND RELIGIOUS-ZIONIST 
CITIZENSHIP  
 The time of national commemoration days comes as spring nears its end in Israel. First, 
there is Holocaust Memorial Day, then Memorial Day for Israel’s Fallen Soldiers, and the 
following day – Israel’s Independence Day. This temporal flow is meant to convey a national 
narrative of sacrifice and revival or redemption (Handelman and Katz 1990, 198). As a person 
who grew up in Israel, I have become weary of this national narrative and have mostly stayed 
away from organized commemoration ceremonies.  
When I first heard of the Zikaron BaSalon (“Commemorating in the Living Room”) 
project, I was not very interested. It was probably another version of the replicated national 
ceremonies that did not speak to me, I thought. These living room commemorations, initiated in 
2010 by a non-for-profit organization, take place in private homes that function as “open houses” 
for one night, during which people were invited to listen to a testimony of a Holocaust survivor 
in a home setting and then ask questions and hold discussions.  
When I was doing fieldwork in South Jerusalem on Holocaust Memorial Day in May 
2016, I began hearing of commemoration ceremonies in living rooms across the neighborhood. 
First, one ceremony, and then another one, and then another. Despite the intimate, unofficial 
setting of this initiative I was still uninterested. As a fieldworker, however, I sensed that there 
was something significant about the multiplicity of these ceremonies in such a small 
geographical area, and I wanted to learn more. 
 The week of Holocaust Memorial Day, the weekly email from the Baka Minyan included 
a brief invitation from a family in the community to attend a Living Room Commemoration 
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event at their home. I knew this family quite well. The couple was approximately my age, in 
their late 30s, and had four young children. I met the woman, Avigail, a couple of months earlier 
for an interview, and I felt that we “clicked.” Although we grew up in very different places – I in 
a secular kibbutz and she in a Religious-Zionist home in Jerusalem – the life experiences she 
described felt familiar. Like me, she was in high school when Prime Minister Rabin was 
assassinated by a religious Jewish man. As a Religious-Zionist woman, she felt she could no 
longer identify with the Religious-Zionist camp after the assassination, and she set out on a 
journey to search for her place in Israeli society. Like me, she travelled to India after her military 
service as part of this search.  
After her return to Israel, she continued to ask questions and doubt the social and 
religious conventions of Religious-Zionist society. She studied Jewish education from a pluralist 
perspective and has worked in non-Orthodox Jewish schools. Eventually, she found her place in 
a religious environment: she married a man who, like her, grew up in a liberal Orthodox 
household, settled in a neighborhood with liberal religious orientation, and became a regular 
member in the Baka Minyan. Currently, she told me, she does not accept social categories of 
religiosity “as is.” She views Jewish religiosity as a spectrum rather than as solidified, 
dichotomous categories. She identifies as a religious woman, but she does not care for definitions 
such as Orthodox, Reform, or Conservative. For her, definitions are less important than forming 
alliances among Jews – Orthodox, masorti (traditional), or secular – who hold the “right social 
view,” and who have a “genuine, strong will to do good in the world,” as she put it. 
 When I saw the invitation she and her husband, Nathan, extended through the 
congregation’s weekly email, I decided to go. I asked Tamara, my housemate, if she wanted to 
join me. Then I learned that Tamara knew the couple. She studied at the Hebrew University with 
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Nathan when they were in their early 20s, and for a while they belonged to the same social circle 
of young, liberal, and dati men and women in South Jerusalem (Engelberg 2016).  
 On a chilly May evening, the evening of Holocaust Memorial Day, Tamara and I set out 
for Avigail’s home. It was a short walk, merely ten minutes away from our Katamon apartment. 
We arrived at the building and climbed the short staircase that led to their apartment. The door to 
the apartment was wide open. We walked in, straight into their living room. It was my second 
time in the apartment. I was there for the first time when I interviewed Avigail so I was able to 
appreciate the modifications she and Nathan made to the living room to accommodate that 
night’s guests. All the furniture, other than a large couch, were removed from the living room 
and were replaced by a circle of chairs. There were only a few people present when Tamara and I 
walked in. Over the next ten minutes or so, more people trickled in. It seemed that some of them 
knew Avigail and Nathan. I recognized two other women, regular members at the Baka Minyan, 
who greeted me. Other guests, however, did not know the hosts. They arrived at this event after 
searching for a Commemoration in the Living Room event in the neighborhood.  
 The premise of these events is to offer people, not necessarily those who knew one 
another, “a new, meaningful and intimate way to commemorate this day and address its 
implications through discussions at home among family, friends and guests” (Zikaron BaSalon, 
n.d.). The organization connects a family who wishes to host an event with people who seek to 
attend one. The organization also helps in pairing hosts with Holocaust survivors who wish to 
tell their stories. Some hosts do not require the organization’s help in finding a speaker and host 
a family member or an acquaintance who survived the Holocaust. 
 In the event I attended at Avigail’s home, the speaker was an elderly woman who 
survived the Holocaust as a toddler. After she told her story, there was time for guests to ask her 
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questions. Then, Avigail announced a break and invited us to regather in fifteen minutes for a 
sing-along, led by Nathan and his guitar, of Israeli songs that had become identified with 
Holocaust Memorial Day. After the sing-along, there would be a discussion in which guests were 
invited to talk about what the Holocaust Memorial Day meant to them. I didn’t stay until the end 
of the evening. It was already quite late, and Tamara wanted to go back to the apartment. We 
thanked Avigail, who seemed disappointed that we were leaving, and headed back home. 
 I didn’t think much more about this evening at that time. It was not a “religious” event, so 
I did not know how, and if, it was even relevant to my fieldwork. I was interested in the 
religiosity of my interlocutors, and the Commemoration in the Living Room event had nothing to 
do with religiosity, I thought. I assumed that that night was part of the Zionist ritual of 
commemorating the Holocaust; it was not about being a religious Jew.  
 I began to think about this night differently when Tamara hosted a Tikkun at our living 
room a few weeks later, on Shavu’ot night. Tamara prepared a short study on a Shavu’ot-related 
topic and invited a few of her friends to do the same. She then advertised the plan for this night 
of study among her friends and invited them to drop by during the night to participate in the 
study sessions. I then realized that along the Tikkunim that were held in synagogues and prayer 
halls of religious congregations in the neighborhood there was a proliferation of home-based 
Tikkunim, like Tamara’s tikkun, in which friends gathered to study together. There was even a 
non-for-profit organization that facilitated these living-room study sessions by providing a study 
kit and a cheesecake (a traditional Shavu’ot food) for people who were interested in hosting a 
Tikkun and were not knowledgeable enough to design a study session on their own.145  
                                                 
145 The activity of this organization, called “929” after the number of Bible chapters, is focused on 
engaging Jews of all orientations with Biblical texts, alone or in groups, by offering structured online 
study plans. According to 929 website (as of 7/12/2018), the people who build the study plans’ contents 
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 I began that Shavu’ot night by visiting several Tikkunim in congregations around the 
neighborhood. When I got back home, well past midnight, our living room was still packed with 
friends of Tamara who were in the middle of a study. Most of them were, like Tamara, liberal 
observant Jews in their 30s. I stayed until the final study session at 4 AM and went to bed. The 
following morning, I wrote field notes on the Shavu’ot events I attended. This is what I wrote 
about Tamara’s living room tikkun: 
As I was sitting in our living room, I was reminded of the Commemoration in the Living 
Room at Avigail and Nathan’s home. In both events, people reclaimed public ceremonies 
and performed them in the privacy of their homes. What does it have to do with the 
“privatization” of the Chief Rabbinate that organizations like Ne’emanei Torah Ve’Avoda 
advocate for? These are very different platforms with different objectives. Nevertheless, 
they are based on a common premise of “reclaiming Judaism,” as Ilan defined it when I 
interviewed him in his ITIM office. In these initiatives [i.e. the living room ceremonies and 
the organizational efforts to privatize religious institutions] Jewish citizens formulate their 
own Jewishness instead of taking for granted institutional formulations. (Fieldnotes, 
6/12/2016) 146 
 Although Avigail’s way of commemorating Holocaust Memorial Day was not directly 
part of her religious life, in an implicit way it was. In my interview with her, she described her 
winding road out of and back into Jewish religious society. She found a place in South Jerusalem 
in a religious environment that allowed her to question religious conventions and craft her own 
way of being a religious woman by searching and experimenting. I never asked her about her 
                                                                                                                                                             
and facilitate the organization’s activity are of diverse religious backgrounds and their mission is to make 
the Bible accessible to Israelis of all Jewish orientations. 
146 See Hebrew origin in Appendix B, item 15. 
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decision to host these living-room commemoration events, but I take ethnographic liberties to 
interpret this decision as related to her wider worldview and practices of searching and 
questioning, rather than of accepting social conventions as given. 
 My ethnographic hunch was corroborated the following year, when three additional 
families from the Baka Minyan opened their homes for a Living Room Commemoration event 
on Holocaust Memorial Day. They hosted events centered on testimonies of family members. 
Therefore, the “reclaiming” of public Jewish-Israeli rituals, and their re-articulation in a private 
setting of the home, was not specific to Avigail. It seemed that this opportunity to re-appropriate 
a public ritual that is so central to the collective identity of Israeli Jews and to redesign it in a 
home setting appealed to members of the Baka Minyan, whose religious congregation is based 
on an ethos of religious autonomy. The same way they chose how to re-design their communal 
prayers, they chose their way of commemorating the Holocaust.  
 In the case of Living Room Commemorations, these were not completely autonomous or 
independent endeavors. After all, there is an organization, unrelated to the Baka Minyan or to 
South Jerusalem, which started this initiative and facilitated these events across Israel. 147 
Nevertheless, I argue that liberal observant Jews in South Jerusalem find these “do-it-yourself” 
commemoration ceremonies particularly appealing because of their self-perception as Israeli 
Jews who do not take institutional definitions of Judaism for granted, and who always question 
and challenge these definitions. Members of the Baka Minyan who hosted their relatives as 
speakers connected to the national narrative of Holocaust Memorial Day through the particular 
and personal story of their families.  
                                                 
147 There is nothing in the organization’s website that implies that the founders of this organization are of 
religious background. As far as I can tell, they are not.  
218 
 
 These ceremonies, therefore, are avenues for liberal observant Jews to articulate what it 
means to them to be Israeli citizens. Their citizenship is not prescribed by official public 
ceremonies organized by government or municipal bureaucrats. Instead, they shape their 
citizenship as Israeli-Jews on their home turf. Their rejection of institutional versions of Judaism 
is parallel to their rejection of institutional ways of being Israeli. In this sense, their belonging to 
an imagined community of Jewish-Israeli citizens is being shaped by their identification as 
liberal observant Jews. They carry out this belonging with the same tools that they use to carry 
out their belonging to the community of religious Jews in Israel – by claiming autonomy and 
authority over designing their Jewishness and Israeli-ness. 
A New Religious-Zionist Citizenship  
This concluding chapter makes connections between the instances of scaled down public 
Judaism I presented in chapters two to five by highlighting the common thread of citizenship. In 
previous chapters, I have argued that, as they scale down public Judaism, liberal observant Jews 
assign new meanings to communities: they treat communities as places that replace some of the 
functions of formal religious authorities (either the institutions of the state or Religious-Zionist 
rabbinical leaders). Chapter two depicts alternative, community-based projects that aim to 
replace the centralized services of the Chief Rabbinate. Chapter three accompanies non-
governmental activists in their efforts to increase the religious freedom and autonomy of Israeli 
Jews. Chapter four portrays how residents of a Jerusalem neighborhood construct it as a place of 
public religiosity that replaces national frames of belonging. Finally, chapter five shows how 
members of a liberal observant congregation exercise innovative halakhic autonomy while 
striving to remain within Religious-Zionist boundaries of social legitimacy.  
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I argue that in all these projects liberal observant Jews express a new mode of Religious-
Zionist citizenship. This mode is composed of the same building blocks as “traditional” 
Religious-Zionist citizenship – i.e., a commitment to the Jewish state and its Jewish people – but 
it is invested in communal and local frames rather than in national ones.  
The projects I describe in this dissertation are acts of civil participation in which liberal 
observant Jews undermine formal narratives about halakhic Judaism. Since halakhic Judaism has 
been the “official” religion of the state since its founding (Ben-Porat 2013), debates about what it 
is and who gets to decide about it are inseparable from questions of citizenship. The citizenship 
of my interlocutors – their attitudes toward the Israeli state and toward their participation in the 
Jewish collectivity in Israel – is shaped by their religious identities, ethnicity, and class 
positioning. Their religiosity is the medium in which they negotiate their social belonging and 
membership in Jewish-Israeli society and “make” themselves Religious-Zionist subjects.  
As I have outlined in the first chapter, my discussion relies on anthropological views of 
citizenship as an ongoing process of social negotiation, identification, and “self-making.” 
According to this anthropological perspective, the citizenship of any social group is shaped by 
their position within social matrixes of racial, ethnic, social-economic, and gender hierarchies. 
To understand this new Religious-Zionist citizenship of liberal observant Jews, it is important to 
situate it within Israel’s Jewish citizenship regime. 
Being recognized as Jewish in Israel entails access to symbolic capital, as Judaism is the 
religion of Israel’s dominant national group. Jewish citizens are privileged over non-Jewish 
citizens within the area of the sovereign state of Israel (as Palestinians, Druze, and Bedouins) in 
relation to allocation of resources by state and para-state institutions, as explained by Shafir and 
Peled (2002). Further hierarchies within the Jewish population stratify citizens’ access to social, 
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economic, and political resources based on class positioning, ethnicity, gender, and level of 
religious observance (Shafir and Peled 2002). Therefore, some Jewish identities are “worth 
more” than others. Being considered Orthodox (but not ultra-Orthodox) entails social legitimacy 
and capital in Orthodox Jewish society and Israeli society in general, as Ferziger (2014) and 
Tabory (2004) argue. 
Acknowledging that one’s religiosity has implications over one’s access to social 
resources and to symbolic capital is important to understanding the motivations of my 
interlocutors. It explains their insistence that their reforms are commensurate with halakhic 
principles as well as their “nonrevolutionary” inclination to follow foundational halakhic norms. 
Shafir and Peled’s model also stresses the significance of social class and ethnicity. As I describe 
in previous chapters, most of my interlocutors belong to dominant social groups: they are of 
Ashkenazi background, middle-class, and have higher than average education. They have a lot to 
lose, therefore, by “falling out” of the Orthodox camp, as Oded, one of my interlocutors at the 
Baka Minyan, described it. Moreover, as I describe in the first chapter, my interlocutors belong 
to the “new Religious-Zionist middle class” (Leon 2010). These Religious-Zionists veer away 
from the original revolutionary ethos of Religious-Zionism and privilege financial security and 
stability (ibid). This is particularly true of my interlocutors who belong to the liberal stream of 
Religious-Zionism, which is characterized by political and ideological moderation (Fischer 
2012).  
All these variables, I argue, factor into the way my interlocutors constitute their 
citizenship. On the one hand, their approach to halakhic Judaism, religious authority, and the 
religious institution of the state is subversive. They claim authority and autonomy over deciding 
what halakhic Judaism is instead of accepting institutional definitions and societal conventions of 
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it. On the other hand, their commitments correspond with the hegemonic national narrative about 
Israel as a Jewish state, and about halakhic Judaism as its national religiosity. 
I argue that my interlocutors’ mode of citizenship represents a new Religious-Zionist 
citizenship. First, their emphasis on communities as the new loci of religious authority allows 
them to fulfill their Religious-Zionist “vocation” of contributing to the state and to the Jewish 
people while expressing their critique of dominant state and social institutions. Their way of 
negotiating their belonging to the national body of Israeli Jews and their relation to the Israeli 
state is shaped by their Religious-Zionist “DNA.” Yet, they express it in a new way – by 
investing these national sentiments in communities rather than in wider national or societal 
frames.  
Secondly, it is a Religious-Zionist citizenship because it is shaped by my interlocutors’ 
interpretation of Judaism and Zionism, and their understanding of the interrelations between the 
two. To them, the establishing of local and communal frameworks in which people can decide on 
their Jewishness, rather than depend on formal religious authorities that make those decisions for 
them, is the “right” thing to do – halakhically and civically.  
As I have shown in the previous chapters, my interlocutors argue that their support of a 
democratic, pluralistic, and autonomous Judaism is rooted in Talmudic Judaism that allowed 
halakhic heterogeneity, and in the decentralized Jewish world of pre-modern times. In this sense, 
their privileging of communal frameworks of civil engagement is entangled with their outlook on 
Judaism. They articulate their “good citizenship” – that is, their concern for the future of 
democracy and Judaism in Israel – vis-à-vis practicing and promoting greater religious autonomy 
and heterogeneity that, to them, represent “true” halakhic Judaism. Their actions, therefore, 
represent enactments of Israeli citizenship that are informed by their religious worldviews.  
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This argument is illustrated by the words of one of my key interlocutors – Ilan from 
ITIM. In my interview with him in May 2016, he told me:  
It is true that we need a functioning religious establishment but not one that determines for 
people their Jewishness. Israel’s religious establishment in its current form, its essence, 
undermines its goal. Fewer and fewer women are willing to use the state’s mikva’ot because 
of the Rabbinate, because of how they are treated there. Women come here [to ITIM] and 
tell us these things. We want to ensure that every woman who wishes to immerse herself in 
the mikveh can do so. Therefore, undermining the religious monopoly in Israel only 
strengthens Jewish life in Israel, while the religious establishment undermines Jewish life in 
Israel. I believe whole-heartedly that strengthening individual rights goes hand in hand with 
living a complete, wholesome, meaningful, and true Jewish life in Israel.148  
This excerpt shows that Ilan’s activism is, to him, an expression of “good citizenship” that is 
informed by his liberal-observant outlook on Judaism. 
 “Help Us Return Sovereignty to the Community”  
One of the most vivid illustrations of my point about the new Religious-Zionist 
citizenship of liberal observant Jews can be found on the website of Ne’emanei Torah Ve’Avoda 
(NTA) whose initiative to democratize the religious institutions of the state I discuss in chapter 
two. In my discussion of this initiative, I briefly mentioned a “pilot” program that NTA initiated 
together with a regional council in northern Israel to test their Democratic-Communal Model. 
The organization produced a short video that portrays this pilot program (“Discover the Pilot 
Project: The Democratic Communal Model,” 6/8/2015, https://youtu.be/lL-K_DxA6-k). 
                                                 
148 See Hebrew origin in Appendix B, item 16. 
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Against pastoral images of green, cleanly-mowed lawns and harvested fields, groups of 
men and women circle each other in an Israeli folk dance, and parents appear strolling peacefully 
with their toddlers, a male narrator says: “Cultural and social anchors connect an individual to 
the community, create a rich social fabric, and a sense of belonging. In Israel, the religious 
budget earmarked to finance Jewish culture in the community are controlled and distributed from 
above by the government and are, therefore, insensitive to the needs of the local communities.” 
The narrator then presents NTA’s Democratic-Communal Model as a “new agenda for the 
relationship between state and religion in Israel based on a broad fundamental agreement in order 
to make Israel a more Jewish and democratic state,” as an image of two girls flapping Israeli 
flags fills up the screen. The camera then zooms-in on Dr. Hadar Lifshitz, the author of the 
organization’s “Communal Model.” One can tell he is a Religious-Zionist man by his knitted 
kippa. Dr. Lifshitz explains that, according to this model, the state would give budgets to 
communities, and community members would decide how to use it. “Thus, the community 
develops, and people make it their home,” he declares.  
The Head Rabbi of the regional council also vouches for the benefits of this model. His 
appearance is of a Religious-Zionist rabbi of a conservative orientation (i.e., not from the liberal 
circles of Religious-Zionism). His beard is trimmed, and he wears a black jacket and a large dark 
kippa. He says to the camera, “The freedom to choose a place in Judaism is a critical choice in 
twenty-first century Israel, and the state must make it possible,” and the narrator explains that 
allowing members to design their Jewish culture would help people feel more “connected.”  
In the video, residents of the regional council, who are seemed to be secular Israelis, 
corroborate this statement with their personal stories. A community organizer in one of the rural 
settlements in the region says, “Our community initiates activities with a Jewish identity and 
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character… these activities tie the individual to the community and to his Jewish identity and 
roots. The community profits from it.” A young man, a resident of a secular kibbutz, is shown in 
the video playing with his toddler daughter and then singing on a stage and lighting-up Hanukah 
candles in a community event. He then says to the camera, “when I’m given the freedom of 
choice I feel like I belong to a community. I can connect with traditions and with Judaism in my 
own way.” The Democratic-Communal Model, therefore, aims to benefit communities by 
helping them to “develop,” and individuals by providing them with meaningful units of social 
belonging. 
According to the video, communal Judaism is the medium through which the model 
improves the lives of Israeli Jews. Ultimately, stronger Jewish communities with members who 
have a stronger sense of affiliation and belonging would lead to a stronger Jewish state. Shmuel 
Shattach, the CEO of NTA, says as the video approaches its end: “We truly believe that this can 
only be good for Judaism in the State of Israel.” As the final tunes die out, the logo of the 
Democratic-Communal Model fills up the screen and the narrator concludes, “Help us return 
sovereignty to the community!” 
This four-minute-long video demonstrates that NTA members seek to strengthen the state 
by focusing on local communities. It is a model of citizenship that treats community-building as 
a form of nation-building. This video illustrates my argument that the scaling down of Judaism is 
not liberal religious-Zionists’ “retreat” from the state but a re-arrangement of their commitments 
to the Israeli state and to its Jewish society in new settings. 
The democratic and “liberal” toolkits of my interlocutors (which they often present as 
stemming from their view of halakha) is utilized to bring to life a Jewish state that will be 
genuinely Jewish, in their view, because it will enable a voluntary participation of a greater 
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portion of Israeli Jews in Jewish public life. While in popular debates about religion and state in 
Israel, halakhic Judaism and democracy are viewed as contradictory and even antithetical to each 
other, my interlocutors advocate for greater religious authority for Israeli Jews that would, 
eventually, bring to life a Jewish state that is “truly” democratic.  
The Scaling Down of Public Judaism: A Conclusion 
Earlier in this chapter I addressed how the different ethnographic cases in chapters two to 
five speak to the question of citizenship. In the following paragraphs, I reiterate how the process 
of “scaling down” of public Judaism gets formulated in different sites and scales in each of these 
chapters. Chapter two focuses on liberal observant activists that have founded organized 
alternatives to the religious services of the Chief Rabbinate. These activists envision changing 
the locus of religious authority – from centralized, state-administered services to decentralized, 
community-based services. I demonstrate ways that these initiatives represent activists’ 
engagement with ideas about pluralistic, voluntarist religious life in the United States. 
 Chapter three analyzes the activism of ITIM, a liberal Orthodox NGO that was founded 
by an Israeli-American rabbi with an explicit objective to reform the religious institutions of the 
state. Although the organization’s activism operates within the political arena of state 
institutions, it is nevertheless focusing on the “personal.” I argue that the activism of leading 
figures in the organization is “affective activism” in its implicit aim to bring to life an Israel in 
which they, as liberal observant Jews, have a more central place. I show how in their activities 
for reform, they work to facilitate the religious autonomy of Israeli Jews. In doing so, they strive 
to make public Judaism a “personal” matter. 
 Chapter four looks at a South Jerusalem neighborhood that is the home of a large 
community of liberal observant Jews. I demonstrate how the plethora of liberal religious 
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congregations that cater to the same crowd and are within walking distance of one another form a 
pluralist religious “marketplace.” I describe how residents of this neighborhood enact their ways 
of being liberal and observant in their day-to-day lives and in public event. By doing so, they 
create their neighborhood as a new Jewish “public square” that, in some ways, replaces national 
frameworks of social belonging and identification. 
 Chapter five examines communal debates about ritual change at the Baka Minyan – a 
liberal and halakha-observing congregation in South Jerusalem. In those debates, Minyan 
members assume religious authority and autonomy in matters that are commonly perceived in 
Orthodox society as belonging to the jurisdiction of rabbinical leaders. I argue that members’ 
willingness to demonstrate halakhic innovations is influenced by their perception that their 
congregation is an intimate, almost private, setting, and by their bodily sensations of what feels 
like an “ordinary” religiosity.  
 These distinct yet interrelated instances illustrate how liberal observant Jews express their 
religious-Zionist commitment to “large-place” Israel (Gurevtich 2007) – that is, to the idea of 
Israel as a place where Jewish life thrives at the societal and national levels – by working to 
reinvigorate public Jewish life in “small-place” Israel, that is, in concrete local and communal 
places.  
In other words, as Religious-Zionists, they are committed to the idea of Israel as a Jewish 
state. As liberal Israelis, they are disappointed in the kind of Jewish state Israel has become. 
Their solution to this dilemma is by carrying out their Religious-Zionist citizenship in local 
settings.  
In chapters two and three I demonstrated that the initiatives of liberal observant Jews are 
shaped by their notions of civil participation in US public and religious life. The “American 
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connection” is prominent throughout my field, and a few of my US-born interlocutors function 
as “cultural brokers” within liberal Religious-Zionist society in Israel. Although the “American” 
influence was not equally central in all my field sites, it is significant nevertheless. Considering 
their disappointment with the way the Israeli state has dealt so far with public Judaism, my 
interlocutors turn to alternative models. Ironically, one of the models in which they find 
inspiration resides in the “diaspora” – in the American Jewish world.   
The case I study shows that the decline of formal religious authority, a process that has 
thus far in Israel been called “secularization” (Ben-Porat 2013), is not restricted to secularism. It 
can also be part of a process of religious change. Like the secular agents of change that have 
created secular spaces in Israel without altering the religious infrastructure of the state (Ben-
Porat 2013), my religious interlocutors promote a public Judaism that is focused on communities 
without undermining the hegemonic premise of Israel as a Jewish state.  
 This leads me to my point about the “nonrevolutionary” aspect of these initiatives. As I 
have argued in my discussions of the activism of ITIM and the “ordinary innovativeness” of the 
Baka Minyan, my interlocutors in these sites strive to lead reforms that entail, at times, a radical 
shift in common perceptions of halakhic Judaism. However, they resist labeling themselves 
“revolutionaries” and reject being labeled as such by others. At the end of the day, as Rinat from 
the Baka Minyan told me, they are not only innovators but also bourgeois. Nevertheless, 
considering that attempts to modify the religion-state status quo from outside Orthodox society 
have not succeeded in generating any substantial change, the “nonrevolutionary revolution” of 
liberal observant Jews might have the potential to bring about social change.   
This nonrevolutionary orientation accounts, I think, for an aspect of my field that 
surprised and puzzled me at first. I refer here to the scarcity of explicit discussions about Israeli 
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policies toward the Palestinian citizens of Israel and in the West Bank and in Gaza. I knew that 
some of my interlocutors are active in various peace initiatives and in organizations that are 
critical of Israeli policies toward the Palestinians and that a few of them had even founded such 
organizations. The Baka Minyan, as I describe in chapter five, has a reputation as a “leftist” 
congregation but its members rarely address contemporary political issues in their congregation’s 
formal events. Similarly, I do not recall hearing any of ITIM’s activists mention the implications 
of the Jewish-Orthodox monopoly for Israel’s non-Jewish populations (such as Palestinians, 
Bedouins, and Druze). The Knesset conference on “alternative marriage in Israel,” for instance, 
which I mention in chapter three, did not include any references to non-Jewish marriage or to 
interfaith marriage in Israel. ITIM’s activism has always remained within the boundaries of 
Israel’s Jewish society.  
On the surface, this “silence,” I suggest, is related to the “nonrevolutionary” orientation 
of their projects. In today’s Israel, taking a public stand against Israel’s policies towards the 
Palestinians involves social sanctions. It is risky. Overall, the liberal observant Jews I study 
strive to make a change but also to do it from within Religious-Zionist society. In order to do so, 
their actions cannot be too controversial, too radical. 
On a deeper level, however, this “silence” is essentially related to the “scaling down” 
aspect of their projects, to their reimaging of Jewish collectivities in Israel. As I have shown 
throughout this dissertation, communities play a central role in this re-envisioning. Jewish 
citizens, according to them, should be able to engage with public Judaism freely, actively, and in 
a personal, unmediated way. In their vision, this kind of voluntary and devoted civil participation 
relies on strong, cohesive communities.  
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The Baka Minyan is an example of a communal project that already functions this way: it 
is a community that enables members to creatively experiment with religious authority and, as 
importantly, provides them a strong sense of belonging. In my interview with Ora she told me 
that several members of the congregation told her that when presenting themselves to new 
people, they always mention their membership in the Minyan early on in the conversation. She 
has always found it interesting, she said, that their membership in a congregation, “that takes 
about four hours of their week has become such a significant component of their identity.”  
I suggest that the relative “silence” of my interlocutors (across my field sites) in relation 
to Jewish-Palestinian politics demonstrates that their aim to (re)position Jewish communities in 
Israel as the most meaningful unit of belonging and identification is entwined with a focus on 
“us” that often erases the concerns and needs of the “Other.”  
And this brings me back to my ultimate argument in this dissertation, that struggles for 
social change are sites in which people negotiate the meaning of “tradition.” The struggles for 
social and religious change that I depict in this dissertation are done in the name of “tradition.” In 
some of these cases, “tradition” means the historic Jewish world that existed before the founding 
of the modern state of Israel. In the Jewish world of the past, according to my interlocutors, 
communities were the primary religious unit and there was greater room for religious pluralism 
and heterogeneity. I heard versions of this argument from the activists of NTA who advance 
democratizing the Chief Rabbinate (chapter two); from the activists who have founded 
alternative procedures for Jewish conversion (chapter two); and from community-building 
activists in South Jerusalem (chapter four).  
In other cases, my interlocutors have turned to halakha in their activities for social and 
religious change. This is evident in ITIM’s efforts to reform the religious institutions of the state 
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(chapter three); and in the conviction of members of the Baka Minyan that their commitment to 
gender equality has halakhic justifications (chapter five). Their reaching to a Jewish past in their 
efforts to validate their practices and beliefs in the present and to bring-about future change 
demonstrates that “tradition” is, more than anything else, an arena of social contestation.  
In social and religious change in Jewish communities, the selective reinterpretation and 
re-utilization of “traditional” texts, objects, and practices has played a central role (Ochs 2007; 
Satlow 2006). Satlow (2006) highlights the central role of the Jewish textual canon in the 
formation of a discourse about tradition in Jewish communities through history (ibid, 850). I 
agree with his discursive analysis of Judaism, yet I highlight ways that social actors’ 
subjectivities shape their discourse of “tradition.” To my liberal observant interlocutors, Jewish 
“tradition” is not a resource they utilize to promote change; it is their way of being in the world. 
ITIM activists fashion their reforms based on their self-identification as halakha-observing Jews 
and their self-perception as members of a society that is guided by halakha. Similarly, members 
of the Baka Minyan modify their communal prayers according to what “feels” to them like 
“traditional” Jewish prayer. As I have shown throughout this dissertation, what liberal observant 
Jews view as “traditional” is very much dependent on their personal histories, either as Israel-
born Religious-Zionists or as US-born Modern-Orthodox Jews. What is considered “tradition,” 
therefore, is socially contingent.  
More than anything, however, this study brings to the fore ways that the politics of 
tradition fuels social and religious changes. The liberal observant Jews I accompanied during my 
fieldwork are committed to doing things differently while insisting that their endeavors represent 
“traditional” Judaism.  
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Let me illustrate. At the Baka Minyan, the reading of the Torah is done while the reader 
faces the congregation (unlike during prayer, when the prayer leader faces the Torah Ark with 
his or her back to the congregation). This did not seem odd to me since my few encounters with 
Torah reading prior to my fieldwork were in Reform congregations in which the Torah readers 
also faced the congregation. Only well into my fieldwork, one member of the Baka Minyan 
mentioned to me casually that in “traditional” Orthodox synagogues the reading of the Torah is 
done, similarly to prayer, while facing the Torah Ark. 
I asked Ronen about this when I interviewed him in April 2016. His elaborate response 
turned out to be extremely valuable. He agreed that their practice went against the common 
practice in contemporary Orthodox synagogues. At the prayer hall of the Baka Minyan, he said, 
the acoustics was “horrible,” and if the ba’al koreh (the person who reads from the Torah) will 
turn his or her back to the congregation, nobody would hear anything. A member of the Minyan 
who was familiar with traditional Italian synagogues told them that the Torah reading was done 
there while facing the congregation. This piece of information, Ronen told me, gave them the 
idea and the legitimacy to turn the direction of the Torah reading.  
To Ronen, this decision had another layer of meaning, one that went further back in 
Jewish history. This is what he told me: 
It [the discussion over the direction of reading] was an opportunity to go back to the 
foundation and to think what was going on here. Reading from the Torah is not a prayer. 
During service, the hazzan stands in the same direction as the kahal (lit. “the crowd.” In 
religious context it refers to the congregants) for a reason. He leads, he prays in front of the 
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Ark. [The tradition of] reading from the Torah originates in the Book of Nehemiah,149 in a 
description of Ezra standing in front of the kahal and teaching them Torah. Therefore, 
reading from the Torah is essentially an act of teaching. It is not a liturgical ritual like a 
prayer. It is an educational-instructional ritual. In this kind of ritual, the teacher never stands 
with his back to his students, he is facing the crowd. Reading from the Torah and the drasha 
(a religious teaching) were two parts of the same action. Therefore, I believe that in the 
ancient world, they used to read [from the Torah] while facing the crowd. The reversal is a 
result of the ritualization of the reading, when the reading had become part of the prayer 
and, thus, the hazzan remained standing in the same direction. To me, it seems like the right 
thing to begin with, it is more appropriate to the act itself. Here [at the Baka Minyan] it was 
done because of technical reasons, because of the acoustics, and we based our decision on 
the Italian custom. It was approved by a majority of 60% [of Minyan members]. There was 
some resistance, but it went through. Some people feel that this is what bothers them the 
most, it looks “reformi” (of Reform Judaism) to them. Some things look “reform” to people, 
fine. I think that people have gotten used to it.150  
The evolution of the direction of Torah reading at the Baka Minyan, as Ronen tells it, 
provides an illuminating illustration of ways that tradition is invoked in processes of ritual 
change. The change in the direction of Torah reading had been perceived by some members as 
non-traditional (“reformi”). To present this change as coinciding with “traditional” Judaism, 
other members invoked the tradition of Italian Jews, which they consider an “authentic” Jewish 
tradition, not a modern modification as in Reform Judaism.  
                                                 
149 The Biblical Book of Nehemiah, together with the Book of Ezra, describe the accounts of the Israelites 
who repatriated to Jerusalem from the Babylonian exile circa the fifth century BCE (Porten 2007).  
150 See Hebrew origin in Appendix B, item 17. 
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To Ronen, however, this change “made sense to begin with,” regardless of the Italian 
tradition. The Torah reading at the Baka Minyan may look “reform” to people who are familiar 
with Orthodox synagogues but, according to Ronen, it could not be farthest from it. While in 
Reform synagogues, according to him, the Torah reading is inspired by Christian churches, at the 
Baka Minyan it represents (to Ronen) a return to the “origins” of Judaism. This is an example of 
how the dynamic of tradition and innovation plays out on the ground in processes of religious 
change. Members of the Baka Minyan understand a “non-traditional” practice as a return to 
“original” Judaism and, thus, including it in their communal repertoire constitutes their 
congregation as “traditional.” This dynamic is also evident in the Hakhel ceremony I depict in 
chapter five. The re-enactment of a Biblical ceremony that Minyan members perceive as 
demonstrating “original” Judaism’s egalitarian approach validates the Minyan’s innovations in 
the area of gender equality as “traditional,” at least in the eyes of its members.  
This salience of a discourse about what “tradition” entails, which I observed in my field 
sites, is not coincidental. In today’s Israel, discussions about Jewish “tradition” occupy a central 
place in the social and political spheres. It is evident in the increasing concern among secular 
Jewish Israelis that Israel is undergoing a process of hadata (religionization), particularly in the 
public education system and in the military (Leon 2012; Peled and Herman Peled 2019). It is 
also evident in periodic reports about Israeli celebrities who become ba’alei teshuva (Jews who 
adopt a Jewish-Orthodox lifestyle and worldview) and in the recent scandal about a Knesset 
member of The Jewish Home party saying that he supports the transformation of Israel into a 
state governed by Biblical law (Sharon 2019). These examples demonstrate that “traditional” 
Judaism is predominantly represented in public discourse as synonymous with Orthodox 
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conservatism and as a threat to secular Israelis. Against this view of “traditional” Judaism, the 
men and women I study turn to Jewish traditions in their efforts to promote liberal reforms.  
The interplay of tradition and innovation is not unique to liberal observant Jews in Israel. 
It formulates itself in diverse ways across different social and religious settings (Clifford 2000; 
Deeb 2006; Fader 2009; Mahmood 2005; Ochs 2007). Nevertheless, by highlighting how this 
relationship plays out on the ground in contemporary Israel, this study allows us to understand 
some of the outcomes of the increasing fragmentation within Religious-Zionist society and 
within Israel’s Jewish society more broadly. It demonstrates that in today’s Israel tradition is a 
valuable social and political currency in struggles between Jewish groups over the nature of 
public Jewish life.  
This study depicts liberal observant Jews’ way of demonstrating social and national 
responsibility to the Jewish collectivity in Israel without compromising their commitments to 
democracy, women’s rights, and religious pluralism. As Religious-Zionist society and Israel in 
general are becoming more polarized and democratic principles are being devalued by state 
institutions, liberal observant Jews envision communities as the place where the Zionist vision of 
a Jewish and democratic state could finally become a reality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
235 
 
EPILOGUE 
KADDISH FOR SAVTA ALIZA 
For the past six years, my mother’s family, six sisters and two brothers, gather on Friday 
morning every January for the annual commemoration of their mother, my grandmother – Savta 
(grandma) Aliza. My mother is the eldest daughter. In my grandparents’ final years, she 
appointed herself as their primary caretaker and spent countless hours accompanying them to 
doctor’s appointments, to governmental offices to take care of their pension funds, and when 
they were no longer able to take care of themselves, she arranged for a stay-at-home caretaker 
from the National Insurance Institute. It has been six year since their passing. Each November 
we commemorate my grandfather’s passing and in January, my grandmother’s. Since my return 
to Israel for my fieldwork, I made the effort to attend these events.  
On a cold Friday morning in January, I joined my parents and my sister to the two hours 
drive to the northern moshav, an agricultural village, not far from the Lebanese border, where my 
grandparents lived since they immigrated from Morocco in 1955. Rain had been pouring down 
since the early hours of the morning. We drove through intervals of heavy rain and warm rays of 
sun that sprouted between the cracks in the grey mass of clouds.  
Before the religious commemoration ceremony in the moshav’s cemetery, the family 
usually gathers at my aunt’s new house, the one she built on my grandparents’ plot, where there 
were once orchards of plums, oranges, and various field crops. My grandfather tried his luck 
with a different crop every couple of years. He was not a successful farmer. The state, however, 
encouraged (sometimes in coercive means) Mizrachi immigrants like my grandfather to settle in 
peripheral agricultural settlements to occupy lands along the young state’s borders. The only 
occupation that was available to my grandfather at that small, rural moshav was agriculture. My 
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grandfather grew more religiously observant as the years passed by. He was the gabbai of the 
local synagogue for several decades. Perhaps his religious life gave him the satisfaction and 
fulfilment he did not get from being a farmer. 
I thought about all this during the drive north. We finally arrived at the Moshav around 
9am and shortly after, additional family members showed up. It was a small gathering this year. 
It was early in the morning, and the weather was not favorable. Two of my cousins stayed at 
home with their young children. Other cousins were either abroad or tied up at work. It was only 
the eight brothers and sisters, my father, my aunt’s husband, my sister and I, and our two young 
female cousins. We drove to the cemetery that is located on the top of a small hill at the outskirts 
of the moshav. On the five-minute drive, my mother expressed concern that there might not be 
enough men for a minyan, which means that we would not be able to recite the mourners’ 
kaddish, the traditional prayer in honor of the deceased.  
It’s the same concern every year. The previous year, we just barely had ten men.  
Although none of my aunts and uncles is very observant (they keep kosher and fast on Yom 
Kippur but that’s about it), Naphtali, the older brother out of the two, insists on having a minyan 
of ten men each year. The brothers and sisters agree to convene early on a Friday morning to 
allow men from the moshav to participate in the commemoration. Friday is a day off for many 
Israelis, a day devoted to running errands and preparing for Shabbat. Because the event is 
scheduled early on a Friday morning, there is a good chance that men from the moshav would 
drop by the cemetery to pay respects to the family by participating in the kaddish before they set 
off to their daily errands.   
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This year, however, there was an especially low turnout of men from the family. We 
needed at least five men from the Moshav to show up and my mother was skeptical. I expressed 
my frustration:  
“Why do these five men from the moshav, who barely knew Savta Aliza, count more 
than you and your sisters, who are her daughters?! In the congregation I study in 
Jerusalem women say mourners’ kaddish and are counted for a minyan.”  
“Yes, but they are Reform,” my mother replied.  
“I told you dozens of times already that I am doing fieldwork with Orthodox 
communities, not Reform ones!” 
“Ah, right. I got confused. So, they are Orthodox, and they count women for a minyan?” 
she asked doubtfully yet with a hint of hope in her voice. 
“Yes! They all wear kipot, and they attended Yeshivot Hesder and Midrashot. They are 
all from dati homes.”  
My mother remained silent. I looked from the rearview mirror at her face. It seemed like 
she was taking in the information. 
We arrived at the cemetery. The rain had stopped but the wind was blowing hard. The 
view from the hill overlooking the moshav was stunning. The Hula valley spread out in front of 
us, checkered with fields in various shades of green and brown. Across the valley, the dark mass 
of the Golan Heights set a majestic backdrop.  
We hurried into the cemetery to start the ceremony before the rain would resume. We 
gathered first under the shed at the cemetery’s entrance, where there are few benches and a small 
table. As my mother suspected, we are five men short of a minyan. Yaakov, my aunt’s husband 
who performs the ceremony every year, put on a kippa he carried especially for this purpose. 
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This signaled to everybody that we were about to begin, and the other men also put on the kippot 
they carried for this occasion. Yaakov began the ceremony by reading verses from Psalms in 
honor of my grandmother’s memory. At the corner of my eye I saw a man from the Moshav 
enter the cemetery and join our small group. Naphtali seemed satisfied. We were still missing 
four men, however. A few minutes later, Yaakov announced, “okay, now it’s time to say kaddish 
by the gravestone. What do we do?” Naphtali hesitated. “We don’t have ten men, so maybe we 
just complete the ceremony here without saying kaddish,” he said finally.  
Suddenly, my mother spoke up: “Ofira is doing her doctorate research on an Orthodox 
congregation and they count women for a minyan!” Naphtali looked at me and said, “well, they 
are in Tel Aviv, aren’t they? everything is possible in Tel Aviv…” “Actually, “I replied, “they 
are in Jerusalem.” Shula, my aunt, added, “Right, and Shimon Peres’ daughter said kaddish over 
his grave when he passed away just recently.” The other sisters joined, “Yes, let’s go to the 
gravestone and say kaddish before it starts raining again.” Naphtali remained silent. 
We walked to my grandparents’ gravestones and surrounded them in a crescent. The rain 
had resumed. Yaakov held the prayer book in front of Naphtali and Danny, the youngest brother, 
so they could recite the words of kaddish. “Yitgadal Veyitkadash Shmei Rabba,” they began to 
read aloud the ancient Aramaic words. “Amen,” we answered. I noticed that my mother 
approached them from behind and peered over Naphtali’s shoulder to get a closer look at the 
text. Naphtali and Danny continued, “Be’Alma Divra Kir’utey…,” and my mother joined them, 
her lips were silently forming the words.  
 
Tel-Aviv, February 2017 
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APPENDIX A 
 
GLOSSARY 
Aliya – (lit. Ascent); pl. Aliyot. In the context of Jewish liturgy: when a congregant is honored 
by being called to stand in front of the Torah scroll and being blessed after the reading of a Torah 
portion. In the context of Israeli immigration policies: immigration under the Jewish Law of 
Return, which entails naturalization rights. 
  
Am Israel – the People of Israel 
 
Arvit – the Jewish evening prayer 
 
Ashkenazi – Jews of Jewish-European descent.  
 
Ba’al Koreh – the person who reads from the Torah scroll in a Jewish synagogue. In Orthodox 
Judaism, only men read from the Torah. 
  
Balanit (pl. Balaniyot) – female attendant at a mikveh. 
 
Bimah – the space in front of the Torah Ark in Jewish synagogues. 
  
Birkonim – Blessing Booklets. In family celebrations in Religious-Zionist society, hosts often 
hand out personalized booklets as gifts to their guests. 
  
Birkat Hamzaon – Food Blessing. 
 
Dati (pl. Dati’im) – a religious man. 
 
Datiya (pl. Datiyot) – a religious woman. 
  
Dati-Le’umi (pl. Dati’im-Le’umi’im) – National Religious Jews. Used interchangeably with 
Religious-Zionist. 
 
Dayan (pl. dayyanim) – Rabbinical judge in a rabbinical court.  
 
Dvar Torah – a short commentary about the weekly portion, delivered by the rabbi or by a 
congregation member. 
 
Drasha – a religious teaching. 
 
Eretz Israel – the Land of Israel. Usually refers to the concept of the biblical Land of Israel. 
 
Gabbai (pl. Gabbai’im; f. gabbai’it) - a member of a Jewish congregation who assists in the 
running of synagogue services. 
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Ge’ula – redemption (in Jewish theology). 
 
Hakhnasat orchim – Jewish custom of hospitality. 
 
Halacha – Jewish religious law. 
 
Haredi (pl. Haredim) – ultra-Orthodox Jews. 
 
Haredi Le’umi (pl. Haredim Le’umi’im) – National ultra-Orthodox Jews (also known by the 
acronym, Hardal). 
 
Haskala – lit. Education. The Jewish Enlightenment movement in 19th century Europe.   
HaTziyonut Hadatit- Religious-Zionist society in Israel. 
 
Havdalah – a ceremony at the end of each Shabbat or Holiday that distinguishes between sacred 
and profane times. 
 
Hazal – Hebrew acronym for Ḥakhameinu Zikhram Liv'rakha (Our Sages, of Blessed Memory). 
Refers to the rabbis whose teachings are recorded in the Talmud.  
 
Hazan (f. Hazanit) – In Jewish communal prayer, a prayer leader. 
 
Hevra Datit – Jewish religious society in Israel. 
 
Hiloni (f. Hilonit; pl. Hilonim) – Secular Israeli Jews. 
 
Hol – profane, secular. 
 
Issur Negi’a – Religious prohibition on physical contact between unrelated men and women. 
  
Kabbalat (pl. Kabbalot) Shabbat – the ceremony of receiving the Shabbat on Friday night. 
 
Kahal – audience, crowd. In the context of a religious congregation, it refers to the congregants.  
 
Kashrut- Judaism’s dietary laws. 
  
Kehila – community or congregation. 
 
Kibbutz (pl. kibbutzim) – communal agricultural settlements in Israel. 
 
Kibbutznik – a person who either lives in a kibbutz or who grew up in one. 
 
Kiddush – blessing over the wine in Jewish ritual. In many Jewish congregations, Kiddush is 
held after Shabbat service and is accompanied by refreshments or a light meal. 
 
Kippah (pl. kippot) – skullcap; yarmulke. Traditional head cover for Jewish men. 
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Kodesh – belongs to a sanctified realm. 
 
Limmud – study; in religious context, limmud refers to a group study of religious texts. 
 
Mamlaktiyut – statism (Mamlakhti – statist). A Zionist ideology (in secular and religious 
Zionism) that emphasizes the centrality of the Israeli state and the commitment of Israeli Jews’ 
to it.  
 
Mehitza – (in synagogues) partition. 
 
Midrasha (pl. Midrashoth) – post-secondary religious school for women.  
 
Mikveh (pl. mikva’ot) – Jewish ritual baths in which some purifications rituals are performed. 
 
Mincha – the Jewish afternoon prayer. 
 
Minyan – Minyan is the quorum required for the communal reciting of Jewish prayers. In Jewish 
Orthodox tradition, a minyan must consist of at least ten adult Jewish men. 
 
Mitzvah (pl. Mitzvot) – a religious commandment; a good deed derived from a religious 
obligation. 
 
Musaf – an additional prayer recited on Shabbat and Jewish holidays. 
  
Niddah – Jewish laws of female purification, centered of menstruation. 
 
Piyut (pl. Piyutim) – Jewish religious songs. 
 
Pesika – halakhic ruling. 
 
Shacharit – the Jewish morning prayer. 
 
Siddur (pl. Siddurim) – Jewish prayer book. 
 
Simchat Torah – the eight day of the holiday of Sukkot in which Jewish congregations celebrate 
the ending of a year-long cycle of reading the Torah and the beginning of a new cycle.  
 
Shivyoni – egalitarian.  
 
Ulam tefillah – prayer hall. 
 
Ulam hitamlut – gym hall. 
 
Tallit (pl. Tallitot) – a prayer shawl. 
  
Tefillah – prayer. 
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Tikkun (pl. Tikkunim) – a tradition of learning Jewish texts on the night of Shavu’ot. 
 
Tzedakah – charity. 
 
Tzitzit – a fringed, four-cornered under-garment worn by Jewish Orthodox men. 
 
Yeshiva – a school for Jewish religious studies. In traditional Orthodox Judaism, Yeshiva is 
restricted to men. 
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מתרחש תהליך של חידוש והרחבת המסגרות ההלכתיות. יש צורך בחשיבה חדשה ומחודשת במקורות ההלכה 
 שמאפשרים להתמודד עם אתגרי הדור הזה. להרחיב מצד אחד ולא לפרוץ את גבולות ההלכה מצד שני. 
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אז ומעולם היו מחלוקות בתוך היהדות. כן, יהדות פתוחה, חושבת, אני טוען שככה היא היתה מאז ומעולם. מ
היה מאבק בין זרמים מתונים יותר לזרמים שמרניים יותר. אבל בסופו של דבר המתונים נצחו. המאבק בין 
 בית הלל לבית שמאי בזמן החורבן. זה בדיוק אותו מאבק בין ליברליות לשמרנות.
 
 4102/31/7 ”,nomihS“ .3
מצדי שרק חרדים ינהלו את זה …לא מוצא תחתיה בור של שחיתות ובעיות כשאתה מגיע לשירותי הדת אין אבן שאתה
יש כל מני הכשרות, יש הכשר חרדי אבל הוא ישר. אנשים ישרים  צות הבריתאבל שיהיה מנוהל כמו שצריך. באר
בארץ אין לך ברירה, אלף חרדים נאבקים על שלוש משרות. זה מביא .. פחות או יותר, כי באמת יש ברירות.
וטיזם... בגדול, הייתי רוצה שיהיה שירות, יחס. אני מאמין שאפשר לעשות את זה על ידי תחרותיות שתעשה רק לנפ
 טוב למערכת.
 
 4102/31/7 ”,nomihS“ .4
בארה"ב זו מדינה דתית, הם אנשים נורא  …צוחק)( כאדם דתי אני חושב שהוא רק יוביל לזה שנהיה יותר דתיים
ף אחד לא כופה אותך. אני חושב שאם פה תהיה בחירה לאנשים, הם יוכלו לבחור לאן אדוקים, למה? כי הכל חופשי, א
הם רוצים להשתייך, מה הם רוצים לבחור, בסופו של דבר זה רק יעשה לנו טוב, לנו אני מתכוון לאורתודוקסיה. 
ה לנו טוב. תהיה היום בישראל רוצים יהדות, מתחברים, יש חזרה לזה. זה רק יעש ך הכלאנשים יירצו את זה, בס
 .מדינה של יהדות בריאה
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 6102/6/7 ,seton dleiF .5
 
הדתיים האורתודוקסים הליברלים פה, שרבים מהם עלו לישראל מארה"ב, חרדים לשלמות הרשתות החברתיות שלהם 
ם עלו לישראל מתוך חזון ציוני ודתי לקייהם מודרני שם ופה. למעשה, -שם, ולקשרים שלהם עם העולם האורתודוקסי
פה יהדות אורתודוקסית מתונה. הרבנות הראשית היתה אמורה לתמוך בהם, לסייע להם לעשות זאת. אולם משהו 
 .השתבש. הרבנות מתנכלת להם ולשכמותם ולא מאפשרת להם לחיות בישראל לפי אמונתם
 
 6102 yaM ”,sirI“ .6
איתנו ברבנות? הרבנות לא מדברת עם  אם נבעט את עצמנו מחוץ לאורתודוקסיה, לא יהיה לנו עם מי לדבר. מי ידבר
ארגונים רפורמים. לכן אנחנו צריכים לשמור על עצמנו בתוך האורתודוקסיה. אולי בקצה הליברלי, אבל עדיין בתוך 
מצד שני אתה רוצה  .זה איזון... מצד אחד אתה רוצה לשפר אז מתבססים על תפיסות ליברליות. דוקסיההאורתו
 צריך כל הזמן לאזן. להישאר באורתודוקסיה. אז 
 
 7102/32/6 ”,analI“ .7
קודם כל זה היה מעבר מיישוב לעיר. מעבר דרמטי. בהקשר של דתיות ליברלית, זה מעבר לחוויה שיש הרבה אנשים 
ה חדשה, סוד שיח, ראלא גם שי בקעהכמוך. אני נחה. אני כבר לא הסמן השמאלי, שמאתגר את המערכת. זה לא רק ב
 ה"מייל הפלורליסטי."ציון. כל המנעד של 
 
 7102/21/6 ,imA-lE ekiahS .8
כיכר העיר זה המקום שבו נפגשים, מרחב ציבורי ששייך לכולם, כיכר העיר היא המקום שבו...כמו פעם, פעם היה 
בירושלים יש כמה כיכרות, יש כיכר ספרא, כיכר החתולות, ויש מתחם התחנה. זה המקום שבו, זה  .כיכר עיר אחת
 נו. זה המקום שבו אני רוצה לעשות משהו משמעותי גדול, שהעיר תשמע, זה שם.כיכר הבית של
 
 
 
 752
 
 7102/21/6 ,imA-lE ekiahS .9
 
קהילה זה ערך. שנים היינו עם של קהילות. הגענו לארץ, בן גוריון אמר ממלכתיות. חשבנו שהממלכה או 
ינה יכולה לפתור רק חלק הרשות תפתור לנו את הבעיות, והקהילה הסתגרה בבית הכנסת. ומסתבר שהמד
ות, של אנושיות. אין תחליף ימסוים מהבעיות. אין תחליף לקהילה כמרחב של שייכות, של זהות, של סולדיר
 לקהילה.
 
 6102/13/3 ”,miaH“ .01
 
זה קצת חמקמק. חמקמק מהבחינה שקשה לי לנסח את זה לעצמי ואני לא יודע אם יש לזה הגדרה מוחלטת... זה 
נסטנקטיבית של בנאדם כשהוא נכנס בדלת. בעיניי יש לזה המון השפעה, ומאוד קשה לשנות את זה. בתחושה הפיזית אי
 ?האם בנאדם שנכנס זה נראה לו, מרגיש לו, כמו בית כנסת רגיל או לא רגיל
 
 5102/8/01 ”,arO“ .11
 
, בקהילה, המון אנחנו רוצים שהשיח יהיה הלכתי וכל שינוי שיהיה שפה של לימוד והלכה. מקובצים בבית הכנסת
להבדיל  –אנשים שהם יודעי ספר. במובן מסוים זה חזרה לאתוס של בני עקיבא, המזרחי, קוראים לזה ה"מרד הקדוש" 
המרד הקדוש שאנחנו גדלנו עליו בבני עקיבא אמר שלא על כל דבר הולכים לרב.  ...מהחרדים שכל דבר הולכים לרב
 .והוא יודע לפתוח ספר והוא בודק אלא אנחנו, אדם צריך לקבל אחריות על עצמו
 
 6102/2/3 ”,molahS“ .21
 
 דמעה מוחות, ובוכות בחיים ראשונה פעם לתורה ועולות במניין אנשים של אמהות אצלנו שבאות לפעמים רואה אני
 הולכות היו, לזלזל יכול אתה. מרגש ממש ממש, מרגש ממש דבר זה. איתן ביחד דמעה מוחה ואני, שלהן מהעיניים
 לא אלו, שלהן הקהילה לא זה, להן מתאים לא זה] אבל... [מטר 003 של אויר במרחק שנמצא קונסרבטיבי ןלמניי
 שמתקרא מניין זה כי, מחיצה פה יש כי בנוח ומרגישות לתורה עולות האלו שהנשים לי ברור. שלהן האמונות
 ".אורתודוקסי"
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 5102/8/01 ”,arO“ .31
 
 ישראלי כנסת בית מכל שונה לך נראה לא זה, חזנית כשאישה גם, כנסתה לבית נכנס כשאתה…הרוגע את משם לקחנו
, פומפוזיות בלי, ראשון דבר אז. ..מתפללות נשים כבר שנה אלפיים כאילו לך נראה זה, כנסת לבית נכנס אתה. רגיל
 יותר יכול אול משהו רואה שאתה כמו, עיניים פותח היה פשוט זה בעיניי. רגילה בתפילה לזרום פשוט, גדול RP בלי
 . דבר אותו המציאות את לראות
 
 6102/01/2 ”,narE“ .41
סגנון התפילה ישראלי ולא אמריקאי, שרים פחות, תפילה תכליתית, זה לוקח פחות זמן, לא מצועצע, לא נמתח כמו 
שרוצה  תי בהם בתור ילד ובין בית כנסת שוויוני יותר,למסטיק. זה היה שילוב מושלם, הזוי, בין בתי הכנסת  שהתפל
 .להיות שוויוני. זה היה מן חלום כזה, דבר שתמיד רציתי ואף פעם לא היה
 
 6102/21/6 ,setondleiF .51
" זיכרון בסלון"עורכת. חשבתי שזה דומה ל תמרהיוזמים "תיקון בסלון", כדוגמת התיקון ש 929-ראיתי בפייסבוק ש
סים ציבוריים וציונם במסגרת פרטית, ביתית. האם מחדש של טק-מות הללו מדובר על ניכוסוזבכל היבבית של אביגיל. 
שלהן זה קשור לפרוייקטים כמו של נאמני תורה ועבודה שמדברים על "הפרטת" הרבנות? שתי הפלטפורמות והיעדים 
קורא לזה. אזרחים  אילןניכוס מחדש של היהדות, כפי ש –שונים מאוד אולם בשתיהן עומד בבסיס אותו מכנה משותף 
 חים של הממסד. יסומאליו את הנ-במקום לקבל כמובןבעצמם  היהדות שלהםשמנסחים את 
 
 6102/71/5 ”,nalI“ .61
נכון שצריך ממסד תפעולי אבל לא ממסד שמכריע לאנשים את היהדות שלהם. כרגע הממסד שנותן את זה, המהות שלו 
רוצים שכל מי שרוצה לטבול,  ת נשים טובלות במקווה בגלל הרבנות, זו עובדה. אנחנווחותרת תחת המטרה. כיום פח
 תוכל. לכן, החתירה תחת מונופול הממסד מחזקת את החיים היהודים בישראל בזמן שהממסד חותר תחת קיום החיים
, היהודים בישראל. אני מאמין באמונה שלמה שחיזוק חירויות הפרט שלוב לחלוטין עם הרצון לחיים יהודים שלמים
 מעותיים.מלאים, ונכונים במדינת ישראל ומש
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 6102/91/4 ”,nenoR“ .71
אני חשבתי על זה מכיוון אחר, זה הזדמנות לחזור ליסודות ולחשוב מה קורה כאן. קריאה בתורה היא לא תפילה. 
בתפילה יש טעם שהחזן עומד באותו כיוון כמו הקהל, הוא מוביל, מתפלל אל מול הארון. קריאה בתורה לקוחה מתיאור 
ול הקהל ומלמד אותם תורה כלומר, קריאה בתורה מיסודה היא אקט של הוראה. היא בספר נחמיה על עזרא שעומד מ
פעם לא עומד עם הגב לכיתה, -לימודי המורה אף-לימודי. בטקס חינוכי-לא טקס ליטורגי כמו תפילה, היא טקס חינוכי
ן אני סבור שבעת בעצם. לכ ,הוא עומד עם הפנים לקהל. הקריאה בתורה והדרשה היו שני חלקים של אותה פעולה
העתיקה קראו בתורה עם הפנים לקהל. וההיפוך הוא חלק מהריטואליזציה של הקריאה בתורה שהפכה להיות חלק 
מהתפילה ולכן החזן עומד באותו כיוון. לי זה בוודאי נראה הדבר הנכון יותר מלכתחילה, מתאים יותר לאופי הפעולה. 
יה מבוסס בין השאר על זה שיש מנהג איטליה, וזה הועבר בהחלטת זה נעשה בגלל עניין טכני, האקוסטיקה, זה ה
. היתה התנגדות לזה אבל זה עבר ומאז זה התקבל. יש אנשים שמרגישים שזה הדבר %06קהילה בהצבעה של 
אבל בסדר, אני חושב , "רפורמים"שמפריע להם יותר מהכל, זה נראה להם "רפורמי", יש דברים שנראים לאנשים 
 גלים גם לזה. שאנשים מתר
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APPENDIX C 
TIKKUNIM MAP (2016): “SHAVUOT NIGHT IN JERUSALEM” 
 
 
Copyrights: Rashut HaRabim and Dov Abramson Art & Design Studio (reprinted with permission). 
(source: https://rashut-harabim.org/shavuot/, accessed 5/1/2017) 
 
